The Eudemian Ethics on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck

THE SIXTH S.V. KEELING COLLOQUIUM IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY
FIONA LEIGH

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The Stanley Victor Keeling Colloquia on Ancient Philosophy are presently held every two years in honour of S.V. Keeling. Keeling was born in 1894, and after receiving a BA from Cambridge University (Trinity), an MA from University College London, and a D-ès-L from the universities of Toulouse and Montpellier, was Lecturer and Reader in the Department of Philosophy at UCL. He was also awarded the D. Litt. of the University of London in 1939. After a period covering WWII during which he was Head of Department, Keeling retired in 1954 and moved with his wife to Paris where he remained until his death in 1979. Keeling himself did not work in the field of ancient philosophy: his intellectual efforts were for the most part focused instead on Descartes and McTaggart. His principle published works were an annotated edition of McTaggart’s work, *Philosophical Studies* (Edward Arnold, London: 1934), a monograph, *Descartes* (Ernest Benn, London: 1934; 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1968), and in 1948 he gave the annual British Academy Master Mind lecture on Descartes (*Proceedings of the British Academy* 34 (1948), 57–80). All the same, Keeling believed strongly in the importance of ancient philosophy, especially Greek philosophy. This is in part because he believed it to be an essential element of the philosophical curriculum, but also stemmed from a simple and enduring affection for the writings of Greek philosophers themselves: it is said that in retirement he and his wife often read Greek philosophy to one another in the evening after dinner. Keeling’s wish to foster and promote ancient philosophy at University College London, for the benefit of students in particular, was observed by a former student of UCL Philosophy and friend of Keeling’s, who, as an anonymous donor, generously founded the annual S.V. Keeling Memorial Lecture in Ancient Philosophy, the Biennial S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, and the S.V. Keeling Postgraduate Scholarship in Ancient Philosophy, all administered by the Department of Philosophy at UCL. A list of the colloquia to date can be found at the end of this preface.

The papers in this volume by David Charles, Christopher Rowe, M.M. McCabe, Jennifer Whiting, and Friedemann Buddensiek were presented at the 6th S.V. Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy in November 2006 at University College London. The colloquium was organized and run by Robert Heinaman (the editorial responsibilities however falling to
me after Bob’s retirement, and my appointment to the department). The respondents to the papers presented included Sarah Broadie (St. Andrews), Julia Annas (Arizona), M.M. McCabe (KCL), and Jennifer Whiting (Toronto).

I am grateful to a number of people for helping me get this volume together, almost six years after the Colloquium took place, including Bob Heinaman, Christopher Rowe, Sarah Broadie, and Jennifer Whiting. I am also indebted to M.M. McCabe, Verity Harte, and Nina Pasqua for their help, support, and advice. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to Brad Inwood, who, being far more knowledgeable than I am about the *Eudemian Ethics*, very kindly agreed to assist me in writing the introduction. Thanks are due to Margaret Hampson and Chrissy Meijns for their work on the indices. Finally, a special note of thanks is due to Caroline van Erp at Brill for her almost limitless patience and invaluable advice and assistance.

FVL
February 2012

Previous Keeling Colloquia, and their publication details are as follows:

1st S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Aristotle and Moral Realism (1994)
Organised by Robert Heinaman
Papers by Bernard Williams (Berkeley), Pierre Aubenque (Paris IV), Jonathan Lear (Chicago), Sabina Lovibond (Oxford), David Charles (Oxford), and John McDowell (Pittsburgh).


Organised by Robert Sharples
Papers by William Charlton (Hexham, Northumberland), Helen S. Lang (Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut), Enrico Berti (Padua), Ahmed Hasnawi (Paris), Jonathan Barnes (Geneva), and Monique Dixsaut (Paris).


3rd S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Descartes and Ancient Philosophy (1999)
Organised by Gerard O’Daly and Martin Stone
Papers by Gail Fine (Cornell University), Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin Madison), Daniel Garber (University of Chicago), J-M. Beyssade (University of Paris-Sorbonne), Stephen Menn (McGill University), and John Cottingham (Reading University).
4th S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Plato and Aristotle's Ethics (2001)
Organised by Bob Heinaman.
Papers by Christopher Taylor (Oxford), Terry Irwin (Cornell), Anthony Price (Birkbeck), Roger Crisp (Oxford), John Cooper (Princeton), and Richard Kraut (Northwestern).


5th S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Philosophy and the Sciences in Antiquity (2003)
Organised by Bob Sharples.
Papers by André Laks (Université de Lille-Charles de Gaulle III), Dominic O'Meara (University of Fribourg), Jim Hankinson (University of Texas at Austin), Jim Lennox (University of Pittsburgh), Philip van der Eijk (University of Newcastle), and Geoffrey Lloyd (University of Cambridge).


7th S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Particulars in Greek Philosophy (2007)
Organised by Bob Sharples.
Papers by Robert Wardy (Cambridge), Carlo Natali (Venice), Verity Harte (Yale), Christopher Gill (Exeter), and Marwan Rashed (Paris).


8th S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy (2009)
Organised by Bob Sharples and Fiona Leigh.
Papers by M.M. McCabe (King's College London), Aryeh Kosman (Haverford), Melissa Lane (Princeton), Tad Brennan (Cornell), Jean-Baptiste Gourinat (Paris), and Gwenaëlle Aubry (Paris).

*Self-Knowledge in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Fiona Leigh (Yet to be published)

9th S.V. Keeling Colloquium, Moral Psychology in Ancient Thought (2011)
Organised by Fiona Leigh.
Papers by Jessica Moss (Oxford), Matthew Evans (Michigan), Rachel Barney (Toronto), James Warren (Cambridge), Raphael Woolf (King's College London), and Daniel Russell (Arizona).

*Moral Psychology in Ancient Thought*, ed. Fiona Leigh (Yet to be published)
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INTRODUCTION

Brad Inwood and Fiona Leigh

The three Aristotelian treatises on ethics that come to us from antiquity are the *Eudemian Ethics (EE)*, the *Nicomachean Ethics (NE)* and the *Magna Moralia (MM)*. It is now generally agreed that the *MM* is not a genuine work by Aristotle himself, while the other two are. A reliable and accessible characterization of the three treatises is given by Chris Bobonich in ‘Aristotle’s Ethical Treatises’,¹ and more recently by Anthony Kenny in the introduction to his translation of the *EE* in the series Oxford World’s Classics.² The *MM* provides a version of Aristotle’s ethical theory which follows the *EE* more closely, though there are a number of features drawn from the *NE* as well and it frequently presents a version of Aristotle’s theory different from that in the *EE* or the *NE*, apparently because the author misunderstands or changes Aristotle’s doctrine.

By the end of the middle ages the manuscript tradition of the *EE* had become sparse and quite corrupt, at least as compared with that of the *NE*. This makes work on the *EE* more difficult; a further, critically important complication comes from the fact that three books of the *EE* (IV–VI) are identical with three in the *NE* (V–VII); these books are, therefore, frequently labelled the ‘common books’. Moreover, in quite a few manuscripts, these three books of the *EE* are not copied out, but omitted and replaced with an indication that they are the same as books 5–7 of the *NE*. This happens in cases where the same manuscript included the *NE* before the *EE*, clearly a labour-saving expedient. The fact that a large portion of the medieval tradition of the *EE* included the so-called common books was not known until Harlfinger published his study of the manuscript tradition of the *EE*.³ It is clear that the transmission of the *NE* eventually became dominant and the quality of the text of the *EE* as transmitted in medieval manuscripts

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¹ Chapter 1 in Richard Kraut (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*.
suffered markedly as a result. To some extent the EE tradition became secondary and may have become dependent on that of the NE. Nevertheless, Harlfinger notes that we cannot draw conclusions about the original ‘home’ of the common books from this evidence (Harlfinger 1971, 45). Based on the evidence of the manuscript tradition, we may conclude that the EE and the NE have both come down to us with the common books as integral parts of the whole of each work respectively.

Over the centuries there has been a great deal of debate over what to make of this situation. The dominance of the NE in philosophical and historical study since the middle ages was nearly absolute, and in the nineteenth century the EE was generally regarded as spurious. The poor condition of the text of the EE and the widespread belief (justifiable until Harlfinger published his study in 1971) that the common books were transmitted only in the NE contributed to a nearly universal tendency to treat the EE as of secondary importance, even when its authenticity was again accepted in the twentieth century. In the heyday of developmental approaches to Aristotle sparked by the work of Jaeger, it was widely held that the EE was an early but inferior work, and that the NE represented a decisively improved second version. As Rowe (1971) illustrates, there was a bewildering array of views about the place and significance of the common books (and indeed, about parts of them), about the proper way to understand the apparently fragmentary chapters which constitute EE 8, and about the arc of development in Aristotle’s ethical philosophy over his career.5

That situation changed in 1978 with Kenny’s monograph, The Aristotelian Ethics, which demonstrated (chapter 1) that in antiquity, until the time of Aspasius, the EE was treated as the standard version of Aristotle’s ethical theory, though the NE was also known.6 Furthermore, he argues persuasively that it was only after Aspasius and as a result of his decision to use the common books to supplement the defective NE that the ten-book NE that we know emerged and became standard (36). It is certain that our ten-book NE was the standard work on ethics in late antiquity, in the middle ages and of course in the modern period. Kenny set out to establish on sound, non-question-begging grounds where the common books originally belonged, and for which of the two ethical treatises they were originally

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5 Christopher J. Rowe, The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle’s Thought.
6 Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics.
composed. Harlfinger’s study of the manuscripts had removed the heavy presumption in favour of the *NE* as the original home for the common books, and Kenny brilliantly deployed the methods of computational stylometric analysis (chapters 4–6) alongside more traditional studies of internal cross references (chapter 2) and distinctive vocabulary (chapter 3) to demonstrate that ‘the common books, ... just as they now stand, belonged originally to the *Eudemian Ethics*‘ (160).

Kenny’s conclusions on this issue have not been seriously questioned, though the sweeping ‘just as they now stand’ has been doubted in a few cases where some adjustment to the Nicomachean context has seemed plausible on philosophical grounds; for example Lorenz argues that *NE* VI’s conception of virtue of character is an improvement on the *EE* version, from which it would follow that some revision must have been made to the original version of this material in *EE* V.⁷ Kenny’s further arguments about the philosophical superiority of the *EE* (chapters 7–8) and the relative dates of the two *Ethics* (chapter 9) have not met with such general agreement, and it must be admitted that despite the compelling case that the common books have their origin in the *EE* it does not follow that Aristotle himself could not have redeployed them in the *NE*, if the *NE* is a later work, although this supposition would complicate the account of how the *NE* was preserved in the time before Aspasius. Kenny’s arguments for thinking that the *EE* is later would, of course, rule this out, but there is general agreement that this is a considerably less persuasive part of his case.

The relative dates of the *EE* and *NE* cannot be settled on content-neutral grounds. However, if we accept the demonstration that the common books were first composed for the *EE* and also come to the view that some feature of the common books appears to have been adapted for the *NE* in such a way that it could not have appeared as we have it in the *EE*, then this would entail a later date for the *NE*. But this would not on its own establish the philosophical superiority of the *NE* or justify a subordination of the *EE* to it. Philosophical superiority is a contestable, revisable issue and there is still a great deal of room for debate about the dating of most of Aristotle’s works. References to it elsewhere in the corpus and allusions to historical events do suggest very strongly, though, that the *EE* was not a very early, immature work. Jaeger’s theory that it like some other works was composed by Aristotle when he was wholly under the influence of Plato’s views can, at

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⁷ Hendrik Lorenz ‘Virtue of Character in Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*‘, at 211.
this point, be ruled out. The field is open, then, for treating the complete, eight-book *EE* on its own terms and pursuing the philosophical issues it raises on their own terms. Some of the aspects of Aristotle’s ethics that may benefit from such reassessments include:

- Happiness and the relative importance in it of theoretical and practical wisdom.
- The nature of friendship.
- The nature of the voluntary.
- The role of chance and the external goods in a good life.
- The nature of pleasure and its role in a good life.
- *Phronēsis*, *prohairesis* and deliberation.
- The virtues of character.

Another important feature of current work on the *EE* is the state of its text. Despite the availability of the Oxford Classical Text (Walzer / Mingay) and the studies by Harlfinger of the textual tradition of the work, there is still a great deal to be done. The OCT contains more emendations than many critical readers think necessary, yet reversion to Susemihl’s text is clearly not wise either. Especially in books 7 and 8 anyone working seriously on the philosophical content has to be prepared to think critically about the text. As Harlfinger noted, speculative emendations are often needed:

> Mag auch die recensio in manch einem Punkt den bislang vorliegenden Text der *EE* verbessern helfen, die Hauptarbeit bei der constitutio textus dieser so korrupten Schrift obliegt letzten Endes doch der divinatio.

But at the same time careful analysis of the argument often shows that manuscript readings make more sense than editors have thought. The common books are, of course, in relatively good condition: they have benefited from the more intense editorial care and generous manuscript tradition of the *NE*—though this does not necessarily mean that the text of the common books and the *NE* is closer to the original. *EE* 1–3 are less problematic than 7 and 8. The complexity of the argument in *EE* 7 has led to a great deal of corruption, and *EE* 8 has long been recognized as being a set of ‘fragments’ rather than a single connected discussion. Chapter 1 addresses the relationship of virtue and knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the role of luck in human happiness. Chapter 3 discusses virtue as a whole, now named *kalokagathia*.  

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9. See J. Barnes ‘An OCT of the *EE*’.
(fine-and-good-ness) in contrast to the particular virtues. Many Aristotelian treatises conclude with a set of miscellaneous problematic themes, so the fact that EE 8 consists of three disconnected essays does not prove that we have lost the original ending of the treatise. But on the other hand it is also possible that the final book of the EE has somehow been damaged or truncated.

The papers in this volume focus variously on the topics of the voluntary, friendship and pleasure. For each of these topics, detailed discussion in the EE is found in those books that are not in common with the NE. Each of the papers takes the Eudemian Ethics as the central focus of its discussion, drawing on other texts in the service of illuminating arguments or ideas found in the EE. For the most part, the authors have restricted their treatment of these topics to the EE, in an effort to understand and illuminate Aristotle's discussion of them without importing views found elsewhere in the corpus (in particular, the NE). Although David Charles' paper, which compares the analyses of 'the voluntary' (to hekousion) in both the ethics, contains considerable discussion of the NE, it, like the other papers in the volume, remains concerned first and foremost to understand the arguments from the EE it examines in terms of that work alone.

Charles's paper, 'The Eudemian Ethics on the 'voluntary' ' seeks to clarify the nature and philosophical role of Aristotle's discussion of to hekousion (which he refers to as 'the *voluntary*') in the EE, by isolating the distinctive features of that discussion as compared to the treatment found in the NE. In the NE, Charles reads *voluntary* as analysed by Aristotle as what has its starting point (archê) in us, in the sense of being caused by the agent's making a choice. The starting point will be in the agent in this sense even where the choice made is non-preferential, or is not the result of deliberation or of preferring one course of action over another, since children and animals choose but lack reason. The starting point is also in the agent in this sense even when the agent could not have rationally chosen differently in the circumstances. The application of this conception of the *voluntary*, which Charles notes is closer to the English use of 'intentional' than to that of 'voluntary', is extended by Aristotle in NE III from non-coerced, 'wide-eyed' action to coerced action, impassioned action and actions that result in character development.

The treatment of the *voluntary* is quite different in EE II, which is reflected in the different application of the term: in the EE, children and animals do not act, so a fortiori they do not act *voluntarily*, in the EE, central examples of coerced action do not count as *voluntary*, and in the
Aristotle wonders whether actions that do not result from the agent’s natural desire or reason, such as sensual passion, do not rest with the agent. Indeed, by contrast with the use of *to hekousion* in the *NE*, in the *EE*, the use is comparable to the English use of ‘voluntary’. Charles shows that Aristotle analyses the *voluntary*, or cases of the agent acting ‘through herself’ in the *EE* as action based on reasoning which is motivated by the agent’s nature, or desires and impulses, as opposed to an external source, and where the agent knows what she is doing. In the *EE*, but not the *NE*, the underlying idea of the *voluntary* is an action performed in line with the agent’s nature and which she could bear not to perform, so that the action is ‘up to her’, whereas in the *NE* the corresponding underlying notion is that of the starting point located with the agent: choice.

Charles draws out the significance of the differences between, and the gaps remaining in, the respective analyses of the *voluntary* in both ethical works viewed apart from the common books. One difference concerns the under-specification of what the knowledge condition on acting *voluntarily* in the *EE* amounts to. *Involuntary* actions are for Aristotle in the *EE* those characterised by ignorance, except in the case of what the agent is ignorant of accidentally, which, Charles suggests, is probably meant to exclude ignorance that results from passion, such as sensual desire or anger. This in turn suggests that action done in ignorance brought on by these passions is *voluntary*. The negligent person who knows but does not use her knowledge is in a way ignorant and in a way not, but Aristotle does not say whether she acts *voluntarily* or not when acting on this basis, and nor does he give a full discussion of whether the ignorant person is to be blamed for her action, or just her ignorance. However, in respect of the question of act individuation, the *EE* offers a more full account than that found in the *NE*. Aristotle claims that it is impossible to perform the one act *voluntarily* and *involuntarily* at the same time and with respect to the same feature of the act. Charles points out that this implies that it is possible to perform the one act *voluntarily* and *involuntarily* in respect to different features of the act, though the suggestion is admittedly not developed by Aristotle. If it were developed, however, it could provide a means of individuating acts and thereby determining responsibility for them: Oedipus *voluntarily* beats a stranger at the same time as *involuntarily* beating his father. On the account of the *voluntary* in the *NE*, one can act as a result of unbearable pain or coercion and act *voluntarily*, while the same actions count as *involuntary* on the *EE* account since the agent is not the controller of the action in the relevant respects. So another, perhaps more radical difference between the two treatises is that in the *NE*, but not the...
Aristotle regards an agent who has only partial control over her action, stemming from a choice, but not necessarily arising directly from her nature (in the EE sense), as morally responsible.

In several respects, Charles argues, the NE account is superior. One is that the NE account is more unified, since it isolates one general type of cause for action—choice—while the EE strikingly does not use the verb for choosing, and accords choice no significant role in the account of the *voluntary*. Another is that the EE account confines itself to character-revealing actions, while the NE account is more inclusive and thereby incorporates into the class of *voluntary* actions those actions agents are deemed responsible for in the forensic context. Charles claims that the shift is of considerable import, since in the NE Aristotle has come to the view that on many occasions people are limited yet sufficient controllers of their actions to be judged virtuous or vicious.

Christopher Rowe’s paper, ‘Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics on loving people and things’, gives an account of philia in the Eudemian ethics that is largely independent of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rowe points out that, as Anthony Price observed, Aristotle’s focus in his discussion of philia in EE VII.2 is the basis upon which some thing (not some person) is loved: it’s being either good, useful or pleasant. That love can equally be of things as of persons suggests that it is mistaken to think, with Gregory Vlastos, that when Aristotle claims that the friend is loved ‘for himself’ he has in mind a Kantian notion of treating the friend as an end in himself, and so an altruistic conception of love.

Rowe distinguishes between a ‘wide’ and a ‘narrow’ interpretation of loving a friend ‘for the other’s own sake’, a distinction he attributes to Sarah Broadie’s reading of the NE. Understood on the narrow interpretation, a person loves his friend ‘for himself’, and not for incidental facts about the friend, such as his being useful or pleasant. Since being excellent or good is not an incidental fact about someone, this person’s friend loves him qua good or excellent for himself. Understood on the ‘wide’ interpretation, a person loves his friend and wishes goods for him ‘for his own sake’ in order that the friend serve some purpose of the agent’s own. Moreover, this kind of well-wishing is a condition of the three kinds of friendship Aristotle distinguishes: ‘useful’ friendship, ‘pleasure’ friendship, and ‘ethical’ friendship.

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12 Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Individual as Object of Love in Plato’.
Rowe, somewhat controversially, also goes on to locate the wide interpretation on friendship in the EE, as well as (non-controversially) the narrow interpretation. The wide interpretation is located by way of a new reading of 1241a1–14 (EE VII.7). The upshot of this reading is that a person necessarily wishes his friend well in ethical friendship because that kind of friendship is in an important sense other-regarding, but he will also wish his friend well in the other two kinds of friendship because they have been, or are, useful or pleasant. Loving, on the wide interpretation in the EE, then, is loving in a manner responsive to the nature of the friendship, that is, as a response to the fact that the friend either serves or has served some purpose of the agent’s own, or to the pleasurable experience of the friend, or to the inherent goodness of the excellent friend. This is not to say that a person will necessarily wish for goods for the object of love because it is useful or pleasant. Instead, she will feel goodwill only where her and the object of love are both friends, i.e. only where the friendship is human friendship: if the object of philia is a useful or pleasant thing one will not feel this goodwill towards it. (Rowe therefore disagrees with Cooper’s view that the EE, unlike the NE, fails to give an adequate and consistent account of the role of wishing well, or goodwill, in friendship, along with the inference that this is a sign of the maturity of the NE in comparison with the EE.) Goodwill is not, however, the same thing as friendship for Aristotle, since it is just wishing, whereas friendship involves the friend acting on what she wishes.

In turning to the larger question of what it is about the friend’s excellence, in ethical friendships, that makes a person love, Rowe reads Aristotle as arguing in EE VII.2 that since the friend’s excellence is haplôs good, it is as good for the person who loves his friend as his own excellence is. In VII.2 Aristotle reasons that it is good, and so the friend is good for the person who loves, because the friend’s goodness is pleasant, haplôs, as well as pleasant for the friend. In EE VII.12, however, the criterion of pleasure is not referred to explicitly, and excellent friendships are instead characterised as desirable because of the self-perception they facilitate (on this topic see also McCabe’s and Whiting’s papers in this volume). Nonetheless, they remain pleasant, according to Aristotle, since the joint activities of friendship are pleasant, and the pleasure of friendship adds to or enhances what is most desirable in friendship and constitutes it. So even in the case of ethical friendships where the love felt is in an important sense other-regarding,

since the excellence of the friend is experienced as good and pleasant haplōs by the one who loves, and as such is desirable, Rowe concludes that Aristotle's conception of friendship remains essentially self-regarding and, contra Vlastos, leaves little room for altruism.

Mary Margaret McCabe's paper, entitled ‘With mirrors or without? Self-perception in Eudemian Ethics VII.12’, argues that Aristotle's conception of self-perception in the context of friendship in this chapter is markedly different from that found in both the Magna Moralia and the Nicomachean Ethics IX.9. McCabe reads EE VII.12 as presenting two puzzles or aporiai concerning the sense in which the self-sufficient person has need of friends. In the first version of the puzzle, either the self-sufficient man, who is likened to God, has no need or desire to live with friends, or else the self-sufficient man does have friendships, but only those based on virtue, since, being supremely good, he gets it right about who to be friends with, and who to live with. In the second version of the puzzle, the first limb or disjunct is similar to that of the first version: the self-sufficient man has nothing left to learn from his friend, although the direct comparison to God is absent. The second limb of the second puzzle, however, is significantly different to that of the first: the self-sufficient person is no longer good in absolute terms, but as good as possible, and enjoys different pleasures (e.g. artistic, philosophical, bodily) that can only be enjoyed as a result of the friends being together. So on the second version of the puzzle, either the self-sufficient man has nothing to learn, and so has no need of friends, or else, being as good as possible, he takes certain pleasures in particular pursuits and activities when he is together with his friend. Doing things together is involved in self-fulfilment, McCabe suggests, precisely because even the best human is still human, and not after all divine.

In response to the first puzzle, Aristotle makes a teleological claim: we naturally desire to perceive ourselves as perceivers, and to know ourselves as knowers. The puzzle about the self-sufficient man does not arise, therefore, solely by comparison to God, but also from considerations of human nature. In response to the second puzzle, Aristotle makes the well known claim that the friend is another self (another Heracles), a separated self. Pleasures enjoyed together are explained by the agent perceiving his friend's state qua perceiver or knower—a state of doing well—and since the friend is another self (in a sense to be explained below), this is a case of self-perception. Perceiving a friend's doing well, in actualising his capacity to perceive and know, is thus the source of the pleasure of friendship. As McCabe reads EE VII.12, Aristotle shows sensitivity to the misleading potential of the comparison with God, a sensitivity which recalls and exploits
the failure of Aristophanes’ lover in Plato’s Symposium to be self-sufficient, lacking his nature’s other, separated half. Indeed, since we humans are not divine, an effort is needed to perceive ourselves at the level of actuality. And since, not being divine, we are not in fact quite self-sufficient, we ‘actualise together’ as a part of the best way of living, and so it takes a friend to complete us. Being all too human, living in this way together with a friend is an intrinsic component of the good life, and not of mere instrumental value.

Moreover, McCabe argues that Aristotle understood self-perception in the EE in such a way that it cannot be achieved by the agent on his own. This is because, first, self-perception has active and passive elements, and second, the agent’s mortal nature is incomplete, so that he cannot at the same time be both perceiver and what is perceived, or contain both elements within him. Hence, perceiving oneself is an activity that must be done in concert with a friend. McCabe explains this radical idea by way of a notion of self-perception according to which it is a complex, rich, high-level reflective activity. It is not, as in the Magna Moralia, the agent’s seeing himself in the friend’s eyes, exactly as in a mirror; it is not a case of the agent viewing himself as simply the object of his own perception; nor is it, as per one common reading of NE IX.9, a case of the agent seeing his friend seeing, and, seeing that the friend is in the same condition as himself, or is his analogue, the agent sees himself seeing through the friend’s seeing. Nor, finally, is it a case of mere self-consciousness, since the self-perception Aristotle describes is a difficult state to attain, and one that requires effort. Rather, it is a case of reflective second-order perception that is a joint or shared activity. On her reading of EE VII.12, the self involved in this reflective self-perception is for Aristotle a composite of the agent and the friend, which suggestion McCabe fills out with examples of listening to music, playing sport, and learning with one’s friend.

Jennifer Whiting’s paper, ‘The pleasure of thinking together: Prolegomenon to a complete reading of EE VII.12’, stands out from the others in several respects, one of which is in not straightforwardly being a record of the paper given at the 6th Keeling Colloquium in 2005, but rather constituting a substantial development of it. Her piece is in the main a translation and commentary on EE VII.12, which on several occasions adduces plausible and novel considerations in favour of retaining manuscript versions of the Greek. And since no single commentary on this enormously difficult, at times corrupt, and yet (as this and McCabe’s paper amply illustrate) important text in the Greek exists, it is a welcome inclusion in the present volume. Whiting starts out by signalling her rejection of McCabe’s reading of EE VII.12 in her paper for this volume (see above), as well as Aryeh Kosman’s
reading of EE VII.12 and NE IX.9, the common element of the two readings being that self-perception is for Aristotle a joint activity between friends. The main point of disagreement with Kosman is that while he takes it that Aristotle thinks that the friend’s perception ought to be understood as in some important sense the agent’s own perception, Whiting takes it that Aristotle’s point is that the friend’s perception is in an important sense a case of the agent perceiving herself. The main disagreement with McCabe, as Whiting sees it, is twofold. One, McCabe’s suggestion that self-perception is a joint activity depends, like Kosman’s view, on understanding the friend’s perception as being in an important sense a case of the agent’s own perception. Two, if, as McCabe suggests, the agent needs her friend to complete her nature, then it is unclear, Whiting argues, in what sense the agent wishes her friend well for the friend’s own sake. At the heart of these disagreements, then, is Whiting’s suggestion that the friend’s perception is in some sense the agent’s perception of herself, and it is this that facilitates self-perception for Aristotle. The role of pleasure is also crucial to Whiting’s reading, a role, she suggests, that has not been sufficiently grasped by other readers of EE: the agent’s pleasure supervenes on the goodness of her friend’s experiences and activities. While this pleasure makes it intelligible that the self-sufficient person has friends, it is not the end of friendship, which is, for the virtuous friends, the goodness of the activities they undertake and experiences they enjoy.

Before outlining and defending her detailed reading of EE VII.12, Whiting argues that passages from Metaphysics XII and Plato’s Philebus constitute the relevant philosophical background for the Eudemian chapter. The dialectical purpose of EE VII.12, that is, is in part agreement with, and in part a critical response to, the Philebus—a response to which Aristotle’s conception of God found in Met. XII, chapters 7 and 9, is relevant. In the Philebus, Socrates argues at 33b that the life of pure contemplation for a human being is not most choiceworthy, since it is missing certain pleasures that, added to the contemplative life, make it more complete. So too Aristotle in EE VII.12. But while Plato in the Philebus has it that God’s life is not characterised by pleasure (31–33), Aristotle in the Metaphysics XII.7 conceives of divine contemplation as being a pleasure, marked off in XII.9 from human contemplation as not requiring an intentional object. Set against this backdrop (although Philebus 21a–d will also prove relevant to Whiting’s reading

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of *EE*), Aristotle's suggestion in *EE* VII.12 that the comparison with God is misleading will be read by Whiting as the suggestion that we ought not overlook the distinctively human pleasure of engaging in our favourite activities with other people distinct from ourselves, even where that favourite activity is theoretical contemplation.

The bulk of Whiting's paper that follows is devoted to a close reading of the Greek of *EE* VII.12, a translation of which is provided over the course of the paper, presented as an argument divided into seven distinct sections. There is not scope in this introduction to preview the substantial and numerous philological considerations that Whiting brings to bear on her novel construal and translation of the Greek, which is at times controversial and will no doubt prove to be of considerable interest to specialists. Accordingly, we will restrict ourselves here to an overview of the reading proposed, following Whiting's useful (but non-standard) section numbers. (1) Unlike McCabe (see above), Whiting discerns only a single version of the *aporia* Aristotle considers in the chapter: why the self-sufficient person, who is comparable to God, should need friends; (2) Aristotle introduces a substantive claim into the argument: to live is to perceive and to know; (3) In the first stage of the argument proper, Aristotle establishes the value of the agent's own perceiving and knowing, i.e. as the subject of perceiving or knowing; (4) In the second stage, he argues for the importance of perceiving and knowing objects that are good, including the agent's perception and knowing of herself, i.e. as the object of perception or knowledge; (5) Aristotle then, in the third stage, considers a possible objection to his argument thus far, to the effect that it is perhaps foolish to value living together, since nothing is added to eating and drinking by doing it together, since idle chit chat is just that, and even where the subject of conversation is good (as in (4) above), the self-sufficient person has no need of learning anything from friends. Two human tendencies are then noted (but not yet explained): all people find undertaking 'higher' activities more pleasant than undertaking 'lower' ones, and all people find it more pleasant to partake of good activities with friends than alone; (6) As Whiting reads it, the argument then culminates in an explanation of these purported facts: Friendship, strictly speaking, is between separate and so distinct individuals (as the question of self-love in VII.6 suggested), and in the case of ethical friendship, friends want to become like one another. Whiting argues that the manuscripts, which all have ἄλλος οὗτος and not ἄλλος αὐτός at 1245a30, ought not be amended to the latter, and so reads Aristotle as claiming that the agent wants to become like her friend Heracles, to become 'another Heracles, another this ⟨so and so⟩'. (She therefore rejects the translation 'another self' offered by everyone
from Rackham, and Kenny, to Inwood and Woolf.) Whiting speculates that one wants to become like her friend because she rightly thinks that this is a good way to be. The difficulty in achieving this suggested by Aristotle is understood by Whiting as the difficulty in becoming completely like another, when similarities friends share are always partial. Hence friends want to live together, in order to achieve the kind of epistemic and hedonic intimacy that will facilitate becoming like one another, an end which is, moreover, more pleasant than living alone. Living a life together with friends is in these ways more choiceworthy than living alone. (7) Finally, Aristotle presents a recapitulation of the argument: the solution to the original *aporia* is that it is most choiceworthy to live together with friends, and that this is the good of the agent. The comparison to God was misleading because it could induce us to forget that we humans, unlike God, need distinct objects of perception and knowledge, without which—somewhat ironically, given the comparison of the self-sufficient person to God—we would not even think.

Friedemann Buddensiek’s paper, ‘Does good fortune matter? Eudemian Ethics VIII.2 on *eutuchia*’, focuses on good fortune in the penultimate chapter of the *EE* in order to elucidate the connection, if any, for Aristotle between good fortune and *eudaimonia* in the *EE*. Buddensiek argues for a connection between the two distinctive to the *EE*. In the *NE* at I.8, although Aristotle is sympathetic to the view of *hoi polloi* that good luck is productive of *eudaimonia*, he does not share it, and in the *Magna Moralia*, he seems to identify, Buddensiek suggests, the necessity of good fortune for *eudaimonia* with the necessity of external goods. By contrast, in the *EE*, as Buddensiek reads it, Aristotle countenances a more subtle connection between good luck and *eudaimonia* or doing well (*eupragia*): Aristotle not uncharacteristically thinks there is some truth in the popular view that the fortunate do well, and in *EE* VIII.2 suggests that there is a natural kind of good luck that corresponds to the individual’s nature, so that both good luck and *eudaimonia* are to a significant extent determined by a person’s nature. What is more, since good luck makes the attainment of external goods more likely and easier, it contributes indirectly to the individual’s *eudaimonia*.

Having argued that good fortune cannot have a rational or divine basis, Aristotle claims in VIII.2 that sometimes good fortune has a basis in the non-rational inclinations of the soul, which lead to impulses. These natural impulses, such as the impulses of the naturally gifted but untutored singer,

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16 H. Rackham, *Aristotle: The Eudemian Ethics*; Kenny, op. cit; Brad Inwood and Raphael Woolf (trs.), *Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics*. 
can lead people to desire the right thing at the right time and in the right way, as a result of which they enjoy success. But since the individual's efforts and successes are not the products of the agent's knowledge or design, but the product of her nature, they are the result of natural good fortune. This is in turn reflected in the fact that such naturally gifted singers are not capable of teaching that which they practice. Nonetheless, people with these natural impulses possess a natural orientation and drive toward the good. But how do these impulses arise so regularly in some people and not others, and direct them so as to achieve frequent success? Unfortunately the EE does not offer a theory of non-rational impulse. Buddensiek somewhat speculatively suggests that these natural or special impulses are accompanied by a kind of pre-deliberative awareness and assessment in perception of the circumstances and the action she is impelled towards. Aristotle himself frames the answer to the question of having the right impulses in terms of the fortunate person having a little bit of the divine in her, a starting-point 'superior to intelligence and deliberation' (EE VIII.2, 1248a32).

In further cases good luck and rationality are co-ordinate: e.g. the navigator and general both possess expertise but also frequently experience good fortune. Buddensiek argues that rational and non-rational good fortune (understood as the luck an expert and non-expert experience respectively) are in fact compatible, for Aristotle. Obviously where the special impulses are consistent with the expert's application of his knowledge, they can be understood as guiding the agent towards the right thing at the right time in the right way. But even where special impulses correctly guide a person in a way contrary to the deliverances of deliberation, we can still understand the individual as experiencing luck, since the impulses guide him to the desired end, where his reasoning about the end had been insufficient. (Buddensiek thus rejects Kenny's suggestion that the individual reasons badly in the sense of misconceiving the end as well as the means, on the grounds that the outcome would hardly count as a piece of luck by the individual's own lights.) Buddensiek discusses the possible connection between natural virtue and good fortune in the EE, before returning to the titular question whether according to Aristotle in the EE good fortune matters for eudaimonia. His answer in the affirmative construes the special natural impulses as capable of regularly facilitating the acquisition of external goods, including non-material external goods such as victory in war, and safe passage at sea. Eutuchia, therefore, is as natural as eudaimonia is to a human being.
References


CHAPTER ONE

THE EUDEMIAN ETHICS ON THE ‘VOLUNTARY’

David Charles

1. Introduction

Aristotle’s discussion of to *hekousion* (the *voluntary*) in the Eudemian Ethics (EE) has several distinctive features which I shall seek to explore and clarify. My main aim, in this essay, is to isolate the special nature of this account and to understand its role and philosophical significance.¹

Since Aristotle discusses the *voluntary* in EE II.6–9, Nicomachean Ethics (NE) III.1–5 and in the books they share NE/EE (the so-called ‘Common Books’: CE) V.8, one can profitably compare these accounts. While all three characterise the *voluntary* in terms of knowledge and absence of force (*bia*), they differ in several important respects. I shall begin with a sketch (in several places controversial) of the NE theory (with which many are more familiar) and then point to what distinguishes the EE discussion. With these two accounts in place, I shall compare them with Aristotle’s remarks in CE V.8 and sketch a hypothesis about how the three are connected.²

2. The NE III.1 Account of *Voluntary* Action: A Sketch

In NE III.1 the basic account of *voluntary* action is, it seems, grounded in two notions:

[A] the starting point (*archê*) of the action lying in the agent, and

[B] the agent knowing the particulars involved in the action.

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¹ In what follows, I shall use the expression “*voluntary*” as equivalent to the Greek term ‘*hekousion*’. So understood, it is open question whether all *voluntary* actions are voluntary. I shall use ‘voluntary’ to signify what we in English would count as voluntary.

² In what follows I shall refer to the Common Books as ‘CE’ but (for greater simplicity) only mention their Nicomachean book number. I shall also use (in an attempt to avoid begging some crucial questions) the terms ‘NE’ and ‘EE’ to refer only to the uniquely Nicomachean and Eudemian Books (NE I–IV, VIII–X, EE I–III, VII–VIII).
Thus Aristotle writes in 1111a22–23:

the *voluntary* would seem to be that where the starting point is in the agent who knows the particulars involved in the action.

Aristotle uses [A] in his discussion of mixed actions in which an agent, for example, throws the cargo overboard in a storm to save his own life and that of the crew (1110a10 f.). In such cases, the agent acts *voluntarily* because

... the starting point of moving the limbs in such actions lies in the agent.

(1110a15: see also 1110b4)

When agents act *voluntarily*, their action is chosen or selected (*haireton*: 1110a12). In such cases, the starting point of the action is a choice (or selection: *hairesis*, a taking by the agent). Aristotle focuses on what the agent chooses (or would choose: 1110a18) and suggests that the act will be *voluntary* if it is chosen (even if what is chosen is not worthy of choice: see 1110a30, b7: *haireteon*). He points to an actual choice (or selection) by the agent in these cases because he is concerned to find an internal cause of the resulting action (as required by [A]).

It is important to note that when the agent chooses to act, his (or her) choice need not be a preferential choice; for the latter requires rational deliberation (see 1112a15 ff.). Children and animals may act *voluntarily* even though they lack preferential choice (111a26, b9). While preferential choices may be a subset of choices, there are choices which are not preferential choices. Children and animals may choose the action they perform *voluntarily* simply by saying ‘yes’ to doing it. They do not need to consider whether it is best to act or to forbear from acting (let alone whether it is best to do something else: *de Anima* III.7, 431a7 ff.). Their choice may

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3 For this use of choice (*hairesis*), see 1104b30 where it is contrasted with flight and distinguished from the grounds for choice (the noble, the pleasant etc). In a similar usage, in 119a22–23, what is chosen (*haireton*) refers to what is taken (as opposed to avoided). What is chosen seems to include, in one of the cases Aristotle considers, giving the tyrant the information he wants, saving your family and bringing dishonour on yourself. For the latter is the shameful part of what is chosen in preference to (anti) the painful package of not informing the tyrant and not saving your family (1110a29–b1).

4 In this passage, Aristotle moves between talking of preferential choice (the ‘act’) and what is chosen preferentially (*prohaireton*). He seems to assume the same type of connection between the act of choosing (*haresis*) and what is chosen (*haireton*). In the analogous passage in *EE* 1226b8, he talks of choice (*haresis*).

5 Animals can say ‘yes’ to something simply by finding it pleasant and going for it. They need not even consider the option of not going for it (let alone the option of doing something else) when they *voluntarily* select it. In such cases, doing the action still rests with the agent since it would not have occurred if they had said ‘no’ and refrained from acting. For further
consist simply in their selecting (and going for) what seems pleasant to them. By contrast, preferential choice is based on a consideration of what it is best to do (1111b15 f., 1113a3 fff.). Elsewhere Aristotle specifies the type of choice (or selection) on which children and animals act as sensual desire (*epithumia: 1111b12–13). This is one type of choice or selection (1104b30 f.: *hairesis*). Other types are based on what is noble, what is judged best or what is useful. So understood, choice (*hairesis*) is a generic term of which there can be several species (set out in the following discussion of preferential choice in III.2, 1111b1 ff.).

Choice, so understood, when combined with knowledge of what one is doing, is sufficient to make the action done *voluntary* (*hekousion*). In the case of mixed actions, the action (such as throwing the cargo overboard) is done *voluntarily* (1101a15, see a18) even though no one would choose to throw the cargo overboard for its own sake (or with no further end: see *CE* 1151b1–5). Such actions are sometimes praised and sometimes blamed. Even

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6 In the *NE*, Aristotle does not analyze the notion of ‘choice’ (*hairesis*) or consider its connection with desire (*orexis*). Indeed, he seems to take it as well understood, not in need of further investigation in the present context. While ‘choices’ may be a subset of desires, not all desires are choices. The self-controlled, for example, act against their desires but not their choices. It is tempting (and may be correct) to identify choices with ‘decisive’ desires (*Met.* 1048a12), the ones which control (*kurion*) action. However, full discussion of this issue lies outside the scope of this essay.

7 Knowledge of what one is doing is taken as a necessary condition of an action’s being *voluntary* in 1112a2. If one does not know what one is doing, one does not act *voluntarily*. In 1112a2 Aristotle classifies actions done in ignorance as *involuntary* although elsewhere he distinguishes between what is painful and regretted (and so *involuntary*) and the more inclusive category of the *non-voluntary* (1101b8–22). Pain and subsequent regret, in my view, serve simply as indicators of a class of actions that are contrary to what the agent would have chosen had they known what they were doing. They need not be taken as defining the *involuntary*. Thus, for example, the last action of a person’s life might be *involuntary* if it is contrary to what they would have chosen had they known what they were doing—even though they do not live to regret or be pained by it. Indeed, there will be many actions can be *involuntary* even if they are not regretted provided that they are contrary to what the agent would have chosen had they known what they were doing. Aristotle, after all, commits himself only to the claim that everything that is painful or regretted is *involuntary* not to the further (more radical) claim that everything that is *involuntary* is painful or regretted. (1101b9). For a contrasting view, see David Bostock, *Aristotle’s Ethics*, 111–112. Bostock, having attributed the stronger claim to Aristotle, refutes it with a number of telling counterexamples.

8 So understood, Aristotle in 1101a8 ff. argues as follows: actions such as throwing the cargo overboard in a storm to save the crew are voluntary but if throwing the cargo overboard were to occur (in different situations) without this further goal, those actions would probably
when one acts under coercion because of factors no one could withstand, the resulting actions will still be *voluntary* provided that one chooses to act (even if the factors go beyond human nature to resist). These cases of *voluntary* action will typically be pardoned or excused, not praised or blamed (110a25).  

In English, coerced actions are classified as intentional but not as voluntary. Thus, since in NE III.1 the term ‘hekousion’ (*voluntary*) applies to coerced actions, it does not refer solely to voluntary actions. Indeed, the extension of the term ‘hekousion’ (when applied to actions) seems to be what, in English, would be classified as intentional rather than voluntary actions. The extension is wider than the class of voluntary actions.

In Aristotle’s discussion, if the starting point of action (archê) is the agent’s choice, it is up to him (or her) to do or forbear from the action (See 110a17 ff.). The relevant order of concepts is as follows:

1. The starting point (archê) is in us (a choice: hairesis);
2. It is up to us to do or forbear from doing the action;
3. We are in control of the action.

Claim [1] is the basis of Aristotle's account. If the starting point is in us, it is up to us to do or forbear from doing the action and we are (in this way) controllers of what we do. (Aristotle employs a similar order of concepts in 113b21, 114a19, 114b30 ff.)

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10 This does not mean that the term ‘hekousion’ should be translated ‘intentional’. Indeed, this translation may be inappropriate since the term is applied not just to actions but to states (114b30) where the translation ‘intentional’ would be incorrect. However, the translation ‘voluntary’ cannot be correct for the NE (since it gets the extension wrong). In the present essay, I use the “voluntary” to avoid issues of translation.
Consider the connection between [1] and [2]: in Aristotle’s view, the agent’s choice, in the case of voluntary actions, determines what happens. This requires that

(i) if he (or she) had not chosen to do the action, it would not have happened, and
(ii) the action is the causal consequence of his (or her) choice.

In these two ways, the agent’s choice plays an ineliminable role among the antecedents of voluntary action. Both claims will be true even if the agent could not have rationally chosen differently in the circumstances in which he (or she) finds himself. For even in those cases it remains the case that had he/she not chosen to act, the action would not have happened.

It is up to the agent to do or forbear from doing the action. Indeed, this will be true if no one could have borne the pain of acting differently.\textsuperscript{13} Even in these cases, it is the agent’s choice which determines whether he will act or forbear from acting. Without that choice, the action would not have occurred. Given this dependence on the agent’s choice, doing or forbearing from doing the action rests with the agent (1110a17). For what actually happens results from the choice the agent made. Had he chosen differently, something else would have happened.

Aristotle takes the idea of the starting point being in us as his basic concept in accounting (in *NE* III.5) for becoming drunk and so ignorant of what one is doing. Guided by this idea, he counts becoming drunk as in our power because the starting point (*archê*) is in us (113b32). If one becomes drunk in this way, we are causally responsible for the resulting ignorance.\textsuperscript{14} He then seeks to generalise this idea to cases of inaction where

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{13} Aristotle speaks of bad actions as done under duress because of factors which ‘over-stretch human nature and no one could withstand’ (1110a24–26). But does he mean that no one could reasonably be expected to withstand such things or that no one has the ability to do so? I am inclined to take him in the second way as referring to pains too great for any human to withstand (so that the only escape route is to take one’s own life—as discussed in the next sentence: 110a26 ff.). But this topic lies outside the scope of this essay.

  \item\textsuperscript{14} Aristotle’s idea of the agent’s drinking as the starting point of his (or her) ignorance needs more spelling out. If someone else (unknown to you) ‘spikes’ your drinks and you become drunk, are you the starting point of the resulting ignorance? Or is the person who spikes your drink, if it this action that makes the difference (causing the transition from mild intoxication to drunken ignorance)? While it is tempting to say, on Aristotle’s behalf, that the ‘spiker’ is the starting point as (i) it is his (or her) action that leads to the decisive transition (compare: 110a2) and (ii) he (or she) is ‘the controller’ of what happens, he does not consider this type of case. I am indebted to Ursula Coope for discussion of this issue.
\end{itemize}
we fail to learn something which we should know and our failure results in our ignorance. Here, too, our ignorance can be punished if it is produced by a starting point in us: our thoughts, passions, or choice not to do what is required to learn what we should. Next, he seeks to extend this account to the case of states of character (hexeis), suggesting that if the starting point (archê) of coming to have a state of character lies in us, it was up to us (at some time) to come to have or to forbear from coming to have that state (1114a12 ff., 18–20). If our choice of *voluntary* actions leads to the formation of a state of character, it was up to us (at some time) to have or forbear from having it. Here too, as in the case of action, the idea of the starting point lying in us ([1]) is taken as more basic than (and explanatory of) the idea captured in [2].

In the case of actions, passions (pathê) and states of character, if the starting point (archê) lies in the agent, he (or she) is the producer and starting point (archê) of what occurs (see 1113b18–20, Meta. 1013a7–10). In the case of actions, the agent is the controller (kurios) of what happens from beginning to end (1114b32). What occurs is determined by them: they initiate the sequence that leads to the action and control it throughout (mechri tou telous: 1114b32). The agent, if he acts *voluntarily*, will choose to act in a given way and act accordingly, controlling his action in the light of his choice (so as to do what he has chosen). In this way, the agent is the starting point and controller of his actions (and of what occurs).

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15 For cases of thought leading to inaction, see the question posed in de Motu 701a7 f.: ‘Thinking in what way do we sometimes act and sometimes not act, sometimes move and sometimes not move?’ In cases like the one described in 1114a1–2 we sometimes say: ‘he chose to remain ignorant of the law’ (when it was easy for the person involved to find out the relevant law).

16 I leave open the issue of how Aristotle understood the internal source in this case. For one suggestion, see F.A. Siegler’s ‘Voluntary and Involuntary’, 268–287.

17 There is an important question here: is the relevant choice simply for a *voluntary* action which leads to the formation of the state or for a *voluntary* action of a type which characteristically leads to the formation of that state or for a *voluntary* action of a type which is known by the agent to lead the state in question? Aristotle is clear that one should know (in certain cases) what the effects of one’s actions will be (1114a9–10). But if one does not know what the effects will be (as one might not know that (e.g.) heavy drinking leads to blindness: 1114a26) is one still *voluntarily* in the resulting state as it is a consequence of something one has done (1114b17)? This question is not, as far as I can see, clearly resolved in this passage.

18 For passions, see Aristotle’s initial reference to ‘pathê’ in 1109b31. While the passions immediately relevant to virtue and vice may be in 1105b22–23, drunkenness (and other passing states) may also be described as ‘pathê’ (see for this wider use of ‘pathos’ CE VII. 3, 1147b8, 16 and V.8, 1136a8ff.). There is no need to restrict the passions (or the actions) which can be *voluntary* (in 1109b30 f.) to those that are relevant to virtue.
In the Nicomachean discussion, agents may only be, in a limited degree, controllers of what occurs. In the case of mixed actions, they are controllers only in the sense that their choices determine what happens. They will remain controllers even if (as we have noted) their choices are restricted to the extent that no one could rationally have chosen differently or endured the suffering involved in following a different course of action. Similarly, in the case of states, their onset will be controlled by the agent even if his relevant end is fixed by nature. In this case, the agent's choice to do something (or his actually doing something) plays a causal role in the formation of the relevant states (1114b15 ff.). The person is the controller of his states only in that the starting point which generated them lay in him, in his past choices.

While these features of the Nicomachean account are relatively clear, two gaps should be mentioned: one concerns action individuation, the other the connection between an action's being *voluntary* and praise or blame.

1. If Oedipus hit the old man *voluntarily*, but hit his father *involuntarily*, what precisely is *voluntary* and what *involuntary*? Are there two separate actions (hitting the old man, hitting his father), one of which is *voluntary*, another *involuntary*? Or is one and the same action *voluntary* under one specification but *involuntary* under another? In NE III.1–5 Aristotle does not engage with questions of action individuation.

2. Is an action's being *voluntary* a necessary condition of its being praised or blamed? In 1111a2, actions done in ignorance through passion (such as drunkenness) are classified as *involuntary* (at least if regretted). However, later in III.5, Aristotle comments favourably on Pittacus' law, which inflicted double punishments in cases of action committed in ignorance induced by drunkenness (1113b32). Is this a case of an *involuntary* action which is punished? Or does the fact that the action is punished make it *voluntary*, on the assumption that actions can only be praised or blamed if they are *voluntary*? Aristotle does not resolve this issue in III.5, although he does suggest that the primary focus of punishment is ignorance induced by drunkenness (1113b30). This remark might imply that we can reasonably punish actions which result from our ignorance (as is our practice)

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19 It is clearly not sufficient as (i) the actions of even wild animals are *voluntary* (1111a26: see the case of the lion described in 118a20 ff.) even though they are not blamed for doing them (ii) some mixed actions are *voluntary* but pardoned (110a23 ff.).
if we have done something to induce that ignorance—even though the action itself need not be *voluntary*. If so, we can (in Aristotle’s account) be punished for a non-voluntary action if there was something *voluntary* about what happened in the ‘lead up’ to the action (in this case getting drunk and so causing our ignorance).\(^{20}\) However, while this line of thought is appealing, it must be ceded that Aristotle does not make it clear in *NE* III.1–5 that this is his favoured response.

3. The EE Account of the *Voluntary*: Differences in Judgement

In *EE*, Aristotle offers different verdicts on some of the cases he considers in the *NE*:

1. In the *EE*, children and animals do not act (1222b21: 1224a29) and so (*a fortiori*) do not act *voluntarily*.* Only man, one who acts on rational calculation, acts (1224a31). He is the starting point for some actions that animals cannot do (1222b21). By contrast in the *NE*, children and animals act *voluntarily* (1111a25–26).

2. In the *EE*, central examples of coerced actions are counted as not *voluntary* (1225a18 ff.). Aristotle writes:

When a man does something evil for the sake of something good or from deliverance from some evil, he will be acting under compulsion and by force (*biai*) or not by nature and *involuntarily*; for these actions do not rest with him.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\) In such a case, there would be a *voluntary* state (or passion: *pathos*), such as drunkenness or drunken ignorance, even though the action itself is not *voluntary*. The opening sentence of *NE* III.1 requires that praise and blame are only bestowed when something *voluntary* occurs but what is *voluntary* (in this context) may be either a passion (*pathos*) or an action (1109b30). There is no requirement (in this passage) that if praise and blame are bestowed, there must be a *voluntary* action. So understood, the law may justifiably punish an involuntary action which results from a voluntary state or passion (as in cases of manslaughter where the agent is unaware of what they are doing because of drunkenness).

\(^{21}\) In this translation I take the phrase ‘and *involuntarily*’ in 1225a19 to say that an action which is done under compulsion in the way described (i.e. ‘to avoid some greater and more painful evil’ 1225a15 ff.) and either by force or not through nature is *involuntary*. Kenny (*Aristotle’s Theory of the Will*, 45) suggests that the phrase ‘and *involuntarily*’ points to the ‘involuntaryness of the circumstances’ of the agent who chooses to do evil to achieve good in an ‘overall situation’ which is not in his power. But in the immediate context, actions are the subject (1225a18, 19) and it is these (and not whole situations) which are said to be forced, not up to us etc. Indeed, it is far from clear that Aristotle can talk of situations not in the
In such cases, the action does not rest with the agent because either it does not flow from ‘his own natural desire and calculation’ or ‘his nature cannot bear acting differently’ (1125a27 ff.). By contrast, as we have already noted, coerced actions of this type are classified as *voluntary* in the *NE*.

3. In the *EE* Aristotle notes that many think that actions done through sexual desire, some forms of anger and natural impulses that go beyond our nature are *involuntary* (1225a21), and suggests that actions that do not result from a person’s natural desire or reason do not rest with him (including actions done on sensual desire: 1225a27 ff.). By contrast in the *NE* actions through sensual desire and anger are classified (without qualification) as *voluntary* (1111a25) and, since the starting point is in the agent, are ones which rest with him to do or not. Further, even actions which stem from features which overcome ‘human nature’ are classified as *voluntary* on similar grounds.

Are these all genuine differences? The issue raised by 1 is not straightforward. In the *EE* Aristotle uses the term ‘action’ to refer only to a subset of the cases of things done in *NE* III: those, for example, which reflect the agent’s settled ethical character. Although animals and children, lacking a settled ethical character, do not ‘act’ in this restricted sense, they may still (consistently with the account offered in the *EE*) act *voluntarily* in the wider sense of action relevant to discussions in the *NE*. Perhaps there is no inconsistency between the two accounts on this issue. They may simply be considering different cases.

22. The *EE* mentions that some take some actions done under compulsion as *voluntary*: ones which rest with the agent (1225a9–11). As the discussion proceeds, Aristotle makes it clear that this category will not include central cases of coercion where the agent does something bad for the sake of a greater good or to avoid a greater bad (1225a17 ff.). Does Aristotle himself think that there are any cases of *voluntary* compelled actions? Perhaps he might so classify actions where the agent does something bad (which he would not wish to do) to avoid a trivial harm (e.g. he kills someone to avoid being ‘caught’ in blind-man’s-buff: 1225a15–17). In such examples, the agent’s natural calculation (e.g. his tendency to over-react) leads him to do something bad to avoid a trivial slight or pain, which his nature could be expected to bear easily (compare cases of *involuntary* coerced actions: 1225a27 ff.).

It is important to note, at the outset, that the *NE* and *EE* discussions differ in emphasis and concern. In the *EE* Aristotle focuses on the virtuous and vicious actions of mature human agents and does not consider actions in the broader legal context mentioned in *NE* (1109b34 ff.), let alone reflect on the actions of other animals. However, this difference cannot account for the issue raised by 1 above. Since the *EE* account is offered as an attempt to answer the question: 'what is the *voluntary* and the *involuntary*?' (1223a21 f.), it must be at odds with the one presented in the *NE* (at the very least) in its view of the extension of the term '*voluntary*'. In all three cases (1–3) he does not in the *EE* classify as *voluntary* actions which he so classifies in the *NE*. Indeed, with respect to 2, the English term 'voluntary' captures the extension of the Greek term as used in the *EE* but not in the *NE*.

How significant are the three differences just noted? Is it simply that Aristotle changed his mind (one way or the other) about the extension of the term '*voluntary*' or came to have different views about coerced actions or actions arising from passion in the two discussions? Is he guided in both works by the same controlling idea, simply changing his mind about how best to implement it? Or is there some more basic change in underlying theory between them, from which these differences flow? To address this question we need to consider the account offered in the *EE* in more detail.

4. *A Sketch of the EE Account of the *Voluntary*"

In his concluding summary in *EE* II.9 (1225b8–10) Aristotle points to three conditions which must be satisfied if an action is to be *voluntary*:

\[
\text{S acts *voluntarily* if and only if it is (i) up to S not to so act, (ii) S knows what he/she is doing and (iii) S acts through himself \((d\'auton)\).}
\]

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24 For an interesting discussion of some of the relevant legal contexts (and cases), see W.T. Loomis, 'The Nature of Premeditation in Athenian Homicide Law', 86–95. Loomis clearly indicates the difficulties and uncertainties that arose concerning the *voluntary* in Greek legal practice.

25 Aristotle considers animal action quite generally as *voluntary* in *de Motu* 703b3 because it is produced in a given way by the agent's relevant internal states. For further discussion of this, see my 'Desire and Action: Aristotle's Move'.

26 See Susan Sauvé Meyer, *Aristotle on Moral Responsibility*, 7. She suggests (with regard to issue 2 above) that 'these conflicting verdicts reflect different ways of making precise the basic presupposition ... that agents are morally responsible for actions produced by their moral character.' See also her later remark: 'Differing views about the voluntary do not stem from disagreement about voluntariness. They differ ... on whether compelled actions satisfy [Aristotle's] requirement for voluntariness.' (97)
Several aspects of this summary mark it out from the account he offers in the *NE* in the *EE*:

1. Three notions are used in the summary rather than the two—the starting point being in us and knowledge—mentioned in the *NE* account (1111b21–22).
2. The idea of being up to us not to so act appears to be as basic as that of the causal condition (*di’auton*) and is not treated as a consequence of that condition as in the *NE*.
3. The third condition, which is only introduced in II.9, is not elucidated in terms of a choice (*hairesis*) on the part of the agent as in the *NE*.

Let us consider each of the conditions mentioned in *EE* 1225b8–10.

(iii) *S Acts through Himself* (*di’auton*)

It is important to place this notion in context. In *EE* II.7 Aristotle seems to be about to investigate the ways in which a man is the starting point of his actions. He suggests that if man is the starting point of actions, there will be one of three starting points present in all cases of human action: desire (*orexis*), preferential choice (*proairesis*) or thought (*dianoia*) (see 1223a25 f.). However, while he appears to be seeking for one type of internal cause which is present whenever the agent acts voluntarily, his discussion follows a different route from that pursued in the *NE*

In *EE* II.7 Aristotle engages in a long and somewhat remorseless attempt to show that not all voluntary action is action on one type of desire (sensual desire/spirit/rational wish). Next he shows that not all voluntary action is action on preferential choice and concludes that

> It follows the *voluntary* is acting on reasoning or thought (*dianooumenon*) as to how to act ... (1224a6 ff.)

The type of reasoning or thought (*dianoia*) required is something that animals and children lack (1224a29). It involves searching and reasoning about what is best to do (see *CE* 1142b15) and is used to address the question: shall I do this or that? Hence children and animals do not act *voluntarily* (in the *EE*) not simply because they do not 'act' (in some narrow or specialised sense of act) but because they do not possess the type of reasoning required of *voluntary* agents.²⁷

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²⁷ According to this account, the *acrates* will act on thought (*dianoia*) when acting acratically (if he/she acts voluntarily). However, in *CE* VII.4, 1148a9–10 the *acrates* is characterised
One might have expected Aristotle, at this point, to examine the nature of the reasoning or thought (dianoia) required for *voluntary* action and to show how such thought leads to action. However, instead, he reintroduces one of the ideas mentioned in EE II. 6, that of man as a starting point (archê). This idea is developed further on the basis of (i) (1224a17 ff.) a view of our natural and intrinsic impulses and (ii) an account of the *involuntary* as what is contrary to our natural and intrinsic impulse, stemming from an external source (1224a22 ff.). Aristotle concludes from these considerations, and from a lengthy discussion of the cases of the acrates and enocrates, that when man is a starting point (archê), the source of the motivation (in the case of *voluntary* actions) is in his own impulse (hormê: 1224b8 ff.). In these cases, in Aristotle’s view, a man acts in accordance with his nature (kata phusin: 1224b36), presumably because he acts in line with one of the impulses which are part of his nature (1224b27 ff.).

Aristotle, if one takes these considerations together, has the resources to spell out in more detail what is required for an action to be ‘through oneself.’ Such action will be based on thought or reasoning which takes as its starting point a source of motivation which is part of one’s nature (hormê). There will be a natural source of motivation which leads the agent to think of one action as the one to do (rather than the other alternatives on offer).

(i) The Action Being Up to Us

Aristotle considers a different set of cases in which one is forced by external circumstances to act in a way which is painful (1225a4 ff.). In such cases, he says that one acts *involuntarily* (1225a19) since the action does not lie with one. In his view, it does not lie with us because our nature cannot bear acting differently: the pain or evil which will come our way if we do not do the action is more than we can bear (1225a26, see 1225a18 ff.). Indeed if we cannot bear the pain of acting otherwise, the action does not follow from our own nature (whether desiderative or rational: 1225a25 ff.) but from external

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28 He does discuss how to define ‘what is in accordance with thought’ in 1225b1, using the idea of knowledge to do so (1225b2–8). However, while these remarks in II.9 indicate how actions have to be if they are accord with thought, they do not clarify the type of thought about what to do that is required to generate them.
circumstances. In this discussion Aristotle has begun to investigate the right hand side of the bi-conditional he had introduced in II.6, 1223a8 ff.:

An action is caused by S if and only if the action depends on S to do or not do.

He looks for guidance as to what is to count as an action of which the agent is the cause by considering actions which he (or she) can bear not doing. More precisely, he employs the idea of the action being one which one can bear not doing to determine what depends on you to do or not do. That is, if one cannot bear the pain of acting differently, the action one does will not (in the appropriate sense) depend on you to do. In effect, in these remarks, Aristotle is using the idea of an agent being able to bear acting differently as a necessary condition of his action being a *voluntary* one.

Aristotle's final summary in EE II.9 brings these two ideas together in conditions (i) and (iii):

S acts *voluntarily* if and only if it (i) is up to S not to so act (ii) S knows what he/she is doing, and (iii) S acts through himself (*di’auton*).

(i) refers back to the idea introduced in 1225a27 ff.:

It is up to us not to φ only if our nature can tolerate not φ’ing,29 while (iii) may rest on the idea of the action being a consequence of a desire or reason which is part of our nature. This is certainly the kind of internal source at issue. So understood, Aristotle’s account in the EE runs as follows: an action is *voluntary* if and only if our natures can tolerate not doing the action and doing the action follows (on the basis of reasoning) from our own natural desire or reason, where we know what we are doing. In the case of *voluntary* actions, what one does is determined (in a way involving reasoning) by a natural source of motivation where one knows what one is doing and could tolerate not acting.

The points just noted serve to distinguish the Eudemian from the Nicomachean accounts of the *voluntary*. There are, at least, three relevant differences.

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29 In 1226a29 ff. Aristotle notes that the things about which we can deliberate are just those things which it rests with us to do or not do. However, in this passage, it sees that the reason we can deliberate about such matters (and just such matters) is that their occurrence or non-occurrence rests with us. The basic notion of what rests with us to do or not do is introduced in the discussion of the *voluntary* and is more basic than the idea of what we can or cannot deliberate about: see 1223a8 ff. (What can we deliberate about? What is up to us to do or not do.)
Difference 1: Order of Explanation

While Aristotle accepts in the *EE* that

\[ \forall x \ [S \text{ is the starting point (archê/kurios) of } x \iff \text{it is up to } S \text{ to do } x \text{ or not do } x] \] (1223a5 ff.),

he attempts to make progress by analysing the idea of something being up to S to do or not do (in 1223a5 ff.), without resting on the idea of a starting point being in us. That is, he seeks to use the right hand side of the bi-conditional as an independent condition on an action’s being *voluntary*. By contrast, in the *NE*, he treats the idea of archê being in us as the more basic notion and uses it to account for what it is for an action to rest with us.

Difference 2: The Definition of What Is Up to Us

In *EE*, the idea of something being up to agent to do or not do depends, in part, on whether the agent can bear not doing it. If an agent cannot bear not doing something, his doing the action is not up to him. This is why coerced actions are classified as *involuntary* (1225a2–19). By contrast, in the *NE*, if the agent chooses to \( \varphi \), then this is what determines what happens. If this is the case, and his/her choice is determinative, it rests with him (or her) to \( \varphi \) or not to \( \varphi \). This can be so, as I have emphasised, even if he (or she) cannot withstand the pain of not \( \varphi \)’ing.

Difference 3: Desire or Reasoning Which Is Part of One’s Nature: In Place of Choice (Hairesis)

In the *EE* the agent only acts *voluntarily* if his (or her) desire or reasoning is part of his (or her) nature (1224a30–1225a2). The action, if *voluntary*, is in line with his (or her) nature and brought on by a line of reasoning or desire which is also in line with his (or her) nature. By contrast in the *NE* an agent can act *voluntarily* even if his (or her) desire is provoked by external circumstances and is for an action which is contrary to his (or her) nature.

These three differences indicate that in *EE* Aristotle is attempting to specify the kind of cause involved in *voluntary* action in terms of the agent’s specific nature leading to an action which he (or she) can (consistently with their nature) forbear from doing. The underlying theoretical idea is that of an agent acting in line with his (or her) nature in situations where his (or her) nature can bear doing something else. As Aristotle remarks:

What rests with him … on which all depends … is that which his nature is able to bear. (1225a26 ff.)
What one’s nature ‘can bear’ depends on two ideas: (i) what is in line with one’s own natural desires or reasoning and (ii) what one can tolerate not doing. These two ideas are used in the EE as a way of clarifying the type of starting point the agent is in cases of *voluntary* action.

When the agent is a starting point (archê) of this type, he is the sole controller of what happens (1223a5 ff.). The starting point of the action lies in his nature, which by itself determines what is done. Even though his nature could bear doing something else, what he actually does is controlled by his own natural desires or reason. In such a context, if the resulting action is to be *voluntary*, it must follow from one of his own natural motivations (ones he himself brings to that situation as a result of his nature). It cannot spring from a source of motivation which is contrary to his natural motivations, springing from the external circumstances in which the agent finds himself. When an agent acts *voluntarily* it is his own nature that controls what happens. It should be no surprise that when Aristotle first introduces the idea of man as a starting point (archê) of this type, he compares man (as agent) with god: the absolute controller of what occurs (1222b22). Man will be a starting point of this type if it his nature alone that determines what happens. He is, in this case, the sole complete, controller of what occurs. It rests with the agent whether or not the action occurs (1223a5–9).

Before commenting further on the philosophical significance of these differences, we should note some distinctive gaps and gains in the EE account. In doing so, we can consider (albeit briefly) the ‘knowledge’ condition mentioned in Aristotle’s summary in EE 1225b5–8.

### 5. Gaps and Gains in EE Account

Aristotle’s specification of the knowledge condition, cited as condition (ii) above, is not fully developed in the EE. In 1225b6, he notes that ‘if one is ignorant of the person acted on, the instrument and the nature of the act through ignorance, not accidentally, one acts *involuntarily*.’ The clause ‘not accidentally’ is probably best taken as excluding cases where ignorance is brought on by other states (such as anger or some other passion). Indeed, this may be what is intended by the next sentence: ‘to act through ignorance of the act, the means or who is acted on is *involuntary*, understanding this as a case of acting through ignorance (without qualification: not induced by some other state or passion). This view, too, may be what is intended by the remark: ‘all things he does in ignorance as the result of being ignorant
he does *involuntarily* (1225b11), which may suggest that acts done in ignorance brought on by passion are not *involuntary*. But the latter claim is not spelled out and the distinction (which we encounter in more detail in the *NE*) is not fully specified.

In *EE* II.9, Aristotle comments on the man who ‘has but does not use knowledge through *ameleia* (negligence)’ (1225b11–13), noting that in one way he acts in ignorance, in another way he does not. But he does not spell out whether he acts *involuntarily* (because in a way ignorant) or *voluntarily* (either because in a way possessing the relevant knowledge or because he can be blamed for not using his knowledge). Similar uncertainties arise over his discussion of the final case of ignorance mentioned in the chapter: ‘one who does not have some knowledge is blamed if it is easy or necessary to know this and his ignorance results from negligence, pleasure or pain.’ (1225b15ff.). Are these resulting actions *voluntary* because the person can be blamed for them (as well as for his ignorance)? Or are they *involuntary* (or non-*voluntary*) because the person acts in ignorance? Or is it just that the state of ignorance itself is *voluntary*? Aristotle seems to leave these issues open in his final remark: ‘these things must be added to our definition’, without specifying the ways in which they should be added. At this point, the *EE* discussion appears incomplete, in need of further development.\(^{31}\)

The connection between the *voluntary* and praise is mentioned in *EE* 1223a10f. where Aristotle comments that ‘praise and blame are given to things of which we are the cause’. However, he does not say how this observation is meant to apply to the case of those who are ignorant through negligence, pain or pleasure. Is it just the ignorance for which we are the causes that is blamed? Or does blame extend to the actions as well, requiring that they too are *voluntary*? Aristotle, it seems, leaves these issues unresolved in the *EE* discussion.

There is, however, one respect in which the *EE* discussion is fuller than that in the *NE*. In his discussion of acratic and self-controlled action, Aristotle addresses in some detail the issue of action individuation, commenting, in his most elaborate formulation:

\[^{30}\] For a similar suggestion see Michael Woods’ *Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics*, 146.

\[^{31}\] For a contrasting view, see Robert Heinaman ‘The *Eudemian Ethics* on Knowledge and Voluntary Action’, 132–136 and ‘Compulsion and Voluntary Action in the *Eudemian Ethics*’, 261–262. Heinaman assumes that Aristotle is putting forward a positive and fully determinate view in 1225b11 ff., rather than leaving some major questions unresolved.
It is impossible for one to do the same act *voluntarily* and *involuntarily* at the same time and in respect of the same feature of the act. (1223b22 ff.)

The addition of the phrase ‘in respect of the same feature of the act’ is suggestive. It seems to allow that one can do the same act *voluntarily* with regard to some feature and *involuntarily* with regard to another. That is, one may (for example) perform one action of hitting a bystander, which is *voluntary* with regard to the feature of hitting a bystander but *involuntary* with respect to the feature of hitting one’s father in those (regrettable cases) where the bystander is one’s father but one is unaware of this fact. However, although this viewpoint is suggested, it is not developed as Aristotle does not connect this distinction with cases of ignorance. So while the *EE* suggests some thoughts about action individuation, they are not spelled out or applied to the central cases where such a distinction would be most useful.

6. The Significance of the Theoretical Differences between the *NE* and *EE*

The *EE* theory of *voluntary* action, unlike that presented in the *NE*, rests on the idea of nature: of desires and reason that flow from our nature and of actions which our nature allows us to forbear from doing. Actions are *voluntary* only if they follow from reasons or desires which are natural to us and (in addition) are ones which our nature allows us to refrain from doing. There can be several springs of action (reason, desire) provided that they are all natural (in the ways just specified). If actions are chosen under duress they do not flow from motivations which are natural (in the required sense) and so are *involuntary*. Such actions are not controlled by us in the way required for *voluntary* action. Indeed, actions are *voluntary* only if they are ones which are controlled completely by our natures. If circumstances conspire to make us choose actions which are not controlled in this way by our natures in this way, we act *involuntarily*.

The positive account of *voluntary* action offered in the *NE* is not dependent on the notion of nature that permeates the *EE* account. In this regard, the *NE* is less reliant than the *EE* on the use (and coherence) of concepts drawn from Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy.\(^\text{32}\) One can, in the *NE* account,

\(^{32}\) See, for example, the remarks at the beginning of *EE* II.6: ‘substances are by nature first principles’ (1222b17 ff.), Aristotle’s comparison with the first principles of geometry
act *voluntarily* even if one acts because of pain no one could withstand or for reasons which arise from the difficulty of the circumstances, as when the action is coerced. In such cases, one does not act in a way one would naturally, if unconstrained by external conditions. One’s motivations, in such cases, will not be ones which are (in the terminology of the *EE*) natural to one. According to the *NE* account, one can act *voluntarily* even though one is not the complete controller of one’s actions in the way required in the *EE*. Aristotle, in the *NE*, allows for the fact that we can act *voluntarily* (and be praised and blamed) when doing actions which do not flow from our natures, even in cases where we could not bear the pain of not acting. For in all such cases it is our choice which determines what happens. In this respect the *NE* account is more inclusive than that developed in the *EE*.

The theory in the *NE*, despite being more inclusive than the *EE*, offers a more unified account of the antecedents of *voluntary* action. In the *NE* there is, I have suggested, one general type of cause which leads to action: choice (*hairesis*), of which there can be different types (preferential choice, choice in anger, for sensual pleasure etc: see 1104b31). Since Aristotle uses the notion of choosing (*haireisthai*) frequently in *NE* I (1094a20, 1097a26, b3–6), it is no surprise to see it (and its derivatives: choice (*hairesis*) and what is chosen (*haireton*)) used in crucial contexts in *NE* II and III. While in the *EE* Aristotle suggests that one can act on distinct types of motivation (reason, desire), in the *NE* he has proposed choice (*hairesis*) as a type of motivational state common to the whole range of cases he considers: animals, acratics, self-controlled, virtuous. Armed with this starting point he can allow animals and children to act *voluntarily*, even though they lack the type of intellect (*dianoia*) demanded of *voluntary* agents in the *EE*. Indeed, the general notion of choice (*hairesis*), which is weaker than that of rationally based choice, is important in that it offers the basis for a unitary type of starting point common to all *voluntary* actions. It is striking that the *EE* does not use the verb ‘choosing’ (*haireisthai*) at all and does not accord ‘choice’ (*hairesis*) any important theoretical role.33 The *NE* account, in taking the idea of what is chosen (*haireton*) as fundamental, avoids a

(1222b33 ff.), the comparison with the *Analytics* (1222b37 ff.). For similar reliance on theoretical philosophy, see also ‘the function of each thing is its goal’ (1219a7 ff.) and ‘the function of the soul is to make life’ (1219a24). I am indebted to discussions with Carlo Natali for my appreciation of the importance of this point.

33 ‘Choice (*hairesis*)’ is only used to describe specific choices in 1215b21, 35, 1216a15 (of life), 1233a4 (of honour) and 1249a25 (of natural goods) and in the description of the etymology of *prohairesis* (preferential choice) in 1226b8.
difficulty implicit in the *EE*, nature-based, account. The latter, as we noted, uses the idea of nature in two ways: action, if it is to be *voluntary*, should follow from one’s natural desires or reason and be such that one’s nature can bear the pain of acting differently. But why impose both conditions? Why should an action which one can forbear not doing be made involuntary by the fact that its motivations are not natural to one (e.g. in cases of mild coercion)? Conversely why if motivations spring from one’s nature should one also require (for *voluntary* action) that one’s nature can bear not doing the action (as in cases where one’s nature has become so crystallised that one cannot bear acting differently: 1114a16 ff.)? It is not obvious why both these conditions are required or how they cohere. In this respect the *NE* rests on less controversial, more defensible, concepts than those employed in the *EE*.

There is a further difference. Aristotle, in the *NE*, armed with his concept of choice as the starting point in us, is able to investigate more fully the conditions under which we *voluntarily* come to have certain characters. He is not confined, as in the *EE*, to the view that any state which is natural to us (provided that we are not corrupted) is *voluntary*. He can distinguish those for which we are causally responsible because of our past choices or actions from those for which we are not. In this respect the *NE* account offers a more thorough account of when (and why) we *voluntarily* come to have certain states than the *EE*, where Aristotle notes that such states will be acquired appropriately if they are the result of natural development (1224b30 ff.). In the *EE* (unlike the *NE*) he seems to have little (or no) interest in the individual’s role in the formation of his own (individual) character or in the idea that the starting point for his (individual) character lies in him. In the *NE* he has the theoretical resources to investigate this issue in more detail and in greater depth.

What accounts for these theoretical differences? Some, no doubt, partly arise from the difference in focus noted above. In the *EE* Aristotle is concerned with actions (*praxeis*) which are significant in the assignment of virtue and vice: these actions reveal the characters of the relevant agents. His account of the *voluntary* is tailor-made for character revealing actions of this type. However, as we have seen, he held in the *EE* that the *voluntary* does not extend more widely to include actions which are coerced or ‘unnatural’ (out of character). In the *NE*, by contrast, he is attempting to

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34 For further discussion of these issues, see C.C.W. Taylor’s Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics Books II–IV*, 164 ff.
formulate a concept of the *voluntary* which is not confined to character-revealing actions but will also be useful in the context of law courts for praise and punishment more generally (1109b32 ff.). He is here developing a more inclusive account of the *voluntary*, resting on the idea of choice as the appropriate starting point, as he seeks an account which will underpin legal practices of praise and blame and can be applied to children and animals as well as mature humans. This project has no need of notions based on a conception of one's natural character (or nature). Even if the latter are useful in characterising those *voluntary* actions which reveal our characters, they are not required in an account which applies to all *voluntary* actions. Aristotle, in the *NE*, is, in effect, separating the issue of what is *voluntary* from considerations of what needs to be present if *voluntary* action is to reveal one’s character as virtuous or vicious.

There is yet a further difference. In the *EE* Aristotle takes our nature, as manifested both in our reason and desires, as the sole and complete controller of our *voluntary* (character-revealing) actions. If one identifies the agent with his nature, he will be the genuine origin as sole controller of these actions. Some, following Kant, have taken the idea of the agent as a genuine origin (of this type) as what is required for him (or her) to be morally responsible for his actions. If so, they will find in the *EE* the first cautious step (in the long journey) towards a theory of moral responsibility of a Kantian type. Indeed, some interpreters have attributed to Aristotle a Kant-like view of moral responsibility in which *voluntary* agents are (in effect) identified with their rational natures and required to control their desires in the light of deliberative reasoning about what is good to do. However, even if one does not read his *EE* discussion of the *voluntary* in this way, it remains true that, in its depiction of the agent as the sole controller of his *voluntary* actions, it makes one move in the Kantian direction outlined above. By contrast, in the *NE*, Aristotle, in providing an account of character-formation in which our past choices are the relevant starting points, develops a different conception of us as the partial controllers of our actions and characters. As long as our past choices play an ineliminable role in the formation of the character which leads to our actions, we are controllers enough of our actions and characters to be regarded as virtuous or vicious. We do not need to be their sole controllers to count as ethically good and bad agents. In this respect, the two accounts are

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35 Although Aristotle does point forward to a discussion of legal issues in 1227a2 ff., they make no impact on his discussion of the *voluntary* in *EE* II.6–9.
built on radically differing motivating concepts. They do not differ simply in that the *NE* account is the more interested in legal contexts. They rest on fundamentally different conceptions of the type of control over one’s actions required if one is to be a virtuous or vicious agent.

In recent discussion, several writers have suggested that Aristotle, in his discussion of the *voluntary* is best seen offering a defensible account of moral responsibility of a Kantian type. Others have agreed that Aristotle was drawn to the Kantian view of *voluntary* agents as morally responsible controllers of their destiny but that he was fundamentally mistaken in doing so. Still others have rejected both alternatives, insisting that in the *NE*, the *voluntary* extends more widely than the domain of moral responsibility. In this essay, I have suggested that while in the *NE* Aristotle’s view of the *voluntary* is quite distinct from that suggested by Kantian interpreters, the *EE* may be seen as making a limited but significant step in their direction. For even if the *EE* does not suggest that *voluntary* agents are those who control their desires in the light of reason alone, it does portray them (or at least their natures) as the sole controllers of what we do. In the *NE*, by contrast, *voluntary* agents need only be (in the sense outlined) limited controllers of their actions and characters. Aristotle, in developing the latter more general and convincing account of *voluntary* agents, stands exposed to the following major question: does the (admittedly more realistic) idea of the agent as a limited controller of his actions and character provide enough resources to underpin our practices of praising virtuous agents and actions and blaming their vicious counterparts? The *NE*’s affirmative answer to this question (1114b16–25) constitutes one of its most distinctive and challenging theses. If it is correct, we do not require the demanding (and, for many, especially burdensome) idea that *voluntary* agents must control their desires in the light of reason alone.

36 See, for example, Terry Irwin’s ‘Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle’. For a somewhat contrasting picture, see Susan Sauvé Meyer, *Aristotle on Moral Responsibility*, 18–20. One consideration used to support this approach is the idea, introduced Thomas Aquinas, that, for Aristotle, the virtuous person is the paradigm case of the *voluntary* agent. However, in the *NE*, there is no evidence that directly favours this view. Children, animals, acratics, those acquiring virtue, the self-indulgent, those who have settled bad characters which they cannot reform and the virtuous are all treated as *voluntary* agents without differentiation. While the virtuous, no doubt, exemplify some appropriate ethical ideal, there is no indication that Aristotle (in the *NE*) took this fact to make them paradigm *voluntary* agents.

37 See, for example, Bernard Williams’ ‘Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents’, 22–34. Williams describes the view he criticises as the ‘Aristotle-Irwin theory’ (25ff.). I have suggested that Aristotle in the *NE* did not subscribe to this theory. Indeed, in my view, when he wrote the *NE*, he would have agreed with Williams in rejecting it.

exaggerated) Kantian idea of us as the sole controllers of our actions and characters to underwrite our practices of ethical praise and blame. The major philosophical question is whether the NE picture provides enough resources to sustain our deeply held reactive attitudes of ethical praise and blame. But that I shall postpone for another day.39

7. CE V.8: Some Moves beyond the EE Account?

CE V.8 begins with a specification of *voluntary* actions as those actions which rest with the agent and are done knowingly (or not in ignorance), noting that this ‘has been said before.’ (1135a24 f.). Aristotle’s remarks, with their dependence on the notions of actions done knowingly and resting with the agent, recall his discussion in EE II.9, 1225b3 ff. and 8 ff. There is certainly no sign in CE V.8 of the notion central in NE III of the starting point lying in the agent.

It must be ceded, however, there is no overt reference to the distinctively EE understanding of what rests with us. However, this idea may be implicit in CE V.8 when in 1135b2 ff. Aristotle describes a person who repays a debt through fear as doing so *involuntarily* (1135b4), suggesting the Eudemian view of coerced action of this type as *involuntarily* in that it rests on considerations which either do not stem from one’s own nature or which one cannot forbear from acting on. If this is an *involuntary* action, it may be because it is done through a motive which the agent’s nature cannot resist (as in EE).40

There are several respects in which CE V.8 fills gaps in the discussion in the EE. First, in 1135a26 f., Aristotle extends his comments on ignorance by noting that ‘the agent must act with regard to the features mentioned not accidentally’ (1135a26) if he is to act *voluntarily*. This point is exemplified as follows: ‘the person struck could be one’s father, and one grasp that he is a bystander or a man but be unaware that he is your father’ (1135a27 ff.). In this

39 For an excellent diagnosis (and exposé) of the Kantian line of thought, see Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 117–118. Nagel writes of the ‘incoherence’ of the view of freedom which requires us ‘to act from a standpoint completely outside ourselves, choosing everything about ourselves, including all our principles of choice—creating ourselves from nothing.’ He concludes that ‘at the end of the path that seems to lead to freedom and knowledge lie skepticism and helplessness’. (119–120)

40 It might be suggested that in CE V.8 handing back the debt through fear is *voluntary* even though it is done by an unwilling (akon) person, pained by what occurs (compare NE 1110b21). However, since such actions are contrasted with *voluntary* actions in 1135b8, there is reason to take them as *involuntary* (in 1135b3 and 6).
case the agent hits the bystander *voluntarily* but hits his father *involuntarily*. Even though there is one action, the agent performs it *voluntarily* with regard to one feature (hitting the bystander) but *involuntarily* with regard to another (hitting his father). If the agent acts ‘accidentally’ with regard to his father (whom he does not recognise) he does not hit him *voluntarily* even though he acts *voluntarily* with regard to the bystander (whom he hits non-accidentally). The use of the phrases (accidental/non-accidental) in this context shows Aristotle at work employing his favoured vocabulary to talk of one thing (here one action) with relevantly distinct features.

Second, in CE Aristotle qualifies the suggestion that actions which do not rest with us are *involuntary* by focusing on examples such as growing old or dying (1135b2). Although such actions do not rest with us (1135a32) they are not *involuntary* because they do not happen ‘by force’ (biai). Aristotle comments: ‘what occurs not in ignorance but still does not rest with us or rather occurs through force is *involuntary*.’\(^{41}\) In the EE, by contrast, Aristotle suggests that actions which do not rest with us are (in some way) forced (1225a13) and appears inclined to take actions which do not rest with us as involuntary (1225a26 ff.). However, in CE he marks off some actions which do not rest with us from those which are forced and *involuntary*. He is now convinced that not everything which does not rest with us must be either forced or *involuntary*.

There is a third respect in which CE V.8 fills a lacuna in the EE account. In 1136a5–8 Aristotle classifies actions done in ignorance through a passion which is neither part of our nature nor common to all men as *involuntary* but not pardonable. This remark is an advance on Aristotle’s aporetic remarks in EE II.9 where, as we noted, actions done in ignorance brought on by a passion specific to the person in question (such as negligence or his distinctive pleasures or pains) are now classified as *involuntary* but not pardonable. In EE II.9 Aristotle noted that there were cases where ignorance was induced by negligence, pleasure or pain but did not classify them, noting only that ‘these issues must be added in our definition’, without noting how this was to be done. Now he is suggesting a way of making the necessary additions:

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\(^{41}\) In this passage, the final ‘or’ is used to clarify the preceding clause as indicated by the explanation in the next sentence ‘for we do or suffer many natural [processes] which are neither *voluntary* nor *involuntary* such as growing old or dying.’ (1135a33–b2). Without the qualification introduced by ‘or rather by force’ such phenomena would wrongly be counted as *involuntary*. I gladly acknowledge a longstanding debt to John Ackrill for advice on these sentences.
i. actions can be *involuntary* (*akousia*), even if not done through ignorance (contrast 1225b8);
ii. cases of negligence (*ameleia*) are *involuntary* (*akousia*) but not pardonable;
iii. cases of ignorance brought on by pain/pleasure/negligence are *involuntary* (*akousia*) but not pardonable.

These remarks appear to be an attempt to fill the gaps he had noted in the *EE* account, building on that account (with its reliance on the ideas of what rests with us and what is done knowingly) but adding further detail to his definition of the *voluntary* and the *involuntary*.

The additions are important. If, for example, drunkenness is a passion which is specific to a particular agent, his action done in ignorance resulting from drunkenness will not be *voluntary* but will not be pardonable either. In *CE V.8* Aristotle’s discussion is based (in large measure) on legal considerations of justice, punishment and acting unjustly. In this respect, the focus is wider than that of the character-expressing actions (*praxeis*) discussed in the *EE*. His remarks in 1136a5–8 seem to flow from a legal perspective: some actions, although *involuntary*, are not pardonable because the agent came to do them because of his own specific nature. He was the cause of the resulting actions even if they were not done knowingly.

In making this claim Aristotle shows that an action’s being *voluntary* is not (in his view) a necessary condition for praise and blame. For actions done in ignorance through drunkenness will (in *CE V.8*) be classified as *involuntary* but blameworthy. In these remarks Aristotle is clarifying the connections between the *voluntary* and praise and blame which were left unclear in the *EE*.

In sum: *CE V.8* contains some additions to the discussion in the *EE* although not ones which are inconsistent with that account. However, *CE V.8* does bring to the fore the legal context which was largely absent from the *EE* discussion and uses it to clarify the status of actions done in ignorance for which the person is the cause.

8. *Is There an Intelligible Route from EE II to NE III.1–5 via CE V.8?*

As we have seen, the *NE* account focuses on legal contexts as well as ethical ones, adopting the more inclusive canvas with which *CE V* (but not *EE*) operates. However, *NE III* goes beyond the *CE* and *EE* accounts in introducing the idea of choice (*haireton*) as the distinctive starting point in the agent which leads to both *voluntary* actions and *voluntary* states. Once
this concept is in place, Aristotle can give a different account of coerced actions than the ones suggested in either *CE* V.8 or *EE* II.

One can see why Aristotle would introduce the idea of choice as the starting point for "voluntary" actions and states in the *NE*, given his discussion in *CE* V.8. There are problems concerning the notion of nature: individual natures (as expressed in passions which are not part of our general nature or common to all men) makes actions in ignorance non pardonable while the self same actions (if they resulted from ignorance which was common to all men) would be pardonable. But why should the mere fact that ignorance stems from something specific to the individual make it non-pardonable? He might, after all, not to be to blame for his distinctive condition: it could be the result of an accident he suffered or an illness specific to his constitution (see 1114a26 ff.). Equally, perhaps we should all be blamed for actions springing from ignorance brought on by a passion to which we all are prone (e.g. getting angry in certain conditions). It is not at all obvious why the fact that a condition is generally shared should be relevant. Perhaps it is the result of a passion which we all generate in our own cases and could all easily avoid. If so, why should the fact that it is commonly shared make the resulting actions (in ignorance) pardonable? At this point Aristotle needs the idea, prominently deployed in the *NE* discussion, of ignorance that follows from our choices to escape the problems that spring from an over-reliance on the idea of nature.

There is, if this is correct, an intelligible route from the *EE* discussion of the "voluntary" to the *NE* account via *CE* V.8. The *CE* remarks, although looking back to the *EE*, build on it by introducing the legal context and classifying certain actions as "involuntary" but non-pardonable. In the *NE* Aristotle deploys the legal context introduced in *CE* V.8 but goes beyond it by introducing the crucial idea of choice as the relevant starting point for "voluntary" actions and states. Given this addition he can replace the somewhat insecure idea of nature as his key concept with that of man as the limited controller of his (or her) actions.\(^{42}\)

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42 This is not to say that *CE* V.8 must be regarded as a part of the *EE*. It might, for all that has been said, be part of a separate small treatise on justice composed after the *EE* but before the *NE* (as parts of the *Metaphysics* may represent different attempts at similar topics at different times.) It is a major step to conclude from the fact that *CE* V.8 is closer to the *EE* in some important respects that they are parts of one continuous treatise. Indeed, the question 'are *CE* V–VII best taken as parts of the *NE* or *EE*?' may not be the right one. For, it needs to be established (i) that *CE* V–VII form one continuous treatise, not two or more distinct treatises, composed at different times and (ii) that *CE* V–VII (or parts of them) are not stepping stones on Aristotle's route from one treatise to another, written after the *EE* but before the *NE*. We
Seen in this light, we are able to fill two of the gaps we earlier saw in the \textit{NE} account. Aristotle can rely on his remarks on action individuation in \textit{CE} and \textit{EE} in his discussion of *voluntary* actions and ignorance in \textit{NE} III. 1. Oedipus’ famous action at the ill-fated crossroads can be *voluntary* in one respect (hitting the old man) but involuntary in another (hitting his father). Further, he can use his \textit{CE} V.8 account of actions done in ignorance brought on by drunkenness to spell out his understanding of how Pittacus’ law applies to those who are ignorant because of drunkenness. The resulting action is to be punished although it is *involuntary* because it is the result of ignorance induced by drunkenness. (Indeed it is to be punished twice as much as it would if the action had resulted from ignorance caused by negligence or anger.) So understood, there is no reason to count this action as *voluntary* simply because it is blamed. Although *involuntary* it can be censured because it is the result of a *voluntary* state (ignorance) induced by the agent’s own choice to get drunk. In this case, blame is applied both to the drink-induced ignorance (a *voluntary* passion) and to the *involuntary* action that results.\footnote{It is, it seems, more difficult to see an intelligible route running in the opposite direction. On this account, the broader legal context which is to the fore in discussions of the *voluntary* in \textit{NE} and \textit{CE} would be dropped in favour of an exclusive focus on character-revealing \textit{praxeis} in which Aristotle uses a unifying, but problematic and underspecified, idea of nature as the basis of his account. This latter direction suggests forgetfulness and decline rather than a rational progress towards a more inclusive, explanatory and unified account of *voluntary* actions and states.\footnote{If we are to make sense of Aristotle’s writings as the result of philosophical reflection and refinement, the order of his discussion will begin with the \textit{EE} and conclude with the \textit{NE} (with the \textit{CE} as a step in the progress from one to the other).\footnote{For further discussion see my \textit{Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action}, 256–259. If this is correct, there is no reason to follow David Bostock, \textit{Aristotle’s Ethics}, 110–111 in taking the act itself to be *voluntary* even though done in drunken ignorance. \footnote{This is not to say that Aristotle’s development in his ethical writings was not, in fact, marked by forgetfulness and decline. I think, however, that we should see his development as rationally intelligible (moving towards a more inclusive, unitary and explanatory account) unless there is decisive historical evidence against this hypothesis. To do so makes sense of his development in philosophical terms.}}}}

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need more detailed three way comparisons on topics discussed in the \textit{EE}, \textit{NE} and \textit{CE} (such as \textit{acrasia}, self-control, preferential choice and virtue) to make further progress with this issue.\footnote{I am much indebted to Ursula Coope, Larry Jost, Anthony Kenny, Jessica Moss, Carlo Natali, Jennifer Whiting and Marco Zingano for helpful discussions of these issues. Earlier}
References


versions of this essay were read at the University of Sao Paolo and at the Keeling Colloquium in University College, London.
This paper will be almost exclusively about the *Eudemian Ethics*, with rather little reference to its *Nicomachean* counterpart. Substantive discussion of bread-and-butter passages of the *Eudemian* (as opposed, say, to its tattered but purple ending), of the sort that will occupy me here, is something that rarely happens in the way that is normal with the *Nicomachean*. The priority of regard that this implies for the *Nicomachean* is understandable enough, given the force of habit, the relative state of the Greek texts, the relative quality of the available modern texts and translations, and so on. But all the same it is more than slightly odd, given that nowadays everyone accepts that the *Eudemian* was written by Aristotle, that it shows at least some important differences from the *Nicomachean* (wherever these are to be located), and that—on the balance of the arguments—it was actually the original home of at least a version of three of the *Nicomachean* books. So on this occasion the *Eudemian* will get a hearing, and serious discussion, even if next week we—among whom I include myself—all go back to talking about Aristotle’s ethics as if it were coextensive with the *Nicomachean* (plus bits and pieces from the non-ethical treatises), with the *Eudemian* in a supporting role.

However I also have a further and more significant motive for tackling the *Eudemian Ethics* independently of its easier-going and more immediately sociable sibling. The biggest unresolved puzzle about the two ethical treatises is that they overlap so much. If they do occasionally diverge, they much more often—and indeed typically?— seem to be saying the same sorts of things as each other, even in the books that are not shared in common between them; only they tend to say them in a different order, with a different emphasis, and/or in a different style. So why did Aristotle write them both? The present paper represents a beginning of the first part of a larger project, which is to understand more exactly what the *Eudemian Ethics* has to say, and so, more exactly, what the differences between the two treatises are. (I shall end by making a small contribution to this topic.) We know
reasonably well, if never well enough, what the *Nicomachean Ethics* is saying, and how; we do not yet have the same familiarity with the argument of the *Eudemian* and the manner of that argument, and are thus not yet in a position to make the kind of detailed comparison between *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* that must be a condition of understanding how they came to exist together. (Nor do I rule out in advance that a better understanding of the *Eudemian* might begin to undermine favoured views about the way the argument of the *Nicomachean* goes.)

In relation to the subject of ‘friendship’, *philìa*, the relationship between the two treatises appears to be particularly close. So it might be particularly tempting to discuss ‘Aristotle on friendship’ from the *Nicomachean* version, with a parenthesis and a couple of footnotes to assure the reader that everything said will cover the *Eudemian* as well. This is John Cooper’s strategy in his 1977 essay, ‘Friendship and the Good in Aristotle’. However the companion essay, also from 1977, ‘Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship’, while following the same general strategy (the piece is throughout focussed on the *Nicomachean*), does discuss what Cooper thinks is a significant difference marking off *Eudemian* from *Nicomachean*: that *Eudemian* fails to give adequate, or at any rate consistent, recognition to the role of *eunoia*, ‘good will’, in all three kinds of friendship. It is around the subject of *eunoia* that a large part of the present paper will be located. (Cooper also thinks that the difference is one sign of the greater maturity of the *Nicomachean*; I shall argue that the difference is illusory, and that there is no evidence here, at least, that *Nicomachean* shows Aristotle moving on from, maturing in respect to, *Eudemian*.) In any case, my own strategy in the present paper will be the reverse of the usual one: I shall attempt to discuss certain aspects of Aristotle’s treatment of *philìa* exclusively on the basis of the *Eudemian*, leaving the *Nicomachean*—as far as I can—to one side. (In fact, as I have already indicated, *Eudemian* will in one important respect turn out after all to agree with *Nicomachean*, but that is not the main point of my argument, which is for the most part simply to begin getting clearer about what Aristotle is saying in the *Eudemian* version, and how.)

The focus of my attention, as the title of the paper suggests, will be the role in Aristotle’s argument about *philìa* of the loving of *things*. For the most part he takes *philìa*, reasonably enough, to be something that exists between persons. (See especially EE VII.2.1236a14–15 ‘There then comes to be a friend when a person who is loved loves in return, and the two people concerned are not somehow unaware of this situation [sc. that the other person loves them in return]: *philos dê ginetai hotan philoumenos antiphilêi, kai touto mê lanthanêi pòs autous*. Things, unlike people, do not
love a person back.) Nevertheless the whole treatment has begun, earlier in chapter 2 (1235b18 ff.), from the question ‘what is it that is loved? What is to philoumenon [neuter]?’ In other words, if we love anything, whether person or object, what will it be about that person or object that causes us to love it? Answer: either it will be good (agathon/agathos), or it will be useful (chrêsimon/chrêsimos), or it will be pleasant (hêdu/hêdus).

This is helpfully put in a larger context by a passage in Anthony Price’s Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle. In his chapter on ‘Friendship and Desire in the Lysis’, Price discusses the way Aristotle exploits the Lysis:

Uncertain what to make of [the argument of the Lysis], we may first look to see how Aristotle exploits it. Firstly, the Lysis provides, or confirms, many of the commonplaces that form the background to his own discussion. [A list follows.] Secondly, Plato’s failure in the Lysis to define friendship in relation to the various uses of philos … inspires Aristotle’s success …: ‘A man becomes a friend whenever being loved he loves in return’ (EE VII.2, 1236a14–15, cf. NE VIII.2, 1155b27–28). Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, Aristotle’s success does not separate him from one of the assumptions that is causing Plato trouble … Plato assumes a close connection between philos in the senses of ‘friend’ and of ‘dear’; indeed, he fails to distinguish them, and so, to our eyes, wambles in and out of discussion of friendship in a way that threatens to dissolve the topic. Aristotle keeps the senses apart, but does not discard Plato’s attention to things, as well as persons, that are dear. Indeed, he grounds, and classifies, kinds of friendship by reference to different categories of things that are loved: just as inanimate objects can be loved as being good, pleasant, or useful, so can men (EE VII.2, 1236a10–14); just as the good, pleasant, and useful differ in kind, so do loves and friendships (NE VIII.3, 1156a6–8). Hence both Plato and Aristotle view friendship against the general background of the structure of human desire. Aristotle’s more developed analogue to Plato’s ‘first dear’ [i.e. proton philon, the ‘first friend of’ Lysis 219d1] came earlier (NE I.2, 1094a18–22, EE I.8, 1218b9–12 [on the good as hierarchical end of human actions]), but for him the problem about how the good man can need friends reduces to the question how friends can contribute to his own final good or eudaimonia (cf. NE IX.9, 1169b3–4, EE VII.12, 1244b5).

(Love and Friendship, 9–10)

In Price’s sights at this point is Gregory Vlastos, who finds a clear contrast between ‘the lover Socrates has in mind’ in the Lysis, who ‘seems positively incapable of loving others for their own sake’ …, and Aristotle’s formula for perfect friendship, ‘wishing another’s good for his sake, not for yours’ …, which Vlastos locates as ‘still far from the Kantian conception of treating persons as “ends in themselves”’, and yet ‘the closest any philosopher comes to it in classical antiquity’. (Love and Friendship, 10)

On the next page, Price himself finds that ‘a contrast between an egoistic Plato and an altruistic Aristotle is imported [sc. by Vlastos], not discovered;
I hope that it will become evident in the course of this book that it can nowhere be made out’. Price’s thesis, in short, is that Aristotle does not make even the qualified kind of Kantian leap away from Plato’s ‘egoism’ that Vlastos supposes.

This disagreement between Price and Vlastos about Aristotle’s position is clearly fundamental. Generally speaking, Price seems to have had the better of the argument; at any rate, most people now seem to recognize that whatever it was, precisely, that Aristotle wants say when he talks about loving other people ‘for themselves’, it has nothing very much to do with any Kantian idea of loving them as ‘ends in themselves’. Sarah Broadie makes a basic distinction here, between two different ways in which Aristotle wants to say friends love each other, wish good for each other, ‘for the other’s own sake’. (The whole of the argument of the following ten or so pages will depend on Sarah Broadie’s being right about this; I myself have no doubt at all that she is.) Aristotle offers

a wide and a narrow interpretation. In the wide one, operative [in *NE* VIII.2], the contrast is with wishing that something or someone be safe and sound simply in order that the thing or person serve some purpose of one’s own (1155b29–31). The wide sense is a condition of each of the three types of friendship … (Broadie in Broadie and Rowe, 409)

i.e., friendship based on excellence, the type based on usefulness, and the one based on pleasure. The second, narrower, interpretation Aristotle puts on wishing good for another ‘for the other’s own sake’ is by way of a contrast with ‘wishing goods for someone because of incidental facts about him’, i.e. because he is useful to one or provides one with pleasure. That someone is good or excellent isn’t a merely incidental fact about him; so if one loves him because of that, that will be a matter of loving him ‘for his own sake’ (or ‘because of himself’, *di’hauton*).

Sarah Broadie develops this distinction between two ways of loving a person ‘for his own sake’ in a discussion of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but it applies equally to the *Eudemian*—or so I shall claim in what follows; the claim will be to some degree controversial and/or (or at least) less than straightforward.

First, the narrow interpretation, because there will not be anything controversial about finding that in the *Eudemian*. The two passages where this narrow interpretation of wishing a friend good ‘for his own sake’/‘because of himself’ appears most clearly are probably (1) VII.2, 1236b27–31, and (2) VII.2, 1237a39–b5 (these are cases where Aristotle is evidently expressing his own point of view, and not merely reporting what people generally, or some people, think). The first passage runs:
But since good unqualifiedly (haplôs) and pleasant unqualifiedly are the same and go together, unless something gets in the way, and the true and unqualified friend is the first [sc. the friend whose friendship is based on excellence], and such is the person who is desirable (hairetos) himself because of (dia) himself (and he must be such; for as (hôs) one wishes him to have the good things one wishes for him because of what he is himself (di’hauton), necessarily one must also desire him to be/exist [sc. and not to be someone else?] ... 

This is complemented by the second passage:

But since active loving (philein) is treating the thing loved [reading tôi philomenôi] qua loved [neuter], and the friend is, for the one who is his friend, something loved qua friend, and not qua musician or doctor [sc. and so not qua someone who gives him pleasure, or is useful to him]: then (toinun) the pleasure that comes from him, qua himself—this is the pleasure that belongs to friendship. For he loves him; he doesn’t love him because he’s someone else. So if one doesn’t enjoy (chairêi) someone qua good, it won’t be the primary kind of friendship.

Now for the more controversial, or at any rate more difficult, part. Does the Eudemian Aristotle ever offer us the broader interpretation Sarah Broadie attributes to him of wishing goods for someone ‘for his own sake’/‘because of himself’—that is (and this is the point at issue), the kind of wishing goods for someone that contrasts with ‘wishing that something or someone be safe and sound simply in order that the thing or person serve some purpose of one’s own’—as ‘a condition of each of the three types of friendship’? I think he does:

Good will (eunoia) is neither something entirely different from friendship, nor the same thing. For given that friendship has been divided according to three ways [sc. of loving], it [sc. eunoia] isn’t either in the useful one (en têi chrêsimêi) or in the one according to pleasure (en têi kath’hêdonên). For if on the one hand (eite) one wishes someone the goods one wishes him because it is useful (hoti chrêsimon), one wouldn’t be wishing them for him because of him but because of oneself, and like ...?, good will too seems not to be for the sake of [reading heneka] the person who has it but for the person towards whom he has it; if on the other hand [reading eite dê] there were to be good will in the friendship for the pleasant then people would have good will even towards inanimate things. So it is clear that good will relates to the ethical sort of friendship [the sort based on character: êthikê philia].

(EE VII.7, 1241a3–10)

So far it may be tempting to see here another case where wishing good ‘for the sake of the other’ is being specifically excluded from U (useful)- and P (pleasurable)-friendships; and so actually another case of the narrow interpretation. However what follows immediately makes this reading distinctly less attractive—especially if we take away, as I shall go on to suggest we
should, the support it appears to get from a8–9 ‘if on the other hand there were to be good will in the friendship for the pleasant ...’ (note: ‘if there were to be’, an evident counter-factual):

But what belongs to the person having good will is just wishing, whereas what belongs to the friend is also to do what he wishes for. For good will is a beginning of friendship; for every friend has good will, whereas not everyone who has good will is a friend. For the one who has good will [towards someone] and no more than that resembles someone at the beginning, which is why good will is a beginning of friendship but not friendship. (1241a10–14)

Lines 4–10 made it plausible—if not more than plausible—to suppose that Aristotle means to restrict good will to E (excellence)-friendships, and to say that only E-friends, not U- and P-friends, can have good will towards their respective friends ‘for themselves’—or indeed can have good will at all, because ‘good will ... seems not to be for the sake of the person who has it but for the person towards whom he has it’: a7–8 (sc. and so cannot be had by those in U- and P-friendships; their good will, if they had it, would in effect be for themselves, insofar as what they love is the profit or pleasure they get out of the relationship for themselves). Lines 10–14, however, and especially the words I have italicized, seem to me to make trouble for this reading. Of course we could try supposing that when Aristotle says ‘every friend has good will [for his friend]’ he means just every E-friend—and this may even appear to be the natural and obvious reading. However it is not a straightforward solution. Apart from the problem that Aristotle may later on actually allow that wishing good things for one’s friend is a characteristic of all three kinds of friendship, it is at least not straightforward to see how, if it is in fact restricted only to E-friendship, it could be said that good will is ‘neither something entirely different from friendship [sc., presumably, in general], nor the same thing’ (1241a3–4). Moreover—if we do take a10–14 in the way proposed (an option that I shall myself go on to reject)—by the time we have reached a12, eunoia will have turned out to be even further from friendship (in general): no more than a beginning (not of friendship as a whole but just) of one type of it, albeit the primary one. (So how could Aristotle have made the claim he did in a3–4, apparently on his own account, about the closeness of eunoia to friendship—i.e., it seems, friendship without distinction?) And one of the recurrent themes of Aristotle’s whole discussion of philia up till now, or at least since VII.2, 1236a16, has been precisely that we should not refuse to call non-E-friendships friendships. Under such circumstances, should it not be at least surprising to find Aristotle suddenly saying, on his own account, ‘every friend has good will’, if what he wanted to say was just ‘every [that is, every E-] friend has good will’?
But in any case—and this seems to me the most powerful point—Aristotle cannot legitimately claim, in the preceding lines, to have ruled out (or, better, we could not legitimately claim him to have ruled out) good will for one’s friend at least in the case of P-friendships. For the argument ‘then people would have good will even towards inanimate things’ (1241a8–9) will hardly serve to rule out P-friends’ having good will towards one another, when P-friendships have been firmly said to be between persons (most clearly and explicitly at VII.2, 1236a10–15, when he laid down the basic features of friendship). If, then, good will were to be found in P-friendships, then, why would that entail that one could have it towards inanimate objects? Or has Aristotle changed his mind, and decided that in P-friendships *philia* is after all for things as well as human beings? (It will then remain to be explained quite what, in this case, is meant by the protasis ‘if … there were to be good will in the friendship for the pleasant’; I shall return to this question in a moment.)

In short, I propose that an alternative reading of 1241a1–14 is needed—one that will respect the fact that a4–10 must give a justification for the claim that good will is neither the same nor wholly different from friendship (because of the *gar* that introduces it: *diērēmenēs gar* ..., a4), while still allowing it to be true that ‘every friend has good will’. We may begin from the fact that, on any reading, Aristotle does not want to restrict good will to E-friendships (‘not everyone who has good will is a friend’), despite a9–10 (‘So it is clear that good will relates to the ethical sort of friendship’). True, *NE* IX.5, 1167a10–18 says that good will won’t ever turn into U- or P-friendship, and suggests that U- and P-friendship won’t turn into the sort of good will that, Aristotle allows, may turn into E-friendship; but why should U- and P-friends not also have *eunoia* for each other, as they are allowed to do in the *Nicomachean* (VIII.2, 1155b27–34)? They will do so precisely because they have been, or are, useful to each other, or have given (or give) each other pleasure: why not? And the Aristotle of the *Nicomachean*, at any rate, seems to agree: see *NE* IX.5, 1167a14–18: ‘... a person who has been benefited metes out good will in return for what he has received, and justly so’, whereas ‘one who wishes someone else to do well in the hope of doing well through him does not seem to have good will so much towards the other person as towards himself, just as he won’t be a friend, either, if the attention he pays the other is because of some use he wants to get out of it’. The phrasing at *Eudemian* VII.7.1241a6 is careful: not ‘if ... one wishes someone ... goods ... because *he* is useful ...’, but ‘if one wishes someone goods because *it* [sc. wishing him goods] is useful’. The U-friend won’t have good will towards his friend because
wishing him well will be useful, but he can still have good will towards him because he is or has been useful.

In fact it is precisely the point of the *Eudemian* discussion, in its first movement (as it were: i.e. 1241a4–10), to use good will, *eunoia*, to help distinguish friendship from mere self-serving. What Aristotle is talking about there is not U- and P-friendships as such, but U- and P-friendships when these are understood just as ‘friendships’ for the useful and the pleasant (with an inference about E-friendship added in a9–10). Aristotle began back in VII.2 by establishing three things as objects of *philia*, understood in the most general way—to quote Price’s summing up again:

Aristotle ... does not discard Plato’s attention to things, as well as persons, that are dear. Indeed, he grounds, and classifies, kinds of friendship by reference to different categories of things that are loved: just as inanimate objects can be loved as being good, pleasant, or useful, so can men ...

(EE VII.2, 1236a10–14)

What Aristotle now does, in (VII.7) 1241a3–10, is to refer back to that first and fundamental move of his, in which he identified what might be called three types of motivation. Or at least that is what he is doing in a4–9: i.e., talking (not about U- and P-friendships as such, but) about U- and P-friendships seen just in terms of that basic relationship each involves with its peculiar *philoumenon*. This is how we should take the expression ‘the friendship for (of) the pleasant’, *hê tou hêdeos philia*, in a9: that is, *tou hêdeos* is neuter, not masculine. But in any case we have no alternative but to take *hê tou hêdeos philia* in this way, because only so can we make sense of the argument. ‘If ... there were to be good will in the friendship for the pleasant then people would have good will even towards inanimate things’: only, that is, if ‘the friendship for the pleasant’ still allows in *philia* for inanimate things in the first place (so we are not talking about P-friendship proper, and if so, not U-friendship proper in a5–8 either).

But then the very reasons for excluding good will from ‘friendships’ for the useful and the pleasant show us why it not only won’t be excluded from ‘the ethical sort of friendship’, i.e. E-friendship, but will be integral to it: ‘So it is clear that good will relates to [‘is about’] the ethical sort of friendship’ (a9–10). It cannot be ‘either in the useful friendship or in the one according to pleasure’ (a5): not ‘in the useful friendship’, because concern for the useful is self-regarding (a5–8) rather than other-regarding (as good will is), and not in ‘the one according to pleasure’ because the impulse towards *philia* of pleasure might in itself just as well be towards inanimate objects (a9). ‘The ethical sort of friendship’, by contrast, the one based in ‘friendship for the good’, is already essentially other-regarding,
i.e. because it involves loving a person ‘for the sake of/because of himself’ (II.2, 1236b27–31 and 1237a39–b5 again), and *a fortiori* involves human objects.

In short, a4–10 shows Aristotle showing one reason why goodwill cannot be quite the same thing as friendship—because it has a special connection with one of its three types. This will be one of the reasons why E-friendship is identified as primary. In E-friendship, goodwill is an integral feature, deriving directly from the basic motivation involved, in a way that it does not so derive in the case of U- or P-friendships. One does not have to have goodwill for people who are useful or pleasant. But friendship would not be friendship at all without goodwill: ‘every friend has goodwill’ (a12–13).

Indeed, one might reasonably say—prompted by Aristotle’s claim about the closeness of the relationship between *eunoia* and friendship—that for him, even in the *Eudemian Ethics*, it is mutual goodwill that is the main factor separating human *philia*, i.e. *philia* properly so-called, from *philia* understood in terms of the three basic types of motivation. So it will actually be a part of U- and P-friendships too; that is, there’ll have to be an element of loving people, wishing them good ‘for their own sake’ in them too, if they are to be friendships, and Aristotle insists that they are. Whatever other people may say, there are friendships based on utility and pleasure (i.e. insofar as we can have goodwill towards someone, and ‘for his own sake’, just because he is—or has been—useful/pleasant to us). So then, if this is the way the argument is meant to go, friendship and goodwill will do go together. ‘But’—and now, in a10, Aristotle comes to the main reason why goodwill is not the same thing as friendship—‘what belongs to the person having goodwill is just wishing, whereas what belongs to the friend is also to do what he wishes for ... Every friend has goodwill [for his friend], but not everyone who has goodwill is a friend ...’

That concludes my long, and perhaps unnecessarily tortuous, justification of the claim that in the *Eudemian Ethics* as well as the *Nicomachean* Aristotle recognizes that in the inferior types of friendship too friends wish each other good, not just with an eye to their own interests, but ‘for their friends’ sake’. However the target that interests me more, for the purposes of this paper (given its title), is actually the other, narrower aspect of wishing people good ‘for their own sake’: the aspect that separates E-friends from other sorts of friends. (In other words, the paper is not intended merely to help bring clarity just to the narrow subject of *eunoia* in *EE*.) My further and larger question is what exactly it is, for Aristotle, that causes E-friends to love each other for themselves; or, more precisely, given that they love each other because of excellence, what is it that they are supposed
to love about other people's excellence? How is it that love of others' qualities is supposed to derive, as it evidently is, from E-friends' 'basic motivation' (as I put it)? Good people love what is unqualifiedly, haplôs, good, which is also what is unqualifiedly pleasant, i.e. the exercise of the excellences; that is what motivates their own actions. But why should they be similarly attracted by their friends' exercise of their (their friends') excellences?

The problem can be set up like this. Aristotle proposes (1) that excellence, aretê, is something haplôs good; (2) that the good person loves both what is haplôs good and what is/seems good to/for him (and what is pleasant or useful to him); (3) that in the case of the good person loving the haplôs good coincides with loving what is good to/for him; (4) that no one loves what is not good to/for him; (5) that a person's own excellence is good to/for him; but (6)—given (1), that excellence is haplôs good—other people's excellence is also good to/for the good person. (6) is put in the form 'So that since the primary friendship is in accordance with excellence, [the friends in this friendship] will themselves, too, be haplôs, unqualifiedly, good' (VII.2, 1237a10–11). Then, Aristotle seems set to suggest (7) that, because of (2), i.e. the coincidence between haplôs good and good to/for the one loving in the case of good/excellent people, they will love other excellent people too. Only (6), and then (7), do not seem to follow. The good, in loving their own excellence, do love both what is unqualifiedly good and what is good to/for themselves; but why should others' excellence, for all that it is unqualifiedly good, matter to them? What is it to them? And for what is nothing to us, we have Aristotle's own word for it that we won't love it ((4) above).

It ought, I think, to go without saying that good in this whole context, as one of the objects of philia, has to be understood in terms of a thing's, or a person's, contribution towards our own end, our eudaimonia (no one can seriously doubt this, if Eudemian VII belongs to the same work, and the same overall argument, as Eudemian I). So when in VII.5 Aristotle distinguishes between desiring something hôs en telei as opposed to pros to telos (1239b26–27), his concern is exclusively with the agent's end, and with no one else's. It is this conception of good that carries him through the whole of the argument of EE VII, and is what now causes his problem—a problem which, I think, he immediately recognizes and tries to answer. After reinforcing his claim in 1237a10–11 about human excellence in general as something haplôs good (‘... the excellence of what is by nature good, spoudaios, is haplôs good’, 1237a17), Aristotle claims that it is also pleasant—and at once launches into the question
whether there is friendship without pleasure, and what the difference is, and in which of the two the loving is, whether because the person is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not because of this [sc. not because he is pleasant] ...

(VII.2, 1237a19–21)

His answer to these questions, so far as I can make it out, amounts to saying that at any rate good and pleasant always seem to go together in friendship, whether because the activity of loving is pleasant (insofar as all activity is), because recognizing those familiar to us (sunêtheis) is like fresh understanding or learning (and equally pleasant), or (just) because the haplôs good is haplôs pleasant; in making a mutual choice of each other’s acquaintance, good people are making a mutual choice of things that are haplôs good and pleasant because good and pleasant. But in the immediate sequel, the emphasis begins to fall on the pleasant, rather than the good, as what motivates the friends: thus ‘loving is the thing they enjoy, not being loved’, and (a passage I have cited before)

... since active loving is treating the thing loved qua loved, and the friend is, for the one who is his friend, something loved qua friend, and not qua musician or doctor: then the pleasure that comes from him, qua himself—this is the pleasure that belongs to friendship. For he loves him; he doesn't love him because he's someone else. So if one doesn't enjoy someone qua good, it won't be the primary kind of friendship.

(VII.2, 1237a40–b5)

This is not in the least to say that the aspect of the good, in and by itself, is forgotten; far from it. Thus in VII.2, 1238a3–8 Aristotle makes his strongest statement yet about the need for the haplôs good to coincide with ‘your’ good (alla kai soi, etc.), if there’s to be a primary kind of friendship between ‘you’ and another. ‘A person is haplôs good by being good, but a friend by being good to another’—but not by being useful to him. But now the same question arises again: how will he be good to him, if not by being useful? And in the next stretch of argument, beginning at 1237b10, Aristotle shows the same tendency as before to emphasize the pleasure of the primary kind of friendship. As he begins to round off the whole discussion in VII.2, he even describes E-friendship as ‘the one in accordance with excellence, and [sc. the one] because of the pleasure that comes from excellence’ (1238a30–31). Evidently what makes the haplôs good person good to/for another good person is, primarily, that he is pleasant, i.e. both haplôs and to his friend.

Thus even before we get to VII.12, containing the Eudemian version of the theme of the friend as ‘second self’, Aristotle has already provided an answer to the problem of E-friendship (why the good person should find someone else’s excellence good for him). VII.12 itself appears as another stage in a dialectical argument, implicitly providing what is, perhaps, the best answer
available to the further question: if others' excellence is good/desirable because pleasant, why exactly is it pleasant? The answer, roughly, is that having and being with friends enables us to enjoy pleasures with them (provided they are like us, and share our pleasures); and witnessing their pleasure in the shared activity increases our own pleasure, by heightening our awareness both of it and of ourselves—self-awareness being itself something desirable.

But now, strikingly, in the argument that tries to establish the latter claim, i.e. in VII.12, 1244b23–1245a10, Aristotle makes no reference to the criterion of pleasure: what is desirable is to perceive oneself as being of a certain sort—this is the cause of our desiring life itself. The outcome seems to be that the pleasures of friendship, insofar as these consist in sharing in activities, add to or enhance what we find most desirable/good, rather than constituting in themselves what friendship has to offer us. (According to the ‘common’ book EE VI = NE VII, pleasures ‘are activities and an end’: 1153a10.) If so, then we will have come full circle, and E-friendship will after all be an expression of our desire for, our philia of, the good rather than of our philia for the pleasant: ultimately, E-friendships will be grounded in our friends' contribution to our own good (which, of course, is also something pleasant).

And in consequence—so I conclude—little room will be left for ideas of altruism, however attenuated. E-friend A will have good will towards, wish good to, his E-friend B, because B helps him, A, realise his own end; the difference from the cases of U- and P-friendship will just be that the good will is because of who or what B is, or perhaps better because of what B does as a result of who/what he is: A actually enjoys him, and the activities that result from his being who he is. But, even if A's good will has benefits for B, and A will do as well as wish for good things for B, the basis of A's behaviour is still essentially self-regarding rather than selfless, or 'altruistic'. This is important for our understanding of the whole shape of Aristotle's argument in EE VII: if here in chapter 12 he had suddenly recognized doing things for others as a motivation for action in itself, then he would have abandoned his initial schema of three objects of love or philia, the good, the pleasant and the useful, which to all appearances was intended to be exhaustive. I suppose, theoretically, that Aristotle might have changed his mind in the course of his discussion, and indeed we might wish that he had done so (I myself confess that I do not). I claim, however, that there is no sign at all in the text of such a change of mind.

I add one last observation: in 1971, I claimed that '[NE] is simply longer [than EE, sc. on the subject of friendship, as elsewhere] and—for the most part—more dialectical'. Whatever I meant by that judgment at the time,
I now think it wrong, at any rate so far as concerns the two treatments of friendship. What I now discover in EE VII, and hope in part to have reported, is a single line of argument which is in a proper sense ‘dialectical’: i.e. one in which Aristotle can be seen raising problems, stating positions for himself, raising new problems, suggesting solutions, modifying, restating—and all the time moving towards a coherent conclusion that links back to his starting-points. So far I do not have quite the same sense of the way that NE VIII and IX develop; for all that there are extended dialectical passages in the two books, these tend to be more localized and self-contained. Or so my preliminary survey concludes; I have as yet to make a full comparison. And as I have said, my main subject for now is the Eudemian Ethics, not the Nicomachean, or the relationship between them.

References


CHAPTER THREE
WITH MIRRORS OR WITHOUT?
SELF-PERCEPTION IN EUDEMIAN ETHICS VII.12

Mary Margaret McCabe

1. Reading Aristotle

Aristotle—so I was brought up to think—does not bear comparison with Plato when it comes to the style of his philosophical writing. For—so this comparison goes—Plato writes proper Greek, carefully (even sneakily) composed, while Aristotle’s works are in note-form, spasmodically literary and condensed. But my youthful assumptions did Aristotle an injustice: not only in respect of his style but also in respect of its service to the dialectical engagements we find in his work. For now, I am interested in EE VII.12 (possibly a last chapter, rather than a first); it is an object lesson, I shall say, for my younger self. Attending to its shape and structure, I shall hope to

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1 Antecedents of this paper were given at the Keeling Colloquium and at the B Club in Cambridge. I am most grateful to the audiences on both occasions for their constructive comments, and especially to my Keeling commentator, Julia Annas, and to my colleagues Peter Adamson and David Galloway. Jennifer Whiting has been extremely generous in discussion of this difficult chapter of the EE, for which I am very grateful. I should like to record, also, a more personal debt, to Jennifer and to Bob Heinaman for their kindness and support during the week of the conference. My gratitude and appreciation are also owed to the Leverhulme Trust for the Major Research Fellowship during the tenure of which I wrote this paper. Thanks also to Fiona Leigh both for her skill as an editor and for her patient care in bringing this volume to fruition. I would like, finally, to record a lasting debt to Peter Goldie, for his friendship and for wonderful conversation over many years about moral perception, both sadly curtailed far too early in October 2011.

2 On this see Barnes, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, 7 ff.

3 Many first chapters are notably ornate (e.g. Rhet. 1.3; DA 2.1); the ornaments are in service to the complex dialectical to-and-fro to be found in these chapters. See McCabe ‘Arguments in Context: Aristotle’s Rhetoric and the Platonic challenge’.

4 The text of the EE, including the division of the books, is famously difficult, even after we may have decided the question of its relation to the NE. I have learned a great deal from Whiting’s detailed and rich account. I have not the space here for a detailed discussion of the differences between us, but have recorded some of the focal points in the notes.
show in what follows, makes a difference to how we understand the chapter’s philosophical point.

This chapter is both carefully wrought and thoroughly dialectical. Carefully wrought: Aristotle makes an important point through puns. The issue is whether the self-sufficient person will have, or should have, friends. At 1244b12–14 one of the partners to the debate is claiming both that he should have fewer and fewer friends, as his self-sufficiency increases, and that he would care nothing for this diminution: the claim has, that is to say, both an objective and a subjective component. But the point about ‘caring nothing’, about the subjective aspect, is made with the verb oligôrein—‘think little of’—itself cognate with the objective expressions for ‘few’. This, I suggest, is a deliberate piece of word-play, designed to bring out the objective/subjective contrast which turns out to be central to the chapter as a whole. That suggestion is supported by a second play, on the question whether the self-sufficient person will be lacking in friends (met’ endeias); and whether he will miss them (deisthai at 1244b20–21). Either the lecture notes were of the crass kind—to include the jokes—or this chapter is much more carefully composed than my earlier self would have been disposed to admit.

Second, the dialectical structure. At the opening of EE VII.2 Aristotle offers an account of the method to follow:

We must, then, take the account which will best explain the opinions held on these matters and will resolve the puzzles and contradictions. And this will happen if the opposed opinions are seen to be held reasonably; such an account will be most in agreement with the phenomena; and it will come about that, if what is said is true in one sense but untrue in another, both the opposed opinions will remain.

VII.12 follows this method in a marked manner, and its structure—complex though it is—is best understood in those terms. For it offers, I shall argue, a double assault on its puzzle about friendship—does the self-sufficient

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5. The comparative for δλίγος may be supplied by ἐλάσσων: see LSJ s.v. VI.1; compare the Platonic association of δλιγωρεῖν with περὶ ἐλαχήστου ποιεῖσθαι in the context of Socrates’ version of Achilles’ choice: Apol. 28c, 30a.

6. Kosman, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’, suggests that the chapter is designed to draw our attention to the subject’s consciousness, and thence to consciousness shared with friends. Below, §10, I suggest a different account, in which reflectiveness is more significant than Kosman allows.

7. See Whiting (‘The Nicomachean Account of Philia’) and this volume on the text of 1244b9.

8. Translations of the EE are my own; other texts are translated as indicated.

9. Hence the repetition of εὐλόγως (a term of art at 1235b16?) at 1244b33, 1245a39, 1245b13.
man need friends?—by means of a series of opposed *endoxa*—where those include both the views of others, and the social or psychological phenomena that need to be explained. And the outcome provides both an explanation of the *endoxa* (it shows why they are reasonable in the first place), a rationale for their opposition (it shows why they are both reasonable at once), and a resolution of the difficulties they jointly pose (they are each true in one way, but not in another). In so doing, as is Aristotle’s wont, he provides a much deeper account of what is going on in friendship—especially, as I shall say, in what is involved in doing things together, in ‘togetherness’.

He does so—and this is what will interest me here—in the context of a distinctive discussion of self-perception and friendship; on that discussion turn the modifications of the original *endoxa*, to show how they might indeed be reasonably held true, at once. The chapter, then, is dialectical through and through (all the more so, I shall suggest *en passant*, in Aristotle’s allusion to a Platonic dialogue, the *Symposium*).

2. Three Texts about Self-Perception and the Friend

There are in fact three parallel chapters in Aristotle’s ethical works that talk about the self-sufficient man and his friends, and do so in the context of some kind of claim about self-perception and self-knowledge: *Magna Moralia* 2.15, especially 1213a8–27; *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9, especially 1170b5–14; and *Eudemian Ethics* VII.12, especially 1245a29–b4. About these three texts we might think that they all say pretty much the same thing, and so might conclude that obviously the *NE* chapter (which picks up on subtle stuff from the psychological treatise, *de Anima*) is the most interesting.

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10 If the chapter is, as I claim, carefully wrought, then the use of the *συν*- prefixes and their explication throughout the central passage of argument is significant: e.g. the initial puzzle denying the importance of *συζυγία*, 1244b7; the comparison between living together 1244b7 and living alone, 1244b17 (retaining *μόνος* here, see below, n. 42); the insistent *συν*-prefixes, 1244b25–26; *συζυγία* glossed in terms of something in common compared to something together, 1245a11–15; and other ‘together’ expressions e.g. 1245a32, 1245a37, 1245b3, 4, 5, 8, 10; 1245b22, 24.

and sophisticated; or we might think that they do not say the same thing, but anyway the NE chapter is the most interesting and sophisticated (just because it picks up on the subtle stuff from *de Anima*). Either conclusion may be too hasty.

2a. *With Mirrors* ...

I begin with the *Magna Moralia*:

Let us leave on one side the question of what god contemplates; for we are making a study, not about god's self-sufficiency, but about man's—whether the self-sufficient man will need friendship or not. Now suppose someone looks at his friend and sees what he is and of what sort [and says to himself] 'this man is just such as I'—if we imagine a friend of the closest sort—whence the saying 'This is another Heracles, my friend is another I.'

Now knowing oneself is, as some of the wise have said, a very difficult thing; and it is very pleasant, too ('to know oneself is pleasant'). But we are unable to contemplate ourselves by our own resources (that we are unable [sometimes cannot] to do so is made evident from the things we blame others for while escaping our own notice doing the very same thing. This often happens through favour or emotion: these things darken good judgement for many of us).

So just as when we want to see our own faces we look into the mirror and see, likewise when we want to know ourselves, looking into our friend, we know. For the friend is, as we say, another I. Then if it is pleasant to know oneself,

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12. There seems to be a lacuna here.

13. The text here is a mess: but however it should read, it seems that here ἐγῶ = ‘self’, as also at 1213a11, 1213a24. This passage suggests that the saying had two clauses, the first about Heracles, the second about 'I' or the self. In the companion passages in the EE and the NE, then, we might expect some expression for ‘self’ in the second clause, such as the reflexive αὐτός (pace Whiting this volume). The saying seems to refer to some joint enterprise on which Heracles is engaged with a friend, without whom he is just one against many (cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 89c); the allusion is perhaps to his being helped in the slaying of the Hydra by Iolaus (see Plato, *Euthydemus* 297); see below, n. 68.

14. Armstrong (*Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics* ad loc.) construes this as a proverb, to get rid of the repetition.

15. Does 'we are unable to contemplate' mean that we cannot ever contemplate ourselves by our own resources? Or that we are (sometimes, even often) unable to contemplate? The corollary—that we decry in others what we escape our own notice doing—implies, I think, that these are somehow faults in us, and so a weakness, not a total incapacity of our natures. So 'we are unable to contemplate' means 'we are sometimes unable to contemplate' and 'knowledge is impossible' means that this kind of self-knowledge cannot be a permanent state of mind; compare the point about θεωρία at NE X. Further issues of modality recur in Aristotle’s discussions of perception and intellec tion; I return to this issue below, and see Johanssen, ‘In defense of inner sense’, McCabe, ‘Perceiving that we see and hear: Aristotle on Plato on judgement and reflection’. 
and this knowledge is impossible without another who is a friend then the
self-sufficient man will need a friend in order to know himself.  

\textit{(MM 1213a8–27)}

This \textit{MM} text represents a view that has acquired some notoriety in later philosophical thought\textsuperscript{17}. It supposes that the friend is the mirror of the self and that we get self-knowledge by looking at ourselves in them. Self-knowledge, then, is treated as self-perception: and this treatment will be the focus of my attention in what follows. Its notoriety, perhaps, derives from two quite different aspects—the first is the sheer \textit{instrumentality} of the way it thinks about friendship (so the first is an ethical matter); the second is the \textit{model of the mind} in which seeing ourselves has looking in a mirror as a suitable analogue (so this is both an epistemological and a metaphysical matter). I shall begin with the second, and its epistemological dimension: why might it be problematic to think that my friend is like a mirror, so that I may perceive myself (and thence come to know myself) in him? I shall return, at the end, to ethics, and to metaphysics, too.

There are (at least) two problems from the start in thinking about self-perception.

i) When I (seek to) perceive myself\textsuperscript{18}, how do I parse this ‘myself’? Is the self I see the \textit{object} of my seeing (so I see myself in just the same way as I see my goldfish: that the object of my perception is in fact identical with me is somehow an opportune accident). Or is the self I see seen as the \textit{subject} of the seeing (so that I recognise that this is seeing done by me, when I see myself)? Likewise, if I seek to perceive myself in my friend, is my aim to see myself as an object of perception (that patch of pink, for example, or that patch of salt-and-pepper brown, or that face) or to see myself as the subject of perception, as seeing (the seer of that patch of pink etc.)?

The mirrors may illuminate: if I see myself in a mirror, the self that I see seems to be the object of my seeing; mirrors tell me less about myself as the perceiving subject. Suppose, for example, that we sought to understand conscious awareness (not, as I shall argue, the only construal of my seeing myself seeing), it seems to me we would be unlikely to stand before a mirror to find it out.

\textsuperscript{16} Translation by St. G. Stock in J. Barnes, ed., \textit{The Complete Works of Aristotle}. I have made minor modifications especially to retain the prominent visual vocabulary of the original.

\textsuperscript{17} E.g. Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, 186.

\textsuperscript{18} The same question, \textit{mutatis mutandis}, for knowing: the case of seeing may be thought the most problematic in respect of our own assumptions about the private and privileged nature of perception: see below, § 7.
ii) When I perceive myself, however I do that, what is the content of my perception? Perhaps I see a raw sight: that patch of pink, or this patch of salt-and-pepper brown. Or perhaps the content is more cooked: I see that this woman is wearing spectacles; or I see that this woman wearing spectacles is me. Perhaps it is even twice-cooked (or ordered): I see that I am seeing that this woman wearing spectacles is me.

Again, the mirrors illuminate the point: if I see myself in the mirror, I may see my appearance raw on the surface of the mirror (and subsequently work out—by some other means than perception, perhaps—that this fright is me). Or I may cook it a bit: I see that the fright in the mirror is me. Can I cook it any more, though, with the mirror: can I see, in the mirror, that this is me seeing myself in the mirror?

Now suppose that I see myself in my friend as my mirror, à la Magna Moralia. The model comes from Plato (Alcibiades 133): when I see myself in my friend, I see the little image of me in her eye. What I see, then, is not myself seeing, but the appearance of me, myself as the object of my seeing; and the image of myself is the cause of my seeing myself. Then how cooked is my seeing? Rawish, if my seeing just is receiving the image of the little person in the other’s eye. More cooked, if my seeing contains more cognitive content (this image is tiny, and I am large: but I see it as myself). But can it be cooked twice, any more in the image in my friend’s eye than in the mirror? Can I see myself as the subject of my gaze?

And anyway might this not—to return now to the ethical issue—be an objectionable way of coming to know myself? If I see myself mirrored in my friend, my friend is herself conceived as a mirror, as nothing more than the surface in which I am myself reflected. So my sense of my friend’s identity, like my sense of her claim on me, is etiolated: limited to the instrument of my self-perception (and -knowledge) that she is here taken to be. And this, we might object (in a Kantian turn, perhaps), is no way to treat others. Nor—even if we reject the thought that we should treat others as ends in themselves—is it anything like the right attitude we should have to those special others, our friends: if they are our mirrors, we use and exploit them—and that is no way to be their friend.

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19 Is my seeing myself de re (the woman I see is in fact me); or de dicto (I see that the woman I see is me)? The de dicto case, at least, is cooked.

20 I mention here—in order to ward it off—the suggestion that this twice-cooked seeing is somehow merely metaphorical, not proper seeing at all—that would depend on what non-metaphorical seeing was conceived to be in the first place.

21 The Greek for ‘pupil’ is the same as the Greek for ‘doll’, ‘girl’ (χαριά); Alc. 133a, in alluding to this, brings out the objective features of this account.
2b. ... Or Without: NE IX.9

But neither EE nor NE mention mirrors; nor should they, for the account that both give of self-perception is much more complex than what we find in the MM. In particular, where the mirrors of the MM seem limited to seeing myself as an object, both NE and EE take us to perceive ourselves as perceiving, and so as the subjects of perception. The question of the instrumentality of self-perception I shall leave till the end.

Consider, first, NE IX.9. It begins, as the MM does, with the problem of the self-sufficient man: ‘it is disputed, in respect of the happy man, whether he needs friends, or not.’ So there is a dilemma. On the one hand, ‘they say that there is no need for friends for the blessed and self-sufficient’ (1169b3–5). And yet, on the other, ‘it is strange to make the blessed man a solitary; for no-one would choose to have all good things by himself; for man is a political animal, and naturally fitted to living together’ (1169b16–19). This dilemma is tackled, in the sequel, ‘more in accordance with nature’ (1170a13) by focussing on the nature of living, determined by thinking or perceiving. Thence (I quote here at length):

But if living is itself good and pleasant (and it seems to be, also from the fact that everyone desires it, and decent and blessed people most of all, since for them life is most desirable, and their vital activity is most blessed), and if the one who sees perceives that he sees, the one who hears perceives that he hears, the one who walks perceives that he walks and similarly in the

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22 See Kosman, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’.


24 The sentence structure is bulky: a series of protaseis leads to a conclusion that the friend is as choiceworthy as oneself.

25 I take the translation of NE from Rowe in Broadie and Rowe, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics: Translation, introduction and commentary, except that I translate ζηυ and cognates here and elsewhere as ‘living’ (rather than ‘being alive’), to mark out its normativity, and συν-αισθάνεσθαι and cognates as ‘perceiving together’ (rather than as ‘concurrently perceiving’).

26 The modality of this claim matters (see above n. 15): does Aristotle mean that the person who sees always also perceives that he sees? So, indeed, it is taken by Caston (e.g. ‘Aristotle on consciousness’) and also by Kosman ‘Perceiving that we perceive: On the Soul III, 2’, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’. But there are doubts about this in the parallel passages from the de Anima—see Johansen, ‘In defense of inner sense’, McCabe, ‘Perceiving that we see and hear: Aristotle on Plato on judgement and reflection’.

27 This may come as a surprise after the two preceding examples, of perceptions. And it is not at all obvious that we always perceive that we walk: I can perambulate absent-mindedly or, thinking fiercely about something quite different, end up somewhere else completely unawares.
other cases there is something that perceives that we are in activity, so that if we perceive, it perceives that we perceive, and if we think, it perceives that we think; and if perceiving that we perceive or think is perceiving that we exist\textsuperscript{28} (for as we said, existence is perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is pleasant in itself (for living is something naturally good and perceiving what is good as being there in oneself is pleasant); and if living is desirable, and especially so for the good, because for them existing is good and pleasant (for perceiving together\textsuperscript{29} what is in itself the good, in themselves, gives them pleasure); and if as the good person is to himself, so he is to his friend (since the friend is another self),\textsuperscript{30} then just as for each his own existence is desirable, so his friend’s is too, or to a similar degree.

But, as we saw, the good man’s existence is desirable because of his perceiving himself, that self being good; and such perceiving is pleasant in itself. In that case he needs to be perceiving together with the friend—that he exists too—and this will come about in their living together, conversing, and sharing their talk and thoughts; for this is what would seem to be meant by ‘living together’ where human beings are concerned, not feeding in the same location as with grazing animals. (\textit{NE} 1170a25–b14)

Aristotle’s argument seems to run like this: suppose that the good man lives by fully actualising his capacities, and that perceiving that he is fully actualising his capacities is part of the pleasure of his life. Then suppose that the good man’s friend is ‘another self’; then the good man will get pleasure from perceiving that his friend is fully actualising his capacities too. But the friend’s full actualisation depends on\textsuperscript{31} his perceiving that he is doing so; so they should do this perceiving ‘together’.

\textsuperscript{28} The parenthesis makes clear that Aristotle is not here dealing with, for example, diabolical doubt, but rather attending to our perception of our own active flourishing.

\textsuperscript{29} The expression here is \textit{συναισθανόμενοι}, ‘perceiving together’. What are the relata of ‘together’? Ross/Urmson have ‘he needs, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well’. I shall ask whether we should allow talk of ‘consciousness’ to overshadow the significance of the prefix \textit{συν-} ‘together’, in both the \textit{NE} and the \textit{EE} (\textit{συναισθάνεσθαι} and cognates do not occur in the \textit{MM} parallel). See e.g. Kahn, ‘Sensation and consciousness in Aristotle’s psychology’ 22 ff.

\textsuperscript{30} The expression here is \textit{εἴτερος αὐτός} (1170b6), making play with the reflexive in the previous line; likewise at 116a31 the context is about reflexive, and the expression for ‘another self’ is \textit{διὰλογος αὐτός}. Compare and contrast the \textit{MM} version, see above n. 13.

\textsuperscript{31} The chapter seems to shift from the thought that living is pleasant and good (1170a26) and thence that perceiving that one is living is (also) pleasant and good (1170b1) to the thought that existence is worth having \textit{because} we perceive it (1170b9) and thence that we \textit{must} perceive together with the friend (1170b10–11). This shift (which seems to turn on the role of the friend as ‘another self’ at 1170b6–7) might perhaps be explained by its having the (different) argument of \textit{EE} VII.12 in the background.
This argument is—to say the least—compressed: in three respects in particular. First, it does not explain just what the self-perception is that so contributes to the best life. Is it the contemplation of my full actualisation (so that such contemplation adds to the goodness and to the pleasure, 1170b4–5, of that life)? Is it that full actualisation of my cognitive faculties must be conscious? Or is there any other way in which my perceiving myself actively perceiving might be a component in the best life for me?

Consequent on this unclarity, second, the chapter does not explain just what work the conception of the friend as ‘another self’ is doing here. Is the thought that because my friend is another me, then in perceiving that he sees, I perceive myself? This would fit, we might at first think, with the MM account, because it seems to treat the vision of myself that I get from my friend as the object of my perceiving. Or is the idea that in perceiving him, I perceive what my perceiving is like (since it is just analogous to mine)? My perception of my friend would thus reveal myself to myself as the subject of perceiving. But why would I need a friend for that? Does the thought that he is another self generate any richer view of his own perceiving than as an instrument to my own, or any better account of why perceiving together should matter to my life?

Third, the value of all this self-perception is not immediately transparent. Is it that self-perception (and perception with my friend) is an adjunct to my best life (a pleasure that we may enjoy along the way)? Or is the value we get from it an essential feature of the best life: ‘the good man’s existence is desirable because of his perceiving himself, that self being good; and such perceiving is pleasant in itself.’ (1170b8–10)? And then what does my friend contribute? Aristotle’s conclusion is a strong one: ‘he needs to be perceiving together with the friend’. But is that need a part of our natural functioning in, or a central pleasure of, the best life, or is it just a means to the end of living well; and if the latter, is it a means in default of some better? Perhaps I should take care to perceive my friend, who is another self, for this is nearly as good as perceiving myself; and perceiving myself is hard, so that I need my friend to help me do so. The MM makes this assumption explicit; not so,

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32 In *NE* IX.4, Aristotle talks about the good man’s relations with himself and with his friends. Reference to himself occurs within the scope of his thoughts (e.g. 1166a13), his wishes (e.g. 1166a23–24) and even, perhaps, his feelings of pleasure and pain (1166a27). Reflexivity, thence, is part of the content of his cognitive states, and not just his consciousness of them (*pace* Kosman, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’). In the parallel between himself and his friends, likewise, the reference to his friend occurs within the scope of his own descriptions of his friendship (1166a29–31), which suggests that he sees his friend as another self (1166a31–32).
here. Or perhaps the pleasure I get from perceiving my friend is additional to the pleasure I already get from perceiving myself anyway. In that case, how are we to explain the strong modality of the conclusion? Perhaps, instead, my perceiving my friend is somehow intrinsic to the best life for me: but how?

The *NE* may take the relation between my friend and me to be one of analogy (‘just as for each his own existence is desirable, so his friend’s is too, or to a similar degree.’ 1170b7–8), not causally linked (there is no mirror). On that account, either we should imagine the two friends realising their own actualisation in tandem (in which case the ‘other self’ idea is doing no serious work; and there is no account given of why I should attend especially to my friend at all);

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33 And yet ‘in that case he needs to be perceiving together with the friend—that he exists too’, 1170b10–11, is presented as an inference.

34 The surprising ‘perceiving that we walk’ fits well the connection of this passage to the DA’s discussion of the natural working of the different faculties of soul.

35 Whiting argues that this is not enough to explain why such perception should be good or pleasant: what if I perceive myself doing, or perceiving, something bad? We need, she suggests, some constraint on the objects of perception for the argument to generate a conclusion about pleasure. This passage, however, sidesteps that objection by focussing on the intrinsic goodness of proper functioning (hence the ‘more in accordance with nature’ point) so that what I perceive, when I perceive myself perceiving, is already a good thing, irrespective, at least as far as this passage goes, of the objects of the first order perception. I shall suggest below that the same is true of the parallel *EE* passage.
Now self-perception, and perception in our friends, is twice-cooked: for an important thing is to see that we see. Rightly so, for among the antecedents of this passage of the NE are, surely, not only the de Anima discussion of self-perception, but also one of its antecedents, the Charmides.\textsuperscript{36} In both Charmides and de Anima the paradigm of self-perception is perceiving oneself \textit{as perceiving}, at least in the latter text because we thus perceive ourselves as properly functioning. If this last feature is central, then what we perceive, when we perceive that we perceive, is ourselves as perceivers. The de Anima makes it clear that this sort of perception is complex and twice-cooked: for it includes both my perception of myself, perceiving, and the content of what I perceive (see 425b13 ff.).

What, then, is it thus to perceive myself perceiving? Is Aristotle talking about self-conscious awareness, or even just consciousness?\textsuperscript{37} Do we need a friend for that? If not, then what is he talking about? And whatever that is, is it any way to treat a friend?

2c. The Context of the ‘Other Self’: The Puzzles of EE VII.12

The argument of the \textit{EE}, I shall suggest, is different again; and so differs, in both its account of the nature of self-perception and its account of its value, from both the \textit{MM} and the \textit{NE}, at least as the latter is most readily construed. The chapter begins with the challenge to the phenomena of friendship: that the self-sufficient man, like god, won’t need anything at all, so friends for him will be redundant, even actively discouraged. In what follows, the challenge is met both directly and indirectly, with the result that its power is both recognised (as the programme of VII.2 requires) and diverted by a discussion of proper functioning. This chapter has affinities with \textit{NE} IX.9, therefore; but it seems markedly different in effect. This is the result of this chapter’s focus, as I shall argue, on man’s failure to be self-sufficient. As a consequence it ends up, first, with a surprisingly different take on natural teleology; and second, with a different account of the ethical structure of

\textsuperscript{36} With the \textit{Theaetetus} in the background, too; see McCabe, ‘Perceiving that we see and hear: Aristotle on Plato on judgement and reflection’.

\textsuperscript{37} As Kosman (see Kosman ‘Perceiving that we perceive: \textit{On the Soul} III, 2’, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’) and Whiting (this volume) both suppose, although Whiting has a more inclusive account of what might be involved in ‘self-awareness’. In what follows I shall take ‘consciousness’ to focus especially on the ‘what it is like for me’ to perceive (see Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’); this is distinct from the kind of reflexive awareness described by apperception; see Johanssen, ‘In defense of inner sense’. It is distinct again, I shall claim, from the reflectiveness upon which we engage with our friends, on Aristotle’s account.
friendship. This may encourage us to believe that the two chapters are quite different; or else to conclude that \textit{NE} IX.9 should be amplified by what we learn from \textit{EE} VII.12.

\textit{EE} VII.12 has a careful dialectical structure. It starts with a puzzle, about the supremely self-sufficient person and friendship (1244b1–21); then connects the answer to this puzzle with self-perception and how best to live (1244b21–45a10). Next the puzzle is reformulated in different terms (1245a11–26) and finally resolved by thinking about the friend as ‘another self’, and the connection between friendship and self-perception (1245a26–b9); this eliminates the difficulties and explains the phenomena (1245b9–46a25).

The chapter is shaped, thus, around the two versions of the puzzle about virtue and friendship: but they are versions that are distinct. The first version (1244b1–24) opposes two views about friendship and the supremely virtuous man (1244b4–5). On one view, he has neither need nor desire for friends—for he is like god (1244b1–15). On the other view, the virtuous man does have friendships, but only of the ‘virtue’ sort; and because he is a virtuous man, he gets it right with whom to live (1244b15–21).

The second version of the puzzle begins in the same way as the first, with the self-sufficient man:

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38 I leave to one side whether this tells us anything about the relative dating of \textit{EE} and \textit{NE}; I confess to thinking that the \textit{MM} is weakly beside the point, and derived from different concerns in Plato than either \textit{NE} or \textit{EE}.

39 I follow the text of Walzer/Mingay’s OCT except where otherwise noted.

40 Whiting (this volume) acknowledges that there is a new move at 1245a11, but takes the run of the argument to be made throughout in the context of the parallel with god, so that the chapter ends with the comparison with god. On the account I offer there are two versions of the puzzle: one version invokes the comparison with god, the other an account of natural function, leading up to the ‘other Heracles’. The two puzzles are connected, but they could be—and here are—treated separately.

41 The person who needs nothing (1244b17); the first part of the chapter focuses on someone fully virtuous, not on someone who is nearly so.

42 The text is vexed. Walzer/Mingay give: ἄλλη οὗ δι’ ἁρετήν φιλὸς μόνον. Susemihl gives ἄλλη δι’ ἁρετήν φιλὸς μόνος. Rackham reads ἄλλη δι’ ἁρετήν μόνος, and translates ‘the only real friend is one loved on account of goodness’. Solomon reads δι’ ἁρετήν μόνος, and translates ‘the friend through excellence is the only friend’. If we allow that the chapter is carefully written, this phrase comes in the second limb of the dilemma, introduced by ἄλλη μὴν καὶ an appeal to the phenomena at 1244b15. The present phrase, then, is the counter to 1244b7, οὗ ἄρετήν γὰρ ἰκανὸς συνέναι: in which case the careful word order should contrast ἰκανὸς συνέναι with μόνος (the MS reading). Perhaps, then, the sentence would read best as ἄλλη οὗ δι’ ἁρετήν φιλὸς μόνος: with the last word used in its predicative sense, ‘alone’. Hence ‘the virtue-friend is not alone’: that is, virtue-friends live together. This rather dramatic formula flags, I think, the central theme of the chapter—what it is to live together, or alone.
To choose to live together would seem to those looking at it to be in some way simple-minded (first in the case of the things common also to the other animals, such as eating together or drinking together—for what difference does it make whether these come about for people who are close to each other, or apart, if you were to take away the power of speech? But then the sharing in casual speech is another such; and at the same time it is not possible for friends who are self-sufficient either to teach or to learn; for if he learns he is not as he should be; and if he teaches, his friend is not; but likeness is friendship).

(EE 1245a11–18)

The puzzle is formulated, again, as a dilemma; and the first limb replicates the first limb of the first version at 1244b2 ff. For both focus on the ‘godlike man’—the person who is ‘in every respect self-sufficient’ (1244b3), even to the extent of having nothing left to learn (1245a16). Here, however, the direct comparison with god is missing; and the second limb seems to have a different tone.

But indeed it [living together] seems so [sc. to be a good thing] and we all take greater pleasure in good things when we share them with friends, insofar as is possible for each and of as much of the good as he is capable; but among these one man is capable of sharing in bodily pleasure, another in artistic contemplation, another in philosophy. And (for this) it is necessary to be together with the friend (hence the saying ‘far friends are a burden’) so that they should not be away from each other while this is happening. This is why love seems to be like friendship—for the lover wants to live together, although not as he really should, but for perception.

(EE 1245a18–26)

For whereas the second limb of the first puzzle simply alluded to the mutual pleasure of virtuous friends (1244b17–19), the second limb of the second puzzle is more cagey about the self-sufficiency of anyone. Instead, Aristotle

\[43\text{ Cf. } NE 1170b12–13.\]
\[44\text{ i.e. casual speech is as unimportant as feeding together.}\]
\[45\text{ This, like the second limb of the first version of the puzzle, presents the phenomena.}\]
\[46\text{ Taking the point of the previous paragraph, these sorts of sharing need to be important, not trivial like feeding at the same trough or sharing in casual speech.}\]
\[47\text{ Whiting here follows the MSS in reading } \epsilon\upsilon\varsigma\varsigma\nu, ‘living well’, and rejects Casaubon’s emendation to } \sigma\zeta\nu. \text{ But this seems to me to miss the point of the introduction of } \epsilon\rho\omega\varsigma, \text{ which is here taken both to confirm the living together of friends, and somehow to spoil it (since love, unlike friendship, is too reliant on sensation). Without } \sigma\zeta\nu, \text{ I think, the connectives (‘this is why’ and ‘for’) lose their point.}\]
\[48\text{ } \alpha\sigma\sigma\theta\nu\varsigma: ‘sensation’? Is the point here that the lover gets } \textit{sensuous} \text{ enjoyment, not the real benefits of love? Then } \alpha\sigma\sigma\theta\nu\varsigma \text{ for ‘sensation’ is a pun of some kind, perhaps, contrasting this point (lovers fall for a pretty face) with the chapter’s overall interest in perception, } \alpha\sigma\sigma\theta\nu\varsigma.\]
\[49\text{ This is anticipated at } 1244b11, \text{ where Aristotle adds a caveat about whether it is possible for anyone to be self-sufficient.}\]
presses the thoughts that mutual pleasure occurs ‘insofar as is possible for each and with as much of the good as he is capable of’ (1245a20–21); that these friendships work in the context of different sorts of pleasure (bodily, artistic, philosophical, as well as the physical pleasure of erotic friendships 1245a21–26); and that for all these pleasures being together is necessary (1245a23–24).

So there are two versions of the puzzle about the self-sufficient man, differing in their second limbs. In the first, the virtuous man is merely good at getting hold of the right kind of friends; they seem to be a pleasant, but not necessary adjunct of his life. The second version, however, rejects the absolute conceptions of the first, supposing, instead, that we are talking about being as good as possible. This generates a discussion of what is involved in self-fulfilment—doing things together—which seems to suggest that we need our friends there with us, even for philosophy. In this context it has a more everyday air, so that it urgently needs resolving. The pair of puzzles is bracketed by warnings about how the comparison with god may mislead us (1244b21–23, 1245b12–19); and they are, we might think, counterpoised so that we see that quite a lot has changed between them. What is it that has changed?

3. The First Puzzle: Living Together

Returning to the first puzzle, we may see that it focuses—perhaps surprisingly—on what it is like to live with someone: either the self-sufficient man is sufficient to live with himself, or the virtuous man is good at choosing his friends to live with him. This question of living together, I suggest, is central throughout the chapter. Tackling the puzzle, Aristotle warns

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50 Whiting (this volume) argues that this requires us to take what I call the second version of the puzzle as a point secondary to the absolute concerns of the first.

51 E.g. the λόγος/ἐργον pair at 1245a28 picks up the λόγος/πράγμα pair at 1244b31–32.

52 This is emphatic at 1244b7; and compare the repetition of συζύγου at 1244b20. On Whiting’s account this is the one of a series of references to the Philebus: that there are such references seems right (and does not preclude the Symposium allusion I find here), but in my view the focus of attention is not so much on pleasure, as on what is involved in ‘together’.

53 The text of 1244b20–21 is problematic; but the sense seems clear.

54 See above nn. 10, 42. Note the repetition of the verbs with συν- prefixes in the sections of the chapter that offer the resolution: 1245a37, 1245b3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 22, 24. Reading μόνος with the MSS at 1244b17, as parallel to μονότης at NE 1169b16, 1170a5, and of rather than δ, to give the proleptic: ‘but nor will (the) virtue friend be solitary. For …’, the puzzle offers a contrast between doing things together and the virtuous man living on his own.
against the analogy with god (1244b23), and demands that we get a grip, instead, on ‘what it is to live in actuality (kat’ energeian) and as an end’. If to live is to perceive and to know, he infers, so to live together is to perceive together and to know together (1244b24–26). This looks as though it is somehow or other obvious: but what on earth does it mean?

Aristotle seems to begin his explanation with self-perception and self-knowledge: ‘For oneself to know and for oneself to perceive are the most choiceworthy for each person; and that is why the desire for living is natural to everyone’ (1244b26–28). So self-knowledge and self-perception are somehow the basis for a natural desire to live a life (1244b29–1245a1), both

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55 So there is a contrast, at 1244b22–23, between what escapes our notice when we think about god, and what is clear, when we think about actuality and ends. This contrast, on my view, is the source of the second version of the ἀποφίλα.

56 This is explained in the next sequence of argument; then the question about living together is revisited at 1245a10.

57 συναίσθανεσθαι: here the sequence of the argument demands that this mean ‘perceiving together’; see above nn. 25, 29.

58 The text, once again, is corrupt; see the detailed discussion by Whiting, (this volume). At 1244b26–27 should we read αὐτῷ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ γνωρίζειν (as Rackham has it: ‘perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable ...’); τὸ αὐτόν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτόν γνωρίζειν (Bonitz, followed by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, which supports Solomon’s ‘self-perception and self-knowledge is most desirable to every one’); τὸ αὐτὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν (Kosman and Whiting ‘what is desirable for each person is that he himself perceive and that he himself know’)? The pronouns, however we read the disputed text, are prominent; and at least some of the time are reflexive (arguably at lines 26, 27 and 30; surely at 32 and 33; and again, whatever the argument, at 1245a4–5 and 10). The issue is repeatedly whether these reflexives refer to the subject of the perceiving (I myself perceive, as Kosman supposes); to its object (I perceive myself); or both (I perceive myself perceiving something or other, where the subject is part of the complex content of the perception, as I shall suggest below). At the very least the argument that follows shows that we must be talking about the subject, since it turns on who is doing the living in question (see Kosman, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’). In the context of the chapter’s earlier play with the contrast between the subjective and the objective, I suggest that we should see this run of pronouns as deliberate elaboration and focus; the complex nature of Aristotle’s conclusion, if I have it right, explains why the text has become fraught.

59 If we read the text printed by Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, the explanation for this follows, 1244b28ff., introduced by γάρ; and the conclusion at 1244b33–34 is expressed as persuasive, εὐλόγως.

60 The argument from the table of opposites is presented as about the nature of things (1245a1, 3), about regularity (1245a1, 9–10) and about capacities or powers (1245a6). This makes clear that we are talking of a natural desire to have a life, not merely to stay alive. If the chapter turns on an account of character and its structure, then the table of opposites fits easily, since it is about how various aspects of character go together: see e.g. 1245a20–26. Whiting (this volume) connects the table of opposites to Metaphysics XII.9, and argues that it is here that the chapter switches from considering the subjects of perception and knowledge to the objects.
because this marks the knowledge or the perception as somehow mine (not impersonal nor alienable: 1244b33) and because this makes me somehow share in the excellent character of determinacy. For to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself determinate in this desirable way: by participation (κατὰ μεταλέψιν) in the capacities of perceiving and knowing:

For perceiving one becomes perceptible\(^{61}\) in the same way and in the same respect as he first perceives, and likewise knowing one becomes knowable.\(^{62}\) And for this reason one also wants to live always,\(^{63}\) because one wants to know always, and this is that he himself should be the knowable thing.

(EE 1245a7–11)

This argument has a strong teleological cast: to become perceptible in this way—that is, by perceiving—is something we naturally aim towards, part of our choice of life.\(^{64}\) Becoming perceptible like this, that is, is not something that happens just by virtue of our exercising our capacity to perceive, for if it did, there would be no significance in my aiming at being perceived over and above my aiming to perceive. And yet we become perceptible as soon as we perceive. Why? And why is that so important? To this question I shall return.

But still what does this have to do with friendship? By now the trajectory of the chapter has become somewhat unclear: Aristotle had seemed to be engaged on an account of why we should live together (1244b25–26), but now he focuses again on our self-sufficiency. After all, if we aim at self-knowledge and self-perception, and we can become the objects of perception by perceiving, then what need of anyone else to achieve our ends? Thus the puzzle of the self-sufficient man and his friends arises again, for a new reason, one developed from the nature of man himself, rather than from the comparison to god.\(^{65}\) So Aristotle moves on to reprise the

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\(^{61}\) αἰσθητός can mean ‘perceptible’ or ‘perceived’. In what follows I take it to mark a possibility, compare DA. e.g. 425b26: if what is αἰσθητός has an actualisation, then what is actualised must be just possible. It is hard to construe ‘perceptible’ here, or ‘knowable’ at 1245a10, without some of the connotations of the object of perception; but if perception is cooked, its objects will include itself.

\(^{62}\) In the parallel chapter in the NE, the higher-order faculty seems to be perception throughout, 1170a29 ff.

\(^{63}\) Or, ‘always wants to live’: ἄει may be janus-faced here (compare Heraclitus DK22B1).

\(^{64}\) The emphasis on pleasure throughout, like the allusions to the Philebus on which Whit-ing focuses, marks this teleology: functioning well has its own accompanying pleasures. I maintain, however, that the significance of pleasure is only as a symptom of proper function in this chapter, which aims at understanding joint function, rather than its attendant pleasure. This, of course, fits the dialectical structure, since the pleasure of friendship counts among the phenomena.

\(^{65}\) Hence in the lead-up to what I call the second version of the puzzle, at 1245a11, the language of φύσις is prominent, 1245a1, 3, anticipated, I take it, in the turn to ἐνέργεια and
account of the self-sufficient man in the first limb of the second version of the puzzle: (1245a11–18) if what I should be aiming at is self-perception and so on, then is living together a matter of indifference, or even folly? Or is there some other account to be given of the phenomena that we all take greater pleasure in good things when we engage in them with friends, some other explanation of living together (1245a18–26), as the second limb demands?

4. Perception and the Friend

Aristotle starts his unravelling of the puzzle (‘we must consider the truth from this point’, 1245a27) after the second version is complete, with a fresh formulation of the relation between friends (1245a29–35), before returning to the question of perception (1245a35–b9). He concludes the chapter by explaining, seriatim, all the opinions that went to make up the puzzles, and showing how the puzzles no longer do any harm (1245b9–46a25).

Friends, first:

For the friend wishes to be, as the proverb says, another Heracles, another self. But he is torn apart and it is hard for them to come to be in the end at 1244b23; this is why I take there to be a single puzzle in this chapter, but in two versions.

66 The hieratic tone of 1244b26–1245a10 encourages the comparison with god, while the second version of the puzzle becomes more earth-bound, see 1245a13–14.

67 Is this intentional (the friend really has this in mind to do) or essential (this is what it is for someone to be a friend)? In what follows I shall suggest that Aristotle trades on the ambivalence of expressions like this.

68 See also MM 1213a12 (discussed above, n. 13) which suggests that the proverb includes both clauses, ‘another Heracles, another self’; this tells against Whiting’s suggestion that we should read allos houtos. Aristotle’s addition of Heracles to the ‘other self’ tag adds several things. First (see Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, 395ff.) it specifies an individual, so that the ‘other self’ has in fact a determinate identity (which is not mine). Second, the scenario is one of a joint collaboration, as when Heracles was helped in slaying the Hydra by his nephew Iolaus (Euthydemus 297c1ff.). Seeking ‘another Heracles’ imagines a situation where two are joined on a single purpose, and where both helper and helped are of Herculean stature—hence ‘another’: there should be two of them engaged on the task at once (we may be misled by a common English idiom of comparison, ‘Tony Blair was another Margaret Thatcher’ does not imply that the two prime ministers actually collaborated). Third, as Kosman makes clear, (Aristotle on the desirability of friends’, 147, citing Plutarch Lives 29.3) the collaboration is a result, or a feature, of the relationship between the two Heracleis; in some versions, the relation is a familial one, but that too would be a case of φιλαίξ. That, in turn, still needs explanation.

69 This ‘tearing apart’ has already figured at 1240b28–30: ‘The one who is absolutely good seeks also to be a friend to himself, because he has two things in him which want to be friends
one. But although by nature the friend is what is most akin, one is like another in body, another in soul, and one in respect of one part of body or soul, another of another. But nonetheless the friend wishes to be as it were a separated self. (EE 1245a29–35)

Two elements of Aristotle's terminology here should give us pause: that the other self is a separated self; and that this separation explains and modifies our natural inclination to friendship.

Therefore to perceive the friend must be somehow to perceive oneself, and somehow to know oneself. (EE 1245a35–37, my italics)

by nature, and which are impossible to tear apart.’ (I am grateful to Julia Annas for pressing consideration of this passage on me). Notice that in the earlier chapter what cannot be torn apart are the two parts of a single soul; the same image seems to be in play here, where what is torn apart is the very thing that finds coming together as one difficult. In both cases, the model is best understood as a whole with parts: in VII.6, a whole whose parts are inseparable (for here we are talking about self-love); in VII.12, parts which it is difficult to keep as a whole (here we are talking about love between friends). I shall return to this below in accounting for the συν- terminology so important in this chapter.

The text seems to be a mess; and the suggestions for fixing it not much better. Walzer/Mingay and Rackham read χαλεπον πάντα ἐφ’ ἑνὸς γενέσθαι, and Rackham translates ‘it is difficult for all to be realised in the case of one person’ (Solomon offers something similar). Susemihl has χαλεπον τά ἐφ’ ἑνὸς γενέσθαι. If, as I incline to think, this passage both alludes backwards to the discussions of moral psychology in VII.6, especially 1240a14–21 and 1240b15–21 (see previous note); and to the discussions of the nature of love in the Symposium (see below), then the point here must be supposed to be the converse of what is said in VII.6 in the same language. There the thought was that the good man has a well-integrated soul—unlike the way in which the bad man is somehow many (1240b16); here the thought is that friends are actually torn asunder, and that it is difficult for them to come together (as the single-souled good man would do). Actually to become a single-souled man is impossible, of course; but a loose formula here would express the aspiration to become one (compare Plato, Protagoras 358b where the aspiration is a painless life) against the facts of being separate or ‘pulled apart’.

Again, the ambivalence of ‘wishes to be’ is noticeable (see above n. 67): is the claim that the friend is by nature a separated self, or that the friend actually wants to be a separated self? If there is a Symposium background here, of course, that would not be quite right, since friends do not want to be separated, but to coalesce. On my account, Aristotle has a less fanciful account of the togetherness of friendship than Aristophanes.

Separated/divided; or separable/divisible: διαιρετές; compare the account of one individual’s soul in VII.6, and see above n. 61 on the ambivalence of similar expressions; here I take the problem to be that the friend is indeed separated, but if there is an allusion to Aristophanes in the Symposium here, the ambivalence will be explained, since it is exactly the problem of the whole-natured creatures that they are separable.

Aristotle is at pains to deny that the pleasure in friendship is explanatory of how we should live; instead, against the opponent in the second version of the puzzle, he insists that the living together happens to generate the pleasure, rather than the pleasure explaining the living together; hence the δείκτης of result at 1245a37. The dialectical structure is prominent: εὑλόγως at 1245a38; and again, to deal with the first limb, at 1245b13, and again at 1245b37, and 1246a13.
But what exactly is involved in that ‘somehow’ (here I come to the object of my exercise)? How is this self-perception done? And how does it treat my friend? It explains, apparently, all sorts of pleasure:

... even to enjoy vulgar pleasures together and to live together with a friend is pleasant (because his perception always comes about at the same time) and all the more so with the more divine pleasures—the reason for this is that it is always more pleasant to contemplate oneself in the better good.

\(EE\ 1245a37–b1\)

This explains the phenomena, namely the pleasures we enjoy, by amplifying how perception—of oneself or of one’s friend—is supposed to be a good thing. For, if perception is itself a good thing to do, then seeing one’s friend as perceiving is seeing him in a good state. Then, if that goes along with some kind of seeing of oneself (perceiving) then one sees oneself in a good state, and the better, the better. Self-perception (or contemplation) is a good thing, part of our end, because when we do that we see ourselves doing well (functioning well); and this gives us pleasure. Likewise, then, when we live with a friend, another self, we perceive them doing well, and this is the source of the pleasure of friendship. But is this anything other than exploiting them?

Why should one contemplate oneself (perceiving)?

... This (being in the better good)\(^76\) is sometimes an affection, sometimes an action, sometimes something else. If it is that\(^77\) one lives well, and thus

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74 The explanatory γὰρ at 1245a38 picks up the result clause at 1245a37.
75 The MS have ἐξεινοῦ, so of the friend; Walzer/Mingay take Robinson’s suggestion of σῶτοῦ = of oneself (reading back from the supposed conclusion at 1245a1). But either way the point is unclear: does Aristotle mean that the perception is of my friend (or myself), or that it is done by my friend (or myself)? Whiting takes it the latter way, and retains the MS reading; and this seems right to me, especially in light of what is to come: so at this stage, what Aristotle is interested in is the subject of perception. The sequel then insists that when we enjoy pleasures together we contemplate ourselves as perceiving; and this is to see oneself ‘in the better good’. The switch between the subjective and the objective is repeatedly the source of unclarity: when I perceive my friend perceiving, he, perceiving, is the object of my perception; but this, as I shall suggest below, is an essential feature of Aristotle’s proposal about friendship and self-perception.
76 What? The contemplating oneself or the being in the better good? (Rackham translates ‘and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes and active experience, sometimes something else’ (my italics).) The former would allow the business of contemplation to be something we can do better or worse; and can improve at doing. The latter seems more appropriate given what happens next (so Whiting), fits in with the underlying theme that perceiving itself—which one may contemplate—is a good and might allow us to explain the infinitives at 1245b4 ff.
77 This might be indirect speech, suggesting that the object of contemplation is oneself living well and one’s friend living well too. Or it could mean that the good state (‘this’ from the previous sentence) is living well etc. So the ‘things included in the end’ at 1245b4 are the
also that the friend lives well, and that they are active together in the living
together, their joint enterprise is most of all among the things included in the
end. That is why we should\(^78\) contemplate\(^79\) together and feast together—but
not in the pleasures of eating and necessary pleasures (for those associations
seem to be, not communions, but sensuous enjoyment)\(^80\)—but the end which
each person is able to attain, in this end he wishes\(^81\) to live with another. If not,
people choose most of all to do well and to suffer\(^82\) well at the hands of their
friends. \((EE\ 1245b2–9)\)

Either affection or action or something else: what something else is
that?\(^83\) If our living well is the end, and so is the friend’s doing so, then liv-
ing well together is actualising together. Failing the fulfilment of this end,
\((1245b8)\) we choose, in fact, to do things and to suffer things at the hands of
our friends.

Aristotle offers, therefore, two different models of our activity with our
friends. The second, and secondary, model is the reciprocal treatment—the
‘doing to them’ and ‘being done to by them’—we engage in when we fail
to engage in the first, in true joint activity. That joint activity, the primary
model, is neither ‘doing to’ nor ‘suffering at the hands of’, but actualising

\(^78\) Walzer/Mingay take Fritzsche’s addition of δευτερον. Whiting translates ‘it is more pleasant
to contemplate together ...’.

\(^79\) More below on what is involved in contemplation: but the present passage does not
require us to understand it as exclusively intellectual; it seems to include the possibility of
contemplating oneself in perceptual mode.

\(^80\) \(\alphaπολαυσει\): picks up, and revises, what we had in the first version of the puzzle, at
1244b18.

\(^81\) Again the expression ‘wishes’ may describe a natural state, or an intentional one, see
above nn. 61, 72.

\(^82\) This suggests that the best joint enterprise, contemplating together in a proper com-
munion, is in fact the ‘something else’ of b2, because the conclusion picks up the second-best
versions in what we do in the case of second-best outcomes: do and suffer. What would
that mean? I think Aristotle’s point—if indeed it is about contemplation throughout this
passage—is that there are ways in which we can contemplate ourselves, and be contem-
plated (be the objects of our friends’ theoretical gaze, to emphasise the parallel with vision),
which are worth pursuing, but are not the best possible way of contemplating together. On
this account of the passage, the best contemplating includes oneself as its subject, while in
the lesser versions either we are the object of someone else’s contemplation or perception
(we suffer it) or they are the object of ours (we do it).

\(^83\) Compare 1244b8–19, where the first version of the puzzle does not consider this
‘something else’: work has been done on how we understand friendship and self-perception
between the first puzzle and here.
together: and that involves, at least, contemplating ourselves as active: so perceiving ourselves and our friends as perceivers.

But even ‘actualising together’ is itself a concession, something we need to do because in fact our natural capacities are diminished in comparison to the self-sufficiency of god. For notice the way in which this section of the chapter follows on from the second limb of the second version of the puzzle. In neat counterpoint to the way in which the first puzzle was followed by a detailed account of what it would be to be entirely self-sufficient, the treatment of the second version of the puzzle presses hard on the thought that our friendships are determined by our capacities (1245a20–21), by the difficult way things are by nature (1245a31–34) and, notwithstanding the difficulties,\(^84\) by our natural inclinations and ends (1245a34–35). By now, that is to say, Aristotle is focussing his attention on the way in which our natural ends are compromised, because we are not gods (even Heracles is a demi-god, and sometimes needs help). The resulting explanation of our relations to our friends, therefore, derives from how we think about self-sufficiency and our failure to reach it. Since it takes a friend to complete us (because the best natural characteristics are scattered about, because the other self is separated) we actualise together as part of living the best way possible. And this actualising together, it seems, is somehow an activity of contemplation or perception: an activity that includes perceiving ourselves as perceiving.

Consider, thus, the resumptive section of the chapter, before Aristotle closes by providing accounts of the phenomena:

So it is evident both that we should live together and that everyone especially wishes to do so,\(^85\) and that the happiest and best person is most of all someone who is such [sc. as to live together and to wish to do so]. But that it was not evident according to the argument is also a reasonable conclusion to reach, since the argument said something true. For the putting together of the two things\(^86\) provides a solution,\(^87\) although the case of god was truly described.\(^88\) For that god is not such as to need a friend, we think should apply also to the comparandum. But by this argument, the excellent man won’t even think;

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\(^{84}\) The qualification at 1245a34 emphasises that these are cases where we are not dealing with the ideal.

\(^{85}\) Again, this is ambiguous between the objective and the subjective.

\(^{86}\) This refers back to 1244b34, as Whiting observes below, 150, and the two things there seem to be the choosability of living well, and the good for the agent of such a life.

\(^{87}\) I follow Whiting’s preference for the MS here. Reading \(\text{ἡ λύσις σῶκ ἔστω,}\) with Walzer/Mingay, the passage needs to say something about where the solution fails; it is not clear just how that would work at this stage in the discussion.

\(^{88}\) Here the sequence of thought fits well with my suggestion, above, that there are two versions of the \(\text{ἀπορία}\) in the chapter.
for that is not how god is best, but in being better than to think of anything except himself. The reason for this is that our doing well is by virtue of another, whereas for him doing well is of himself. (EE 1245b9–19)

The opening of this paragraph insists on the imperative conclusion: we should live together. It requires, that is to say, stronger grounds than merely that we happen to derive pleasure from these associations. What is more, this conclusion is based on facts about human nature: this is humanity's natural tendency, as well as its inclination, and thence a matter of character: the best person is such as to live together with another. Aristotle's point, therefore, is not that as a matter of fact the virtuous person can accommodate friends in his life; but rather that the commonality of friends is an intrinsic part of the best person's nature. The argument has shifted in focus, therefore, from the first version of the puzzle to Aristotle's response to the second; and that is now his point. The trouble was caused, he suggests, by the comparison with god; by the assumption of the first version of the puzzle that man is godlike, rather than human. But for humans, by contrast, 'doing well is by virtue of another'.

So during the working out of the puzzles in the dialectical sequence of the chapter Aristotle has modified his account of what it is to be a virtuous person. In the first puzzle, he treated the virtuous person as the human equivalent of god, as someone solitary and self-sufficient, whose ends are best met by his remaining alone. But the intervening passages rethought this conception, and allowed us to see that the person under consideration is someone who is not really like god at all. Instead this is someone who just operates as best he can, within the limitations of his humanity (this just is what his humanity is). He has, as I have suggested, ends from which he must necessarily fall short, even although he still does the best he can. This contrast between the two figures on Aristotle's stage deals with the inconcinnities of the two versions of the puzzle: in the first, man was just like god, in the second he crucially falls short. This contrast explains why god may be alone, but we are not: instead, in the best case, we actualise together with our friends. Actualising alone is god's nature, but it is beyond us, whose nature it is—according to this argument—to actualise in communion. This actualising in communion is a matter, not of one party using the other to their own ends, or even of mutual exploitation to the ends of both, but an account of what human nature is, frail as it is: such as to actualise in communion.

89 Or, on a different text, 'anything alien rather than'.
This kind of actualising must include, it seems, perceiving ourselves as perceiving. But unlike god, we are not mere self-perceivers, nor merely engaged in reciprocal self-perception with our friends. How exactly, then, does this joint actuality answer to the chapter’s earlier insistence on self-knowledge and self-perception? And how does it explain (or is explained by) the claim that the friend is another self?

5. Failing to Be God

It is a striking feature of this chapter that Aristotle’s language at this point, as he talks about the friend as ‘another self’ in the context of our failure to be god, recalls another account of the natural condition of love—that given by Aristophanes (with several nods to Empedocles) in his speech in the Symposium (189–193). The friend, the other self, ‘is torn apart and it is hard for them to come to be in one’ (1245a31). In Aristophanes’ story, the whole-natured creatures, who were self-sufficient and arrogant, aspired to be gods. But Zeus was furious at their hubris: and to teach them a lesson, he cut them in half. As a consequence, they were separated from their proper halves—and spent their lives trying to be reunited with them—in vain. Aristophanes’ account rested on a view about natural identity; he supposed

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90 Aristophanes’ speech, like Aristotle’s arguments here, is about love and friendship and happiness and being blessed, see 193d5. Aristotle is a careful reader of Plato, as I have argued elsewhere (McCabe ‘Perceiving that we see and hear: Aristotle on Plato on judgement and reflection’), giving clear allusions to Platonic texts and arguments, but not attributing them directly. This passage, I suggest, is another such; and even if the allusion is looser than direct (as several people have suggested to me), the parallel is still, I think, instructive, especially in giving us a model for what joint perception would be, in the context of questions about identity. Compare also NE 1166a34–35.

91 e.g. DK31B17.

92 See Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, 123.

93 See especially Symp 190–192. Although Plato does not use the expression δίασπάσται, Aristophanes’ speech is littered with the two prefixes δι- and συν- (e.g. at 191e9), emphasising the separation and coming together which, on the account I give, is the focus of Aristotle’s attention here. Aristotle uses διασπάσω infrequently, usually of forcible tearing apart: e.g. de Caelo 313b20; Meteor. 372b19; Rhet. 1386a10; Pol. 1303b13; and see above on the earlier passage in EE VII.6. The vivid language and its connotations of force bring to mind the forcible splitting of the whole-natured creatures in Aristophanes’ account of love. Both Aristotle and Aristophanes are giving an account of human nature in these terms, see Symposium 189d5–7, 191d1–3, 193c5.

94 With the Symposium in mind, where the whole-natures are chopped up, we might think that this expression is striking; compare ‘making one from two’ at Symp. 191d2; and the Empedoclean version, e.g. DK31B17.
that our present natural condition, that is to say, is of a kind of failed or deficient identity, something we may be always seeking to improve or complete; and he suggests that this is to be understood in terms of what it is not—self-sufficiency. For man—on Aristophanes’ account—spectacularly fails to be like god; and this is what explains his nature, his desires and his attachments. It explains his aspirations, too: becoming self-sufficient, becoming whole, is the way to be blessed and happy, impossible though that may turn out to be.

In this passage of the EE, I suggest, Aristotle is exploiting something like Aristophanes’ account: hence ‘by nature the friend is what is the most akin’\(^\text{95}\) (1245a32); ‘nonetheless the friend wishes to be as it were a separated self’, (1245a34–35); and hence the sudden remark about love, erôs, at 1245a24. In both accounts, the friend or the lover is understood in terms of the self—in terms, that is to say, of our failure to be a single self, a failure to have a complete identity. That failure, further, is understood in terms of natural deficiency, and of a failure to be god, a failure to be self-sufficient and complete. For to be complete, we need our friend, our other, separated self; only then will we be able to actualise—when we actualise together. Aristotle, like Aristophanes, undermines the possibility of an individual’s reaching self-sufficiency. Instead, the best we can do is to get together with another self; and our aiming at this explains how we behave. Aristotle’s discussion of friendship here reflects our real feelings of inadequacy and our vain searching to compensate for it.

It is this conception of identity and its failures, therefore, that underlies this account of what it is to be a friend and of the lives we share: an account that is built on a series of thoughts about nature and teleology, about the essence of man and his aspirations. It is, therefore, no coincidence that Aristotle’s description of the friend is put in terms that embrace both expressions of desire and intention (the friend ‘wants to be …’) and claims of essence (a friend ‘really is’ a separated self): the combination of the two shows up how Aristotle appeals to a teleological account that rests, not on the perfectibility of man, but on his imperfection.

The discussion of the idea of a divided self is anticipated in an earlier chapter of the EE, VII.6, which tackles the question of self-love.\(^\text{96}\) Should we say that self-love is the paradigm of friendship, or an aberrant or metaphorical version of it? After all, ‘being loved (being befriended) and loving

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\(^{95}\) Compare the use of σίζείς in Symp; e.g. at 192c1, 193d2.

\(^{96}\) I am grateful to Julia Annas for insisting on this point, against my stronger claim that Aristotle is deliberately invoking Aristophanes’ speech.
(befriending) are *in two separate things*’ (1240a14–15). As a consequence, Aristotle concludes, the model for self-love must be like the model for continence and incontinence⁹⁸ where we must suppose that the soul is somehow divided: insofar as the soul can be divided, there can be self-love; insofar as not, then not (1240a20–21).

This account of the divided self, recalled in the context (in VII.12) of our failure to be god—and in the course of a chapter whose dialectical strategy is to show just how we should concede that we fail to be gods—echoes the Aristophanic account of love (of *philía*, friendship, as well as *erôs*, 1245a24), even down to the way in which Aristophanes’ story invokes the comparison with god in the hubristic challenge of the whole-natured creatures. Indeed, it seems plausible to suppose that some such account, if not this very account, is being alluded to by Aristotle here: a supposition which is reinforced by the careful composition of the chapter, down to the level of its literary complexity.⁹⁹ Even if the connection is looser than a direct allusion, the model that Aristophanes provides for us can offer a useful commentary on just what is going on in *EE* VII.12, when Aristotle tells us about the ‘other self’.


Aristotle’s allusion in VII.6 to the problem of explaining incontinence reflects a broader problem of understanding any kind of reflexive conception: self-love, self-perception, self-motion. For we should not say that something moves and is moved by itself in the same respects at the same time; instead, if something seems to be a self-mover, then part of it moves, and part is moved (even if the part that moves is then moved, accidentally). In cases such as these, that is to say, where something seems to be agent and patient at once, he suggests dividing, and supposing that the agent is one part, the patient another.¹⁰⁰ The self that loves, on this account, is in

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⁹⁷ Solomon has ‘loving and being loved require two separate individuals’; Rackham ‘being loved and loving involve two separate factors’. The expression for separate, διαιρέται, at 1240a14 is cognate with διαιρέται at 1245a35. Compare *Physics* 254b31, for the same expression in respect of the movement of living organisms, and 258a5 ff. for the amplification of the point in terms of (something like parts and) wholes. See Furley’s classic ‘Self-Movers’, and his reservation that Aristotle is here not specific about this being a division into *parts*, 166: the same reservation applies at *EE* 1240a14.

⁹⁸ Compare e.g. *NE* 1102b13 ff., *EE* 1224b21 ff.

⁹⁹ Compare Whiting (this volume) on allusions to the *Philebus* here.

¹⁰⁰ If the language is not always of parts (see Furley, ‘Self-movers’, n. 99), it nonetheless
some sense divided from the self that is loved; but considered together, they count as the same self, the proper possessor of self-love. Likewise, we might think, self-perception is of one part of the self by another; each part belonging, nonetheless, to the same self, which thus perceives itself. The language throughout VII.12 of both division and togetherness reinforces the thought that this is the burden of ‘perceiving together’, of sunaisthēsis.

If this is what we should say about self-perception, how is it accounted for by my relationship with my friend, where he is another self? What is the relation between our perceiving together, my perceiving myself and my perceiving myself as perceiving (all of which are involved in my end)? Aristotle takes himself to be entitled, in the closing sections of the chapter, to the claim that ‘if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at the same time, it is most desirable that these [sc. friends] should be as many as possible; but since this is most difficult, the activity of joint perception must exist among fewer’ (1245b20–24). And he reaches this point by means of the claim that friendship as he has described it will generate some kind of self-perception (and so be a good thing). But what exactly does that involve?

Think, first, about two things it is not:

– It is not an objective account: the issue is not that I see my reflection in my friend’s eyes. There are no mirrors here; this account of self-perception is far from the MM. For throughout EE VII.12 Aristotle insists that what is important is my perceiving; and in that case, perceiving that I perceive should not be meant as my merely becoming the object of my own perception (self-perception, on this account, cannot be raw, as first-order perception is often construed).

– It is not, either, the sort of subjective account that suggests that self-perception (or joint perception) is the natural and immediate accompaniment of first-order perceiving. So the issue is not that I am self-conscious when I see.101 For self-perception to be this kind of immediate consciousness is at odds with the teleological cast of the whole account, which insists that this sort of becoming perceptible is something we should aim at (that is, it is both the object of my deliberate

allows for a conclusion which can be read, as at EE VII.12, as the separation of two countable individuals, which can come together somehow into a joint enterprise. On this issue see the classic discussion at Plato Republic 435eff.

101 Nor is this the account of self-perception that many find in the DA; but McCabe, ‘Perceiving that we see and hear: Aristotle on Plato on judgement and reflection’.
striving and of my natural tendencies) and something that, without a friend, we may well miss. (We had better not, then, read ‘perceptible’ at 1245a8 as some kind of regularly activated natural potentiality.)

Instead, therefore, we should think of this as a genuine possibility: as soon as I perceive I can be perceived in the fashion in question, but not necessarily am I so perceived. Now, if we are to be perceived as perceivers, as the subjects of the perception, then it follows immediately that when we perceive we become perceptible as such: and this explains the detail of ‘perceptible in the same way and in the same respect [sc. as the perceiving]’ (1245a7–8). So becoming perceptible and then becoming perceived (if we succeed in our aims) is correlated to our perceiving: and likewise for knowing: the self that becomes perceptible is the self that perceives, as such: what happens, somehow or other, is that we perceive ourselves as perceiving—twice-cooked.\(^{102}\)

How then does what I do with my friend convert into self-perception (or self-contemplation)? Well, if I have the trajectory of 1245a38–b9 right, it does not do so in simple terms, where the friend is a mirror, the object of my perception (so that, at one remove, I too am the object of my perception, just because he is another self); nor yet where he is the subject (where he perceives me, so that I am the subject of my perceiving at one remove—this is a harder case to imagine).\(^{103}\) Instead Aristotle emphasises the fact that it is an actualisation that is realised by the composite of myself-and-my-friend. I aim to perceive myself as perceiving; but if my nature is incomplete, I cannot do this on my own (or not, at least, if this kind of self-perception is normative, difficult, not mere self-awareness). Instead, I need my friend to complete the thing: it is, somehow, a joint enterprise, on which I and my friend, my Heracles, are engaged together.

7. Team Spirit

How does this differ from the account of self-perception with my friend offered in NE IX.9? Both accounts suggest, first, that it is an activity (so I perceive myself as perceiving) and second, an activity which is hard to achieve

\(^{102}\) So by the time we get to the close of this section of the chapter, at 1245a10, Aristotle has filled out the programme announced at 1244b23: that the question will be answered if we attend to living and the actuality.

\(^{103}\) Is this sort of reciprocal action the second-best model, the action and passion described at 1245b1–9?
(so not mere consciousness). But the *NE* suggests, we might think, that the virtuous man does this with his friend by analogy with himself (1170b5–6); and suggests, therefore, that the fulfilment of this natural capacity is well within our grasp. I may find it hard to perceive myself perceiving; but by seeing my friend in the same condition, I may come to see it for myself. There is something of the mirror here, no doubt: because the argument rests on the thought that this aspect of fulfilment, the fulfilment of self-perception, comes about just because I see my analogue in another. The perceiving of myself that I may eventually come to do, that is to say, comes about because of the parallel case which I see in my friend. He is not my mirror, but he is my Doppelganger; by looking at his activity I see my own.

In *NE* IX.9, then, it seems that ‘myself perceiving’ is the content of my perception, just as ‘myself walking’ or ‘myself existing’. The second-order perception, that is to say, has as its content at least the first-order activity. But is that all there is to it? Is the point of self-perception that it is merely reflective, merely able to give me some reference to myself in the perceiving I do with my friend? Is the content of this sort of perception exhausted by myself as perceiving—at least on the *EE* account?

The *EE*, by contrast with the *NE*, presents a far bleaker world, where we are incapacitated by nature to perceive ourselves, since we ourselves are incomplete—we are not, as Aristophanes had pointed out, gods (to make this point is the effect of the complicated dialectical structure of the chapter). Instead, to fulfil our natural capacity of perceiving ourselves, we must do so in concert with a friend (this is the ‘activity of seeing together’, 1245b24, see 1245b3–4). That is the point of Aristotle’s insistence that this actualisation is prior to the secondary business of reciprocal action and passion, at 1245b2; and the qualification that this joint activity is somehow perceiving myself, somehow knowing myself (1245a36–37). This has a far more radical appearance than the *NE*: the activity is fulfilled by *being done together*. So there is no mirroring at all; instead this is a genuinely joint activity. As a consequence, my friend and I are genuine collaborators: we do—whatever we do—together, and neither uses the other as a mirror, or a likeness, either.

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104 If the *NE* refers across to the *DA*, then we had better not think that the latter is just about consciousness, either.

105 I have some reservations about this, however; perhaps instead *NE* IX.9 needs to be reread in the light of *EE* VII.12.
But what then is involved in this kind of joint activity? I might be able to talk about rowing a boat together, and imagine that for it to work we each have to do our bit, for the team. I might say the same, even, for a joint activity of knowing or learning—since I certainly have no privilege except by virtue of having written what you are reading. But could we say this for perceiving? How could we think that you and I might perceive together? Has Aristotle just been misled by Aristophanes—whose whole creatures could, indeed, share a perceptual faculty? We, who are irrevocably parted, surely cannot.

In (nearly) closing, I offer some thoughts to combat your incredulity here. Our immediate assumption that we cannot perceive things together—except, perhaps, in some etiolated or metaphorical way—relies, perhaps, on perception’s being, at its base, private and privileged (that is why it is often thought to be raw). But if perception is a bit more cooked than raw, it may not be inner, or private, in quite the same way (contrast the perception of this patch of puce with the perception that this music is loud). What, then, if it is twice-cooked? If self-perception merely stands in for the business of my awareness of my perceptual states, we might still deny that it could be joint. But suppose self-perception is more reflective, more something we do as a difficult actualisation of a cognitive faculty: what then?

Suppose, that is, that self-perception includes my perception of myself as perceiving, but is not exhausted by it. Instead, perhaps, its content would include my first-order perceptions, too; and would bring them into the purview of my reflection. Why could not this reflective sort of perception, which would include its own second-order features, be something I could do with someone else?

If we are perceiving something together, and reflecting perceptually at the same time on what we are perceiving, the process of perceiving may be rich in content, and productive in terms of the development of our natural capacities.¹⁰⁶ For example, I may see that grey wagtail over there just because we have practised bird-recognition on our ornithological expeditions; and my doing so is itself a part of our joint reflective perception. I may get better at playing tennis by practising doubles with you, and acquiring an improved

¹⁰⁶ Notice the significance of this in the account of the less than perfect man, 1245a17–18.
¹⁰⁷ It may include, e.g., good judgement in choosing our friends (1244b19–20); or teaching and learning together (which the self-sufficient person does not need, 1245a16 ff.). These examples demand the kind of rich reflection involved in the development of our other ethical capacities; on this see Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on learning to be good’, McDowell, Mind, Value and Reality, Goldie, ‘Emotion, Reason and Virtue’. For a slightly different approach, see Sherman, ‘The Virtues of Common Pursuit’.
sense of where the ball is relative to my racquet and yours by seeing it repeatedly coming right at us over the net, and by perceiving that I am seeing it that way. I may enjoy music alone by reflective perception of what I hear, and have heard; all the more so when we listen together, and I think of us both as perceiving the same cadence, as our appreciation of music, how we hear it, develops over years of listening together.\textsuperscript{108} In ethical cases, too, my sense of moral perception may be enhanced by our seeing the situation together; and by doing so over time as our friendship matures. Why should we not be able to think of a rich perceptual life together, just as we might have a rich shared intellectual life? And when we do, if that life is reflective enough, it will focus our attention both on what we see and hear, and on who we are who do so, and who our companions are who share, or refract our point of view. What is more, it is this very reflectiveness that explains our progress—in ornithology, in tennis, in musical appreciation and in doing the right thing. Is it the mischief of sceptical arguments\textsuperscript{109} that prevent us from seeing Aristotle’s point in the EE—that we can have a genuinely shared life of the eye and the ear?\textsuperscript{110}

8. ‘Another Self, Another Heracles’

This, I suggest, is what Aristotle has in mind in EE VII.12 by the togetherness that comes from friendship: and it is this that he takes both to explain the phenomena (that we both should, and desire to, live together, 1245b9–11), the puzzle (that if god neither needs nor desires a friend, the godlike person should be the same, 1245b12–15) and the importance of friendship to our development of the best life.

In all three of the passages I have discussed, my friend is ‘another self’. The locution is both striking and unclear; and thus brings out the fact that the reflexives are the focus of Aristotle’s attention. But ‘another self’ means, I suggest, quite different things in the three contexts I have discussed.

– In the MM the friend is another self because he is my mirror: looking at him, I see myself back again. There is, we might think, only one self

\footnote{108}{Notice the joint enterprise of music and philosophy at 1245a22.}
\footnote{109}{Kosman, ‘Aristotle on the desirability of friends’, takes this point, but does not, I think, suppose that the development of skills or values is involved in these reflexive activities.}
\footnote{110}{It is a connected mistake to suppose that all such rich perception is in fact a combination of raw feels with something else that is cognitive but non-perceptual. This mistake is often attributed to Plato, but we should be more wary, I think; see McCabe, ‘Looking inside Charmides’ Cloak’.}
here: me. My friend is another self only in the sense that I am reflected in him. This makes clear just how instrumental is the MM account: there is only one self to be the focus of attention, the ‘otherness’ of my friend is because he is not quite me. I exploit him to see myself (and if he fails to mirror me, presumably, he should be thrown away).

- In the NE the picture is a different one, because my friend is imagined to be, like me, the subject of his functioning senses: it is as such a subject that in him I see myself seeing. The fulfilment I get from him may then be from his full functioning; so he is another self, just like me. In this sense, even if my enjoyment of him is egocentric (and this is reasonably disputed) it is not exploitative.

- In the EE the picture seems different again; and the ‘other self’ expression is, if I am right about it, odder. For here the joint functioning of friendship is the way to fulfil my function; so that—as Aristophanes would have construed it—the self is a composite entity, made up of the two of us, engaged on the joint enterprise of self-perception and self-knowledge. I do not exploit him; nor is my functioning along with him egocentric from my own point of view; instead, we function together for our joint benefit.

Does this last just beg the question against the challenge of self-sufficiency? I think not: for it was set up by the discussions about the ‘other self’ at 1245a30–34. There the modification of our self-sufficiency was argued in terms of the respect in which we are akin to others. It is this kinship that explains our natural purposes together; and the failure of our natures to stand alone makes kinship central. The point would be lost without the long account, throughout the chapter, of the nature and significance of self-perception to our functioning; of the reasons why we should not think of ourselves as functionally self-sufficient; and of the way in which intercourse with a friend can thence be understood, not in terms of the pleasure it brings (which is, if anything, merely concomitant) but in terms of the way that togetherness contributes to our reaching our natural ends, actively engaged on our best possible functions. In the EE, then, our friends are our companions, not our instruments. Kant might be pleased.

References


CHAPTER FOUR

THE PLEASURE OF THINKING TOGETHER:
PROLEGOMENON TO A COMPLETE READING OF EE VII.12

Jennifer Whiting

I. Introduction

The first two thirds of *Eudemian Ethics* VII.12 correspond closely to *Nicomachean Ethics* IX.9. Each seeks to resolve a version of the same *aporia*, about whether someone who is self-sufficient (or *autarkês*) will have friends. Each relies on an argument from the value of perceiving one’s own activities to the value of perceiving the activities of one’s friend. And each reaches the same conclusion: the self-sufficient person will have friends. But there is a striking difference: whereas the Eudemian discussion explicitly compares the self-sufficient person to God, and is in fact organized around this comparison, the Nicomachean discussion does not even mention God.

M.M. McCabe’s reading of the *Eudemian* chapter (this volume) suggests a way to explain this. She reads this chapter as discussing two versions of the *aporia*, the first invoking the comparison with God and the second dropping this comparison because (as Aristotle himself suggests) it somehow misleads us. McCabe thus reads the *Eudemian* chapter as responding primarily

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1 I have not yet reached reflective equilibrium on some of the points discussed here but am letting this go because I promised it to Bob Heinaman, who has shown far more patience than even an old friend can be expected to show (for which I thank him). I also want to thank Fiona Leigh for taking over from Bob: she too has been a model of patience. Work on this paper has been an object lesson in the benefits—not to mention the pleasures—of thinking together. I have benefitted over the years from discussions with audiences at the Keeling Colloquium (especially M.M. McCabe, who kindly shared with me her own work in progress); the Paris-Lille Aristotle seminar; the Centre for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters; the ancient philosophy workshop in Toronto; and the classical philosophy group at Princeton (especially the temporally extended help of Hendrik Lorenz, who first pressed me to see the forest and later helped me to prune some of the trees). I also want to thank Aryeh Kosman and Joel Yurdin for a pleasant day at Haverford discussing the material with Jakub Krajczynski (to whom I am indebted for extended conversation and written comments); Brad Inwood for his constant support; and Charles Brittain for serving (once again) as a first-rate midwife (I just hope he hasn’t let any wind-eggs slip by).
to what she views as the second version of the *aporia*. This suggests the following possibility (which however McCabe does not herself articulate): assuming (with most commentators) that Aristotle wrote the *Eudemian* books before he wrote the *Nicomachean* ones, Aristotle may have come to see—perhaps as a result of writing the *Eudemian* chapter—that the comparison with God was not just potentially misleading but also unnecessary, so that the *Nicomachean* chapter could do without it.

But even granting the plausibility of this general line of thought, there are drawbacks to McCabe’s reading of the *Eudemian* chapter. First, McCabe’s reading emphasizes the second half of Aristotle’s discussion at the expense of the first, and so fails to do justice to the way in which the comparison with God reappears in the conclusion of the Eudemian discussion. And many features of Aristotle’s reply to what McCabe regards as the first version of the *aporia* reappear in the *Nicomachean* chapter—most notably, the crucial move from the value of perceiving one’s own activities to the value of perceiving the activities of one’s friend. So it is difficult to read Aristotle as thinking in terms of two versions of a single *aporia*, with the second version superseding the first.

Second, and more importantly, McCabe reads Aristotle’s reply to the second (and in her view less misleading) version of the *aporia* as involving a major concession to the sort of incompleteness of human beings that is stressed in the Aristophanes speech in Plato’s *Symposium*. But the effect of this is to remove—rather than to resolve—the *aporia*. Man, as McCabe puts it, ‘spectacularly fails to be like god’ (my italics). So there should be no problem understanding the evident fact that even the best and most self-sufficient among us *do* have friends: this is all too intelligible given that (on her reading) we *need* friends in order to complete *ourselves*. But this stress on what we *need* not only threatens to remove the *aporia*; it also makes it difficult to see why Aristotle should regard the primary sort of friendship—namely the friendship of virtuous agents with one another—as a paradigm of wishing and doing well for the friend for the friend’s sake (as distinct from one’s own). For it is hard to see how allowing the virtuous agent to have friends because she *needs* them in order to complete *herself* can satisfy Aristotle’s persistent requirement that we wish and do well for our friends for their sakes (as distinct from our own).

McCabe seeks of course to explain how on her reading this requirement is satisfied. And like Aryeh Kosman, whose reading she in other respects opposes, she emphasizes the ‘joint activity’ of the friends.2 On her reading of the *Eudemian* chapter,

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2 See Aryeh Kosman, ‘Aristotle on the Desirability of Friends’ (‘Desirability’). The main
... the joint functioning of friendship is the way to fulfill my function; so that—as Aristophanes would have construed it—the self is a composite entity, made up of the two of us, engaged on the joint enterprise of self-perception and self-knowledge. I do not exploit him nor is my functioning along with him egocentric from my own point of view; instead, we function together for our joint benefit.³ (my italics)

Kosman too emphasizes joint—or as he puts it ‘shared’—activity. He places more emphasis than McCabe does on the individual subjectivities of the friends, but then speaks of ‘refiguring [the] separate I’s as a common we’. He goes on to say:

... since we are engaged in shared perception, what my friend perceives is in a sense what I perceive, since it is what we perceive, and his consciousness is mine, since it is ours. The force of the conclusion that ‘the perceiving of one’s

issue between Kosman and McCabe is, very roughly, whether the sort of self-perception of which Aristotle speaks in EE VII.12 and NE IX.9 is (as Kosman thinks) the sort of awareness of what one is experiencing and doing that we ordinarily take to be ‘built in’ to the first-order experience and action not just of human beings but also of other animals; or whether it is (as McCabe thinks) not just ‘reflexive’ but in fact ‘reflective’ in a way that involves a kind of stepping back and reflecting on one’s experiences and actions, and (far from being relatively automatic) involves effort and is open only to rational animals. My own view is that Aristotle is interested in both sorts of self-consciousness, but that it is the relatively automatic built-in sort that plays the most important role in these chapters, where the idea seems to be that in living together with one’s friend, one can come to have something like the sort of relatively constant and unmediated (though not non-conceptual) awareness of the friend’s experiences and actions that one has of one’s own, which gives rise in turn to something like the sorts of pleasure and pain associated with awareness of one’s own good and bad experiences and actions as such (i.e., as good and bad). Of course this sort of relatively immediate awareness may lead to the sort of individual and joint reflection of which McCabe speaks and be informed in turn by previous activities of individual and joint reflection. For it may be in virtue of a kind of mutual understanding that is acquired only through conversation about their respective activities and the value of these activities that friends come to have the sort of relatively immediate comprehension of one another and of one another’s experiences and actions that gives rise to each taking pleasure (or pain) in the other’s experiences and actions that is not unlike the pleasure (or pain) each takes in his or her own experiences and actions. But my point is that neither McCabe nor Kosman does justice to the role played by pleasure in EE VII.12; their disagreement with one another is largely tangential to my main argument.

³ Note the move from ‘my function’ (which seems both inapt and insufficient to answer the moral concerns in play here) to ‘our joint benefit’ (which seems more appropriate given McCabe’s general picture and is arguably better able to address the moral concerns). One might however wonder whether Aristotle thinks that non-instrumental concern for another can be explained only by positing some larger self of which the agent is herself a part; or whether he thinks it possible to explain in some other way how an agent might come to take in the activities of another, conceived as other, something like the sort of interest she takes—and thus something like the sort of pleasure she takes—in her own activities. It is the second possibility that I want to explore here.
friend is in a sense necessarily the perceiving of oneself, and his knowing in a sense one’s own knowing⁴ (1245a35–37) now needs to be understood in light of this. I take Aristotle to mean here, as an important step in the argument, that one’s friend’s perception and cognitive awareness is in a sense one’s own.⁴ (my italics)

But Kosman’s construal of the passage quoted is (as we shall see below) controversial: Aristotle’s point may be not (as Kosman takes it) that my friend’s perceiving is in a sense my own perceiving, but rather (as it is most often taken) that perceiving my friend is in a sense perceiving myself.

Kosman seems to me to err here in a way that many readers err—namely, by taking Aristotle’s talk of the friend as an ‘other self’ to involve treating the friend as a kind of extension of oneself or at least as a part of some larger self of which one is oneself a part. But I do not think this does justice to the independent value of my friend’s activities of perceiving and knowing, a value these have regardless of any relationship in which my friend happens to stand either to me or to some larger self of which I am myself a part. Nor do I think Aristotle would allow that it does justice to this independence. For his strategy for explaining why the self-sufficient person has friends seems to rest not so much on establishing a sense in which the friend’s perceiving and knowing are one’s own as on showing how one can come to stand to the experiences and actions of one’s friend in something like the relationships—both epistemic and hedonic—in which one stands to one’s own experiences and actions.⁵ And the crucial factor, I think, is the pleasure the self-sufficient person takes in the experiences and activities of her friend as such. The idea, very roughly, is that standing to one’s friend and her activities in something like the epistemic relationship in which one stands to oneself and one’s own activities gives rise to pleasures like those taken in one’s own activities.⁶

⁴ Kosman, ‘Desirability’, 149.
⁵ I continue here to challenge what I elsewhere call ‘colonizing ego’ readings of Aristotle’s conception of the friend as an ‘other self’. See my ‘Impersonal Friends’, and ‘The Nicomachean Account of Phìlia’ (‘NAP’). These works, however, were aimed primarily against treating the friend and her good as parts of the agent’s good. My concern here is more with treating the friend and her good—together with the agent and his good—as parts of some larger entity and its good. I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle never has anything like this in mind: but I think that this reading misses an important way in which he thinks it possible for an individual agent, as such, to take in the activities of her friend something like the pleasure she takes in her own activities.
⁶ The point of speaking of an epistemic relationship is to distinguish the sort of relationship in question from the sort of ownership of which Kosman speaks. But the issue is complicated if (as on Lockeian views) the epistemic relationship is part of what constitutes the subject’s ownership of its own experiences and activities. See my ‘The Lockeanism of
The role played by pleasure seems to me to be missed not only by McCabe and Kosman, but also by the common reading of Aristotle that is Kosman’s main target, a reading based as much on the Nicomachean chapter as on the Eudemian one. This is the reading according to which otherwise self-sufficient agents need friends in order to achieve a kind of self-knowledge or self-awareness. On this reading, awareness of one’s friend either is or enables a kind of self-awareness because the friend—at least if she is a character friend—is, as Aristotle puts it, an ‘other self.’ But here again we face the question whether this reading respects Aristotle’s requirement that the best sort of friendship involve concern for the friend for the friend’s sake (as distinct from the agent’s own). There is also a question whether this reading does justice to the role Aristotle assigns to pleasure.

On my account, the pleasure a self-sufficient agent takes in the experiences and actions of her friend is part of what explains why she wants to live and act together with her friend, but the pleasure explains this in a way that does not involve satisfying any bona fide need on the part of the self-sufficient agent. Nor does the explanation involve pleasure’s being the end for the sake of which the friendship and the sort of living and acting together involved in it either come to be or are sustained once they have come to be. So although pleasure is a factor that helps to render intelligible the evident but allegedly puzzling fact that the self-sufficient person does have friends, the friendship in question is not the sort of friendship that Aristotle speaks of as being on account of pleasure (dia hêdonên); it is rather the sort of friendship that he speaks of as being on account of virtue (di’ aretên). For the pleasure that a virtuous agent takes in her friend’s experiences and activities is—like the pleasure she takes in her own experiences and activities—taken in them because they are good. The pleasure thus supervenes on what self-sufficient agents really care about—namely, the goodness of their experiences and activities. And this is a point I think EE VII.12 goes out of

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7 The well-established talk of those who are friends on account of virtue as ‘character friends’ comes from John Cooper, ‘Aristotle on Friendship’. Kosman ascribes the common reading to S. Stern-Gillet, Aristotle’s Philosophy of Friendship, especially chapters 2 and 6. For more on the idea of the friend as ‘another self’ or (as Aristotle sometimes says) ‘another this ⟨so and so⟩’, see my discussion of [6](A) below.

8 For Aristotle’s general accounts of the forms of philia, see EE VII.2 and NE VIII.3.

9 This is confirmed in the very interesting passage at 1237a23 ff. (where the point of prosphatoi is pretty clearly about what is recent in the sense of most advanced). Please note that my point in using ‘supervene’ is not to suggest that the pleasure is always distinct from some activity: even if—as the treatment of pleasure in EE VI.13 (a.k.a. NE VII.13) suggests—
its way to make. But the point tends to be missed because of the general obscurity of the section in which it is made. This is section [4] of the text as I divide it, a section whose obscurity is due as much to that of the apparently Pythagorean views on which it draws as to any indeterminacy in the text. It is here that I hope to make my most distinctive contribution to a proper reading of EE VII.12.

In [4], as elsewhere in the chapter, the manuscripts are sufficiently corrupt that it is difficult to determine with confidence what exactly to read. And what it makes sense to read depends in each case not just on controversial decisions about what to read elsewhere in our text, but also on the reader’s potentially question-begging sense of the overall argument and how exactly it works. It is thus impossible to separate completely the two tasks I undertake in what follows: that of establishing what text to read and that of making sense of this portion of text as a whole. The best I can do is to indicate where my sense of the argument has influenced my decisions about what to read, so that my readers can decide for themselves whether I have allowed such considerations to weigh too heavily in resolving textual issues.\(^\text{10}\)

Even so, it will be difficult at points to see how decisions about particular bits of text are related to the overall argument. So I propose, before engaging with textual details, to outline in a relatively dogmatic way what I take to be going on in each section of Aristotle’s text as I divide it, and to explain very roughly how I take these sections to add up. But let me first introduce two texts that—especially when they are read together—provide important background.

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\(^{10}\) That such considerations must be given some weight seems clear. Otherwise we must fall back on the sort of divination of which Harlfinger spoke in his study of the manuscript tradition: ‘Mag auch die recensio in manch einem Punkt den bislang vorliegenden Text der EE verbessern helfen, die Hauptarbeit bei der constitution textus dieser so korrupten Schrift obliegt letzten Endes doch der divination’ (‘Die Überlieferungsgeschichte der Eudemischen Ethik’, 29).

I am grateful to Brad Inwood for calling this passage to my attention during one of my many moments of despair over a textual issue. I am also grateful to him for constant advice and for sharing with me drafts of the complete translation of the EE (including the common books) on which he and Raphael Woolf have been working.
II. Important Platonic and Aristotelian Background

The first text is *Metaphysics* XII, chapters 7 and 9, where Aristotle compares the activities of human and divine thought (*nous*). The relevance of these chapters to our text tends to be more widely acknowledged than it is adequately explained. This may be in part because the prior relevance of the second text is not viewed as part of the overall equation: this is Plato's *Philebus* (to which the *Metaphysics* chapters arguably respond). Once we see the relevance of the *Philebus* to the *Metaphysics* chapters, we will be in a better position to see the relevance of the *Metaphysics* chapters to our *Eudemian* text.

The relevance of the *Philebus* to our text should be obvious, if only because both involve an explicit comparison (*parabolê*) of the best sort of human life to the life of God. The *Philebus* is also the source of the requirements that structure not just the discussions of friendship and self-sufficiency in *EE* VII.12 and *NE* IX.9 but also Aristotle's overall discussion of the human good: namely, the requirements that the human good be *teleion* (or complete) and *hikanon* (or sufficient) in the sense that nothing further can be added to it to yield something even more desirable or worthy of choice—i.e., more *haireton*—than it is when taken by itself. Moreover, the *Philebus* and *EE* VII.12 offer parallel arguments: each argues that a certain life is not the human good because something further can be added to it to yield a life that is even more *haireton* for a human being than the relevant life taken *without* whatever is added. In the *Philebus* Socrates argues that the life of pure thought is not the human good because there are some pleasures such that their being added to a life of pure thought renders that life *even more* *haireton* for a human being than it would be in the absence of such pleasures; in *EE* VII.12, Aristotle argues that a solitary life, no matter how good in all other respects, fails to satisfy these criteria because there are pleasures to be had in the company of others such that the addition of these pleasures renders a life *even more* *haireton* for a human being than it would be in the absence of such pleasures.

Here, however, it is important to note the qualification ‘for a human being’. This is crucial to the *Philebus* argument. For Socrates tends to identify pleasures with fillings of the sort of bodily lacks and social deficiencies that gods, unlike human beings, do not suffer. So although Socrates thinks that

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11 Socrates speaks of a *parabolê* of lives at *Philebus* 33b2.
12 Compare *Philebus* 20dff. with *NE* 1097a22–b21.
13 I say ‘tends’ here so as to bracket questions about the extent to which the second form
a god lives the very best sort of life that any being can live, he does not allow that this sort of life includes any pleasure: a god’s life is, as Plato might put it, ‘beyond pleasure’. But Socrates argues that it does not follow from this that the best sort of life for a human being consists exclusively in the god-like activity of contemplation. For he takes human life to admit pleasures of a sort that, when added to a life of pure thought, yield a life that is even more desirable for a human being than that life would be in the absence of such pleasures. If, per impossible, such pleasures could be added to a life of divine thought, then God’s life could perhaps be improved by the company of others; but as things stand it cannot.

Aristotle however takes a different tack, one that shows why it would be too quick to conclude, from the similarities of EE VII.12 to the Philebus, that the point in VII.12 is that the comparison with God misleads us by leading us to forget about pleasure altogether. For Aristotle is not as inclined as Socrates is to identify pleasure with the filling of some lack or deficiency. So in spite of agreeing with Socrates that god is lacking in nothing, Aristotle is free to treat divine contemplation not simply as pleasant but as itself a pleasure (hêdonê). He makes this point in the following passage about the first mover, which is a being that is supposed to move other things without itself moving, a being that Aristotle sometimes calls ‘God’.

[ST1][b]–[e] Metaphysics XII.7 (1072b14–28)\(^{15}\)

> ... its ⟨the unmoved mover’s⟩ career (diagôgê) is such as the best we have for a short time—for that one is always ⟨engaged⟩ in this way, but for us it

\(^{14}\) See Philebus 33a–b.

\(^{15}\) ‘ST1’ for ‘Supplementary Text 1’, so as to distinguish the supplementary texts from the consecutive sections of EE VII.12 (which I have labeled simply [1]–[7], with subsections indicated by uppercase letters). I use lower-case letters (as here) to indicate sub-sections of the supplementary texts and start here with [b] so as to make it clear when I eventually introduce [a] that I am quoting from an earlier portion of this chapter. See [ST1][a] below.

All translations, except where otherwise noted, are my own. I use brackets, as in (diagôgê) above, to indicate the Greek for what precedes it; and I use angular brackets, as in ⟨engaged⟩ above, to indicate what I understand in spite of its not being explicitly stated. In some cases what I understand is implicit in the text, but this is not always the case. I make liberal use of angular brackets so as to make it clear exactly how I fill in various gaps that one must somehow or other fill in. I am not thereby claiming that my way is the only way to fill them. My aim is two-fold: to make it clear how as a matter of fact I understand what is to be filled in and to flag my interpretive decisions for the reader to make of what she will.
is impossible (always to be so engaged)—since the activity of this (sc. the unmoved mover) is also (a) pleasure (hêdonê). And on account of this, waking and perceiving and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories (are pleasant) on account of these.\[16\]

[c] And the thinking that is in itself (thinking) is of that which is in itself best (tou kath’ hautou aristou), and the (thinking that is) most of all (thinking) is of what is best of all.

[d] And nous thinks itself by partaking of the object of thought (kata metalêpsin tou noêton).\[17\] For grasping (the noêtou) and thinking, it (sc. nous) comes to be an object of thought, with the result that nous and noêton are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought and the substance (of what is thought) is nous, and having this (the object) it (sc. nous) acts, with the result that it is this (sc. acting) more than that (sc. being capable of receiving) which divine nous seems to have, and contemplation is the most pleasant and best.

[e] If, then, God is always in this way (i.e., actively) well disposed (houtôs eu echei),\[18\] as we sometimes are, it is amazing. And if God is (always) better disposed (than we sometimes are) that is still more amazing. And God is (always) thus disposed. And life also belongs (to God), for the activity of nous is life, and that one (sc. God) is the activity. And the life of that one is in itself activity, best and eternal (activity).

I have quoted at length here because this passage will prove relevant in various ways as we proceed. The point at present is simply that Aristotle treats divine contemplation as involving—indeed being—a kind of pleasure, albeit one that does not presuppose any sort of lack or deficiency on the part of its subject.\[19\]

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\[16\] The reference to hopes and memories is reminiscent of Philebus 32b–39e. It seems pretty clear that Aristotle wrote Metaphysics XII.7, especially this bit, in opposition to the Philebus’ denial of pleasure to gods. But this bit also points to EE VII.12, which I read (together with Metaphysics XII.7 and 9) as part of Aristotle’s response to the Philebus.

\[17\] This section is clearly relevant to the interpretation of EE VII.12. See especially \[4\](C) below, where Aristotle also uses the language of metalêpsis and speaks of human perceivers and thinkers as in some sense becoming—like the divine thinkers here—objects of their own cognitive activities.

\[18\] Here again the language is very close to that used in EE VII.12. See \[7\](B) below, where Aristotle says that ‘it is not in this way (sc. by thinking something else) that the god has his well (being/doing) (ο/uni1F50γ/uni1F70ρο/uni1F55τω/uni03C2/uni1F41θε/uni1F78/uni03C2ε/uni1F56/uni1F14χει but he is better than to think something else besides himself (thinking) himself’.

\[19\] Cf. EE VI (a.k.a. NE VII) 13:1153b9–12. Aristotle makes a parallel point about human contemplation at Nicomachean Ethics 152b36 ff., where he recognizes the existence of human pleasures that involve neither any pain or appetite, nor any defective nature, and cites the pleasures of contemplation as an example.
So if we are to understand the God with which the self-sufficient person is compared in EE VII.12 as Aristotle understands God, we cannot take the point to be that the comparison with God misleads by leading us to forget entirely about pleasure. For the comparison with God—at least as Aristotle conceives of God—should render the pleasures of contemplation salient. Aristotle’s point—if it is a point about pleasure—is presumably that the comparison with God leads us to overlook a distinctively human sort of pleasure, one that (unlike the pleasures of food, drink and sex) does not presuppose any sort of lack or deficiency on the part of its subject (not even, as we shall see in [5](B), the sort of deficiency of knowledge associated with the pleasures of learning). This distinctively human sort of pleasure is the sort of pleasure we all take in doing our favorite things in the company of others, even those of us whose favorite thing is contemplating purely theoretical truths.20

Here, however, it is still an open question whether the respect in which Aristotle takes the comparison with God to mislead us is that it leads us to forget about such distinctively human pleasures. For Metaphysics XII.9 (to be discussed below) highlights an important respect in which human thought differs from divine thought: namely, in requiring an object distinct from itself. So we might well suppose that Aristotle takes the comparison with God to mislead us by leading us to forget about this difference. We might even suppose that he takes the comparison to mislead us in both ways: by leading us to overlook the dependence of human thought on an object distinct from itself and by leading us to overlook distinctively human forms of pleasure. In that case, we might even hypothesize that the two oversights are related: it may be that we overlook distinctively human forms of pleasure precisely because the comparison with God leads us to overlook our need for objects of thought distinct from ourselves. For not only are our friends and their activities among the objects contemplation of which we find pleasant: it is also true that we sometimes find the contemplation of other things more pleasant when we contemplate them together with our

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20 It is possible that Aristotle thinks the comparison with God misleads his audience because they are operating with the Philebus conception of God as ‘beyond pleasure’. That might well be the case if, for example, the Eudemian chapter was a very early text, preceding Metaphysics XII; or if the Eudemian chapter was simply part of a lecture course responding to the Philebus view without assuming any familiarity with or acceptance of the views advanced in Metaphysics XII.7. But the clear affinities between these Eudemian and Metaphysics chapters seem to me to render this possibility less likely than those I suggest in the paragraph to which this note is attached and in the paragraph that follows it.
friends than when we contemplate them alone. And in this we seem to differ from God—at least as Aristotle conceives of God.

Let us turn then, with this background in mind, to our text.

III. Dogmatic Preview

The relevant portion of EE VII.12 runs from 1244b1–1245b19. There is controversy about how exactly this discussion is structured, but I divide it as follows:

1. Initial statement of the *aporia* (1244b1–21)
2. Diagnostic hunch and the *basic logos*: to live is to perceive and to know (1244b21–26)
3. First step: the value of one’s own perceiving and knowing (1244b26–33)
4. Second step: the importance of perceiving and knowing good objects (*oneself included*) (1244b33–45a10)
5. Third step: a possible objection and two purported facts about human nature that point the way to a resolution of the *aporia* (1245a11–29)
6. The culmination of the main argument: making sense of the purported facts (1245a29–b9)
7. Recapitulation: 1245b9–19

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21 Though much of what follows this preview will be accessible only to specialist readers, non-specialists should be able, with the preview in hand, to follow the main lines of argument. I shall try to facilitate this in what follows by mentioning only the most important philological details in the main text and subordinating the discussion of other details as much as possible to footnotes. I hope also to explain the crucial philological points in ways such that non-specialists can at least see what the basic questions are.

Kosman and McCabe each divide things differently. McCabe sees a second version of the *aporia*, one meant to supersede the first, being introduced in [5] and answered in what follows. And Kosman, who sees only one version of the *aporia*, sees [2]–[5] as providing further elaboration of it, with the resolution starting only in [6]. (Sorabji, in his *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death*, 234–235 seems to follow Kosman in this.) I agree with Kosman that there is only one version of the *aporia* and that its resolution comes in [6]. But I read [6] as completing an argument begun back in [3] and continued in [4] and [5]. And I read [5] as introducing friends into what has up to that point been an argument about the value to a subject, first of her own perceiving and knowing (this is in [3]), and then of her perceiving and knowing good things, herself included (this is in [4]). It is the introduction of friends in [5] that provides the crucial link between these earlier steps and the culmination of the argument in [6], where perceiving and knowing one’s friend (assuming she is good) is supposed to have a value like that ascribed in [4] to perceiving and knowing oneself (assuming one is oneself good), the value in question being at least partly hedonic.
The general shape of this division is supported by the manifest relation between [2] and [7]. [2] suggests that the initial statement of the *aporia* that was provided in [1] may mislead us insofar as its comparison of the maximally self-sufficient person to God leads us to overlook something important. And [7] returns to this point, suggesting (I submit) that what is overlooked has at least something to do with the way in which human thought, unlike divine thought, requires an object distinct from its subject.

My reading of [7] is based partly on its acknowledged affinity (in both language and dogma) with the argument of *Metaphysics* XII.9, from which I quote at length below because of the role it plays in my overall account. The topic of this chapter is the nature of *nous* (in particular divine *nous*) and how it must be disposed if it is to be—as it is assumed to be—most divine among the things that appear. Aristotle suggests first that divine *nous* must actually think, and that nothing else (besides itself) can be in control of its thinking. The idea here seems to be that the actualization of divine *nous* does not depend, as the actualization of perception depends, on objects distinct from itself, objects that serve as the contents and/or efficient causes of its activity of thought. Aristotle then asks what divine *nous* thinks, whether something different from itself or not; and if something different, whether it always thinks the same thing or different things (presumably at different times). He continues as follows:

[ST2] *Metaphysics* XII.9 (1074b23–36)

[a] Does it make any difference, then, or none at all, whether the thinking is of what is fine or of any random thing? Or is it out of place for it ⟨sc. divine *nous⟩ to think about some things? It is clear then that it thinks the most divine and most honorable ⟨thing⟩, and that it does not change. For the change ⟨would be⟩ to ⟨something⟩ worse, and such would in fact be a kind of movement.

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23 1074b17–18, taking µηδέν adverbially.

24 Note once again the similarity in language with *EE* VII.12, especially in [5] below, where Aristotle suggests that the mere addition of speech, if it is simply participation in random speech (τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος), does not suffice to explain the preference of human beings—or at least of self-sufficient ones—for eating and drinking together. (I assume that by 'random speech' he means what we would call 'small talk' or 'chit-chat'.) Aristotle goes on to reject the hypothesis that we can explain the preference of maximally self-sufficient agents for one another's company by appeal to the idea that they might learn from talking to one another, since this presupposes a defect incompatible with their self-sufficiency; and he suggests instead that we should explain this preference by appeal to (a) the value of the activities in which self-sufficient agents engage together and (b) the pleasures to which their mutual appreciation of this value gives rise. His examples are activities such as artistic contemplation and philosophy, each of which presumably involves not merely random speech but talk about something *kalon*. 
πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; ἢ καὶ ἀτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἕνων; δὴλον τοῖνον ὃτι τὸ θείατον καὶ τιμώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μετάβαλλει· εἰς χείρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησις τις ἡ ἰδή το θοιοῦτον.

[b] First, then, if it is not (actual) thinking but a capacity (to think), it is plausible to suppose that the continuity of thinking would be toilsome for it. Next it is clear that something else would be (in this case) more honorable than nous, (namely, the thing being thought). For to think—i.e., (actual) thinking—will belong even to one thinking the worst thing, so that if this is to be avoided (for some things it is better not to see than to see) the (actual) thinking would not be the best (activity). Therefore, it thinks itself, since it is the best thing, and the thinking is (in its case) a thinking of thinking.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησις ἐστὶν ἄλλα δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίστον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νόησεως· ἐπειτα δὴλον ὃτι ἄλλο τι δὲν εἶ τὸ τιμώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοοῦμενον. καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοουν, ἀκτ' εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὅραν ἐνια κρείττων ἢ ὅραν), οὔτι δὲν εἶ θ' ὁ καθότα ἢ νόησις, αὐτὸν ἀφα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοησεως νόησις.

[c] But it appears that knowledge and perception and opinion and thought are (each) always of something else, being of itself (only) peripherally.

φαίνεται δ' ἄρ' ἄλλον ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ ἀισθήσις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὐτῆς δ' ἐν παρέργῳ.

I shall return in due course to sections [a] and [b], especially the underlined bit of [b]. It is sufficient for present purposes to note the way in which [c] contrasts human forms of cognition—such as epistêmê and aisthêsis—with the divine form of cognition on which Metaphysics XII.9 is focused. For unlike the divine form, which is primarily and indeed only of itself, each of the human forms is always of some object distinct from itself and apparently only ‘peripherally’ of itself. My suggestion is that understanding this will help us to see why even the maximally self-sufficient person will have friends.

The idea, very roughly, is that among the objects of human thought and perception are other human beings, who can of course be thought of and perceived as good. And when a human being thinks of or perceives another as good, she herself in some sense takes on the form of the other, including the other’s goodness, which is pleasant for her in a way that renders it intelligible that she—even if she is generally self-sufficient—wants to live and act together with the other. But this sort of pleasure is not available to a divine thinker, whose own activity of thought is according to Aristotle the only object of its thought. So even if Aristotle allows, as Plato does not, that God’s thinking is pleasant, Aristotle does not allow that the pleasure of God’s thought can be increased by God’s thinking in the company of others.
So the comparison of the self-sufficient person with God may lead us to overlook the ways in which the pleasures of human thinking can—like the pleasures of human eating, drinking and making merry—be increased by thinking together with others.

All of this fits the emphasis found in the culmination of the Eudemian argument on the way in which the pleasures of thought and perception are—like the pleasures of wining and dining (not to mention sex)—increased by our engaging in the relevant activities in the company of others; the higher pleasures may even be more increased by the company of others than the lower pleasures tend (at least for the most part) to be. The idea, again roughly, is that to the extent that it is more pleasant to perceive oneself enjoying a bit of contemplation than to perceive oneself enjoying a good meal, so too it is more pleasant to perceive one's friend enjoying a bit of contemplation than to perceive him enjoying a good meal. So if we take the pleasure involved in perceiving oneself enjoying a good meal to be increased by perceiving one's friend enjoying it too, we should be able to see how the pleasure involved in perceiving oneself enjoying contemplation of the starry skies above may be increased by perceiving one's friend enjoying it too. And we should be able to see this without needing to attribute any sort of lack or deficiency to a subject whose pleasure is thus increased by contemplating the starry skies above in the company of his friend. So we should be able to see this without impugning the self-sufficiency of the subject whose pleasures are increased in this way.

This no doubt makes it sound as if Aristotle's argument and the texts that present it are far more straightforward than they actually are. But it will help to have this general picture in mind as we approach what can only be described as a dizzying array of textual possibilities. It may also help, if one loses one's bearings at any point, to be able to refer back to the following, admittedly dogmatic, outline.

Section [1] presents what is effectively one side of an aporia both sides of which are presented in the *Nicomachean* chapter. It presents an argument, completed in [1](D), for thinking that the maximally self-sufficient person will not need—and so will not have—a friend. (Aristotle's general strategy is to deny the inference, familiar to readers of the *Philebus*, from a subject's not needing some thing to the subject's not having that thing; he aims to show that there are reasons for the maximally self-sufficient agent to keep company with others even if she has no need for such company. And the reasons to which he appeals will prove in the end to be largely hedonic.) [1](E) then makes some points about what he assumes must be true of any
friend the maximally self-sufficient agent in fact has (assuming she has one). So the contrast that becomes explicit in [5](D)—between the argument according to which the self-sufficient person should not have friends and the evident fact that such persons do have friends—is already implicit in [1].

Section [2] suggests that the comparison with God may mislead us and that the key to resolving the aporia lies in understanding that what it is for a human being ‘to live in activity as an end’, is to perceive and to know. This suggests that certain features of human perceiving and knowing—at least when these things are construed as activities and ends—play a crucial role here, so that when we come to understand human perceiving and knowing, as activities and ends, we should be able to understand why an otherwise self-sufficient agent will want to live together with friends.

It will turn out that one of the things Aristotle thinks we must come to see about human perceiving and knowing is the way in which these activities—unlike divine knowing—require objects distinct from the subjects themselves. For attending to some of the most characteristic objects of human perceiving and knowing—namely, our friends and their activities—reveals a form of pleasure that will allow us to make sense of the evident fact that even maximally self-sufficient human beings have friends. The relevant form of pleasure is the form that each human being seems to take in engaging together with like-minded others in the best activities of which she is capable. Since the relevant activities in the case of maximally self-sufficient agents are forms of perceiving and knowing that are chosen for themselves and not simply as means to further ends, the pleasures that will allow us to make sense of this evident fact will be the pleasures that such an agent takes in engaging together with like-minded others in the forms of perceiving and knowing that are chosen not as means to further ends but for themselves.

Section [3] is where Aristotle’s main argument begins. It is also where the serious textual difficulties begin, in part no doubt because of the ways in which indeterminacies in the original manuscripts gave rise to various determinations in the hands of various copyists. The problems stem from the fact that what originally appeared in majuscule as AΥΤΟ and its various forms could be read in any of the following ways, depending on various factors (including not just its position but also each individual reader’s sense of the overall argument). It could be read (and thus copied into minuscule) as αὐτό, which could be either (a) an intensive pronoun (as in ‘Beauty itself’ or ‘the animal itself’) or (b) a definite adjective meaning ‘same’ (as in ‘the same beauty’ or ‘the same animal’). Or it could (at least in oblique
cases) be read (and so copied into minuscule) as ἀὑτό, which is a reflexive pronoun (as in ‘the animal perceives itself’). The problems here are compounded by the frequency with which AYTO and its various forms are scattered throughout the text. And I suspect that the problems have been exacerbated by a tendency on the part of copyists, editors and commentators to assume that Aristotle is making more or less the same point in the different places where AYTO appears, when Aristotle may in fact be making different points in what are different stages of an evolving argument.

Resuming now my dogmatic outline, I read the controversial occurrences of AYTO in [3] as forms of the intensive pronoun. So I read [3] as making a point about the identity of the subjects of the perceivings and knowings in which human living was said back in [2] to consist. The point here is that what is most haireton for each person is that she herself should perceive and that she herself should know; it is not (as commentators who see a reflexive pronoun here take it) that she should perceive and know herself. But it is compatible with this that AYTO and its various forms should be read differently elsewhere in the argument: it may be, for example, that they function in [4] as reflexive pronouns used to make a somewhat different point about the objects of perceiving and knowing.

Section [4] is exceptionally difficult, even given the extent to which [3] raises the bar. But I take Aristotle to be turning from the point made in [3], about the subjects of the relevant perceivings and knowings, to some point or points about the objects of these perceivings and knowings. I say ‘point or points’ because what I see here is a combination of two points whose relations to one another are not entirely clear to me. The first is that it is generally more haireton for a subject to perceive and know herself than to perceive and know others. I take this point to rest largely on the value of self-awareness both as it is presented in Plato’s Philebus (where those activities in which the agent is aware of what she is doing are generally taken to be more haireton than those activities in which an agent is not aware of what she is doing) and as it is understood by Aristotle (who takes a certain kind of awareness of what one is doing to be required for responsible agency and the sort of activities, including distinctively human forms of friendship, that are made possible by such agency). The second point is a version of one made in section [b] of ST2—namely, that the value of any given activity of perceiving or knowing depends at least in part on the value of the

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25 For more on this, see Whiting ‘Lockeanism’ 115–118.
object that is perceived or known. Hence, the better the objects of any given subject’s perceiving and knowing, the better (at least for the most part) that subject’s perceiving and knowing, and so the better the life that consists in this perceiving and knowing.

How exactly these points are combined in [4] is hard to say. But the combination may turn on two features of human perception and knowledge as Aristotle presents these elsewhere: first, the way in which (as he explains in the de Anima) the subject, in perceiving and knowing, becomes in some sense like the object perceived or known; and second, the way in which (as he explains in Metaphysics XII. 9) the subject, in perceiving and knowing other things, comes to perceive and know herself, at least ‘peripherally’. The upshot is roughly that in perceiving and knowing good objects, the subject herself becomes in some sense like those objects, and so in a better state than she would have been in had she perceived and known inferior objects instead.

This, I think, prepares the way for Aristotle’s central point, which comes in [6](B) and (C), where Aristotle argues that to perceive one’s friend is in a way to perceive oneself. It will follow, given what he has argued in [4], that the better the activity in which an agent perceives her friend engaged, the better the condition in which she herself not only comes to be but also perceives herself being. And this will allow Aristotle to argue in [6](C) that the better the activity in which an agent perceives her friend engaged, the more pleasant her self-perception. As he says in [6](C): ‘it is always more pleasant to perceive oneself in the better (of two) good (conditions)’. But before he can connect the pleasures of perceiving and knowing oneself with those of perceiving and knowing one’s friend, Aristotle must reintroduce the friend, who has been offstage since the argument began back in [3](A). This is the function of [5].

Aristotle concedes in section [5] that choosing to live together with others may seem foolish to those who begin by considering activities we share in common with other animals, for example eating and drinking. For in the case of other animals, who engage in such activities without sharing in conversation, it seems to make no difference whether they engage in these activities side by side or in separate fields. So it might seem that in our case too the value of such activities is not increased by our engaging in them in the company of others—unless perhaps these activities are accompanied by conversation that somehow enhances their value.

At this point Aristotle seems to suggest—in a way reminiscent of the question posed in ST2[a]—that partaking of random speech cannot be such as to make a significant difference. But he proceeds in [5](C) to
introduce two alleged facts of human nature, one of which casts doubt on this and serves together with the other to challenge the initial argument against supposing that the self-sufficient person will have a friend. The first is that everyone—including therefore those engaged in mundane activities like wining and dining—finds it more pleasant to enjoy goods together with friends than to enjoy them alone. This idea here, I think, is that random speech does make a difference to some agents—namely, those who find that even ‘small talk’ or ‘chit-chat’ increases the pleasure of such activities. The second alleged fact to which Aristotle appeals is that it is especially the best activities of which a person is capable that she most enjoys doing with others, with the result that different people tend, according to differences in their abilities, to enjoy doing different things together. Aristotle is clearly working towards the idea that a self-sufficient agent, for whom the attractions of ‘small-talk’ or ‘chit-chat’ are not enough to draw her to others, will nevertheless get more enjoyment from engaging with others than from engaging alone in the best activities of which she is capable.

I think Aristotle regards these facts in something like the way he elsewhere regards facts about what people tend as a matter of psychological fact to love and cherish—namely, as facts about human nature that pack a kind of explanatory punch. And I think it the task of [6] to make sense of these facts in a way that shows what is wrong with the argument against supposing that the self-sufficient person will have a friend. The basic idea is this: the ‘higher’ the activity, the greater the pleasure to be had in engaging in it with others. So to the extent that we think it makes sense—as we clearly think it does—for people who pursue ‘mundane’ pleasures to prefer pursuing them with friends to pursuing them alone, we should think that it makes sense (perhaps even more sense) for people who pursue ‘higher’ pleasures to prefer pursuing them with friends to pursuing them alone.

The explanation for this turns at least in part on points established back in [4]: the ‘higher’ the activity in which I perceive my friend engaging, the better the condition in which I myself both come to be and perceive myself being; so the ‘higher’ the activity in which I perceive my friend engaging, the more pleasant my self-perception. Here, however, it is important to see that this pleasure does not function as the end for the sake of which I value perception of myself or others: it is the goodness of the object per-

26 See NE IX.7 and section 8 of Whiting ‘NAP’.
ceived that makes the activity of perceiving that object good and so haireton. The pleasure taken in perceiving a good object is thus a by-product of what is truly haireton. But it is a by-product that allows us to make sense of the fact that self-sufficient agents do have friends. For given the completeness criterion presented in the Philebus and taken over by Aristotle himself, a life with these pleasures is more haireton for a human being than a life without them.

But it is precisely such pleasures that the comparison with God may lead us to overlook. For even if we allow (as Aristotle himself allows) that the activity of God is pleasant, the comparison with God may lead us to overlook the way in which human forms of cognition, in requiring objects distinct from their subjects, give rise to the distinctively human sort of pleasure taken in engaging together with others in the best activities of which we are capable. But we cannot afford to ignore the way in which human forms of cognition depend on objects distinct from their subjects. For, as Aristotle says in section [7], ignoring this will lead us to conclude that the self-sufficient agent will not even think! Aristotle's argument is thus a kind of reductio of taking the comparison with God too far.

Many important points have been omitted from this preview. But I hope I have said enough to convey what I take to be Aristotle's main line of argument. Let us turn then to the nitty-gritty of the text to see whether there are independent grounds for taking it to convey something like the line of argument suggested here.

IV. The Eudemian Text as I Divide It: [1]–[3]

The Eudemian chapter begins, like its Nicomachean counterpart, with a presentation of the fundamental aporia. But the Eudemian presentation is one-sided in a way the Nicomachean presentation is not. It focuses from the outset on the reasons for thinking that the self-sufficient person will not have friends, while the Nicomachean chapter starts in the same place but quickly introduces the other side, saying (only seven lines in) that it seems strange to attribute all goods to someone who is eudaimôn (and thus autarkês) but to deny that he has friends, given that a friend seems to be the greatest of external goods (NE 1169b8–10). What generates the sense of aporia in the Eudemian chapter is the way in which (as [5](D) explicitly says) some argument to the effect that a self-sufficient person will not have friends is contradicted by the obvious fact that such agents do have friends (a fact which [1](E) hints).
I take the argument in question to be presented in [1](B)–(D): (B) introduces the initial argument in the form of a rhetorical question; (C) reinforces the expected answer by drawing the comparison between the self-sufficient person and God; and (D) draws the general conclusion. [1](E) then hints at the fact that self-sufficient agents do have friends and says something about what sorts of friends such an agent seems likely to have. And [2] suggests not only that the comparison of the self-sufficient person with God misleads us but also that we might come to see why self-sufficient agents have friends if we attend to what it means to live ‘in activity and as an end’, a point to which Aristotle returns in [6](C). But let us move one step at time. The chapter begins as follows.

[1] Initial presentation of the aporia (1244b1–21)

(A) We must also consider self-sufficiency and philia, and how their fundamental characters stand in relation to one another. For someone might puzzle whether, if someone were self-sufficient in all respects, he will have ... a friend—*if a friend is sought according to need*. Or (is this) not (so)?

(B) Or will the good person be most self-sufficient? If the person with virtue is *eudaimôn*, why would ⟨such a person⟩ need a friend? For it is characteristic of one who is self-sufficient to need neither useful ⟨friends⟩ nor ones who cheer ⟨him⟩, nor ⟨generally⟩ living together ⟨with others⟩. For he is adequate company for himself.

It is impossible given the preceding lacuna to determine the content of the negation whose possibility is being considered. I like to think that it is the claim that the friend is sought according to need. But there is no clear justification for this. So I leave this open.

There is a lacuna in the manuscripts here (12 spaces in C and L; 19 in P).

One might be tempted to see [1](B) as referring *seriatim* to each of Aristotle's three canonical forms of friendship and so to take the reference to *συζύγω* to refer simply to friendship on account of *virtue*. But [1](D)’s talk of friendships with a view to *συζύγω* seems (given the contrast with friends who are useful) to include those who are friends on account of pleasure; hence my insertion of ⟨generally⟩, which seems justified given that the association of pleasure-friendship with *συζύγω* is confirmed elsewhere. Aristotle takes friendships based on pleasure to resemble—and sometimes to morph into—friendships based on virtue (which are often associated with the value of *συζύγω*). See e.g., *NE* 1157a10–12 together with section 7 of my ‘NAP’. For these reasons, I take [1](B)’s reference to *συζύγω* as covering *both* friendships on account of pleasure *and* friendships on account of virtue.

Following Ross.
Loeb has ‘that inasmuch as [God] has relatively simple emendation.

be calling attention to the fact that even the most self-sufficient men, namely masters, need itself

his end. But there is no need to appeal to anything so speculative. Aristotle could simply does not need even the sort of internal master we have in

VII.10 1242a26–35; and especially VII.15/VIII.3 1249a12–b23. These passages suggest various here); VII.6 1240a33–b1 and VII.9 1241b11–24 (both quoted in the discussion of [6](A) below);

and that they are always becoming fewer, and that he will not take trouble in order that ⟨they⟩ should be ⟨his⟩ friends, but will look down not only on those ⟨friends⟩ who are useful but even on those who are such-as-to-be-chosen with a view to living together.

1244b7–10)

So also a human being who is most eudaimôn will be least of all in need of a friend, except insofar as it is impossible for him to be self-sufficient. It is therefore necessary that the fewest friends belong to the one who lives ⟨the⟩ best ⟨life⟩ and that they are always becoming fewer, and that he will not take trouble in order that ⟨they⟩ should be ⟨his⟩ friends, but will look down not only on those ⟨friends⟩ who are useful but even on those who are such-as-to-be-chosen with a view to living together.

The ‘in addition’ is meant to represent the προσ- in προσδεσμένος. See also NE 1098a8–16; 1099a15; 1155a26–28. Here again, the Philebus is in the background: see 20e5, where Socrates says that if either φρόνησις or ἡ δοξή is ⟨the⟩ good, it must have no need of anything further (προσδεσιῶν).

Although all the manuscripts agree in reading οὐδὲν δεσπότου (where my translation runs ‘nor will he have ⟨a friend⟩, nor ⟨indeed⟩ anything characteristic of a master’), many modern texts and translations (especially in English) read some form of δεσπότης (connoting need or want) in place of δεσπότου. Décarie (whom I follow) is the main exception. The Revised Oxford translation thus runs: ‘nor will [a God] have [a friend], supposing that he does not need one’ (reading οὐδὲν ἕσται αὐτῷ μηθὲν δεσπότου). And Rackham’s Loeb has ‘that inasmuch as [God] has no need of [a friend] he will not have one’ (reading οὐδὲν ἕσται αὐτῷ εἶ γε μηθὲν δεσπότου). But such radical change seems to me unwarranted, given both the frequent talk of despots in surrounding chapters and the availability of Decarie’s relatively simple emendation.

For talk of the despotēs in surrounding chapters, see VII.5 1239b10–29 (arguably relevant here); VII.6 1240a33–b1 and VII.9 1241b1–24 (both quoted in the discussion of [6](A) below); VII.10 1242a26–35; and especially VII.15/VIII.3 1249a12–b23. These passages suggest various points Aristotle might be making here, including one suggested by the last: namely, that God does not need even the sort of internal master we have in phronēsis, for God’s only activity is itself his end. But there is no need to appeal to anything so speculative. Aristotle could simply be calling attention to the fact that even the most self-sufficient men, namely masters, need (in the sense that they have a use for) things (such as slaves) for which God has no use. This would set us up nicely for the point that that it does not follow from the fact that God will not have a friend that the maximally self-sufficient person will not. For God no more has slaves than he has friends; but it is precisely self-sufficient men who have slaves. This may even help to explain why they do not need the sort of utility friends that less self-sufficient agents might be thought to need. But we need not resolve this here. For nothing in my interpretation of the main argument depends on this.

33 Following Décarie, 194, n. 222.

34 I have italicized this and the preceding ‘so also’ in order to highlight what I take to be the conclusion of the argument to which Aristotle refers back both in [5](D) and again in [7](A).

35 I shall return shortly to my reasons for adopting the ‘such-as-to-be-chosen’ locution, which is intended to capture possibilities ranging from ‘can be chosen’, through ‘is the sort of thing that tends to be chosen’, to ‘what is worthy of being chosen’ (which will play
But surely in that case it would seem clear that the friend (sc. any friend the self-sufficient person does have) will be neither for the sake of use nor for the sake of (any) benefit. But (his friend is) not a friend on account of virtue alone. For whenever we are in need of nothing, it is then that all seek companions in enjoying (things), and those who will receive benefits rather than bestow them. And we have better judgment when we are self-sufficient (than in need), when above all we should have\textsuperscript{38} friends \textit{worthy} of living together (with us).\textsuperscript{38}

\begin{quote}
\textit{άλλα μήν καὶ τότε φανερὸν δὲν εἰναι δέξειν ὡς ὑπὸ χρήσεως ἔνεκα ὁ φίλος ύπὸ ὑφελείας. ἀλλ’ ὃ δὲν ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνον.\textsuperscript{39} ὅταν γὰρ μηθὲν ἐνδεῖες ὄμεν, τότε τοὺς συναπλαυσμένους ἥττοιοι πάντες, καὶ τοὺς εὖ πεισομένους μάλλον ἢ τοὺς παίσιστοικες. ἁμηλοθεὶ δὲ’ ἠχομεν κρίσιν αὐτάρκειας ὄντες ἢ μετ’ ἀρετής, ὅτε μᾶλλον τὸν συζήτην ἄξιων δεόμεθα φίλων. (1244b15–21)}
\end{quote}

\textbf{[2]} \textit{Diagnostic hunch and the basic logos (1244b21–26)}

\textbf{(A)} We must consider this puzzle, lest something in it be well said, while something escapes our notice on account of the comparison (to God).

\begin{quote}
	extit{περὶ δὲ τῆς ἁπορίας ταύτης σκεπτέον, μὴ ποτὲ τὸ μέν τι λέγεται καλῶς, τὸ δὲ λανδάνει διὰ τὴν παραβολήν. (1244b21–22)}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} The idea here is that the self-sufficient agent’s judgment is not distorted by her own needs, nor even (when it comes to pleasure) her own mere tastes. So she can focus on the features of her friend that make the friend \textit{worthy} of living together with her. For more on the way Aristotle seeks focus on features of the \textit{object}, as distinct from needs and mere tastes of the \textit{subject}, see Whiting ‘NAP’ \textit{passim}.

\textsuperscript{39} Reading \textit{ἀλλ’} ω’ at the start of the second sentence with all manuscripts (instead of \textit{ἀλλ’} ὃ, adopted by Bekker and Solomon, following the Codex Oxoniensis); but rejecting the manuscripts’ μόνος in favor of the OCT’s μόνον (due to D.B. Robinson). Solomon (followed by Rackham) reads \textit{ἀλλ’} ὃ δὲν ἀρετὴν φίλος μόνον and translates ‘but the friend through virtue is the only friend’. This leaves it open that the point here is that the friend through virtue is the only friend that a self-sufficient person will have. Rackham’s translation on the other hand supplies a general point that is often ascribed to Aristotle: ‘the only real friend is one loved on account of goodness.’ But this seems misguided: Aristotle explicitly denies this general point back in VII.2 at 1236a23–32 (discussed in section 5 of Whiting ‘NAP’). For a very different reading, see McCabe, this volume.
The matter is plain when we have grasped what it is sc. to live in activity and as an end. It is clear then that it (to live, in activity and as an end) is to perceive and to know, and so also that to live together (presumably in activity and as an end) is to perceive together and to know together.

δήλον δὲ λαβώσι τί τὸ ζήν τὸ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ώς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθά-νεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, ὡστε καὶ τὸ συζήν τὸ συναισθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ συγγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.

1244b22–26

There is a lacuna in [1] (A) such that it is impossible to tell what exactly the point there is. But little if anything in the interpretation of what follows depends on this: the gist of the puzzle is reasonably clear. I have italicized the last bit of (A) so as to call attention to the assumption I think Aristotle means to challenge—namely, that it is only in accordance with some need that a person seeks a friend. For I think it pretty clear from what follows that Aristotle’s solution to the puzzle consists largely in denying this. He argues, very roughly, that there are activities such that although an agent can successfully engage in them on her own, the pleasure she takes in them is increased by engaging in them together with a friend. So although the self-sufficient agent has no needs a friend might fill, it makes sense that such agents have friends with whom they engage in such activities.

It is clear from [2] (A) that Aristotle takes the puzzle in question to have been presented in [1], in spite of the fact that there is no explicit presentation there of the case for the self-sufficient person’s having friends: there is simply the suggestion in the first sentence of [1](E) that any friend he does have—assuming he has one—will not be for the sake of use or any benefit. Readers recalling the three forms of friendship that were introduced in EE VII.2 and employed in subsequent chapters will at this point be inclined to suppose that any friend the self-sufficient agent has must be either on account of virtue or on account of pleasure. So it is no surprise that Aristotle turns immediately to friendship on account of virtue and then makes indirect reference to the issue of pleasure.

But there is a question about the second sentence of [1](E). Is the point that any friend the self-sufficient person does have is a friend only on account of virtue? Or is the point rather that any friend the self-sufficient person does have is not only on account of virtue but also on account of something else? I have opted for the latter because of the way in which the next sentence, like the rest of the chapter as I read it, points to the alleged fact that all people tend in the absence of need to enjoy doing with others the sorts of things they most enjoy doing. So I take the next sentence to suggest that even if self-sufficient agents are friends primarily on
account of virtue, it is not only on account of virtue that they are friends: they are also friends on account of the pleasure they take in doing things together.

There is a subtle but important shift here, from the talk at the end of [1](D) of friends who are such-as-to-be-chosen (haireton) with a view to living together, to the talk at the end of [1](E) of friends who are worthy (axion) of living together. We have already encountered talk of what is haireton—and of what is more haireton than what—in Plato’s *Philebus*, and I have so far represented this (following many commentators) by talk of ‘what is desirable or worthy of choice’. But there is a multivocity in the -τος /-τόν suffix that will play an important role throughout what follows. So let me pause here to explain the possibilities before we proceed.

We have seen this suffix in the *Metaphysics* XII use of ‘to noêton’, which is cognate with the verb ‘noein’ (meaning ‘to think’) and is used to refer to the object of thought. And we shall encounter this suffix repeatedly in our Eudemian text, both in talk of the objects of perception and knowledge and in talk of the objects of choice. In some cases, the suffix bears the meaning of the passive participle, so that ‘to aisthêton’ (which is cognate with the verb ‘aisthanesthai’, meaning ‘to perceive’) means ‘what is perceived’ in the sense that it is actually perceived; and ‘to gnôston’ (which is cognate with the verb ‘gignôskein’, meaning ‘to know’) means ‘what is known’ in the sense of what is actually known. But the suffix often indicates possibility, so that ‘to aisthêton’ and ‘to gnôston’ are often used in the sense of ‘what can be perceived’ and ‘what can be known’; and ‘to haireton’ (which is cognate with ‘hairesthai’, meaning ‘to choose’) often means ‘what can be chosen’ or—as I render it in my translations—‘what is such-as-to-be-chosen’. This translation is intended to reflect a complication that arises especially in the case of ‘to haireton’, which can be used to mean not simply ‘what can be chosen’ or even ‘the sort of thing people tend to choose’, but ‘what is worthy of choice’.40

It may be on account of the ambiguity of ‘haireton’ that Aristotle shifts from his talk (at the end of [1](D)) of friends that are ‘such-as-to-be-chosen with a view to living together’ to his talk (at the end of [1](E)) of friends that are ‘worthy of living together ⟨with us⟩’. For he may want to make it clear that the self-sufficient person will have only the latter sort of friend:

40 The range of possibilities is clearly exemplified by ‘to philêton’ (which is cognate with the verb ‘philein’, meaning ‘to love’): this can be used to refer to what is actually loved or to what is lovable, where this in turn may be either the sort of thing that people are in fact disposed to love or the sort of thing that is worthy of being loved.
the sort worthy of the kind of living together of which Aristotle goes on to speak in [2](B), where he identifies living (in the case of a human being) with perceiving and knowing. That Aristotle’s point is about a friend worthy of sharing one’s perceptions and thoughts is borne out in what follows, especially section [4], where Aristotle turns his attention to the way in which the value of any given activity of perceiving and knowing depends on the value of the object perceived and known: the better the object, the better the activity of perceiving and knowing. But the argument does not end there: the crucial step involves the connection with pleasure that is made in [6]: the better the perceiving and knowing, the more pleasant the perceiving and knowing; so the better the perceiving and knowing together, the more pleasant the perceiving and knowing together.

The argument for this is prefaced in [2](B) with what (for reasons to be explained below) I call ‘the basic logos’: namely, that what it is (for a human being) to live—in activity and as an end—is to perceive and know. The talk of living in activity also appears in NE IX.9. But the talk of living as an end appears only in the Eudemian chapter, where it seems to play an important role in the culmination of the main argument. This is [6](C), where Aristotle says that the activities that self-sufficient agents most enjoy doing together with friends are those belonging ‘in the end’. The idea is no doubt that the activities that self-sufficient agents most enjoy doing together are the ones that constitute their eudaimonia, the ones for the sake of which they would (as Aristotle puts it in EE I.5) choose to come to be rather than not come to be.

It is worth pausing here to note that the idea of something for the sake of which one would choose to come to be rather than not figures prominently in the Eudemian Ethics in a way it does not in the Nicomachean. Aristotle tells a story in EE I.5 about Anaxagoras answering a question about that for the sake of which he would choose to come to be by saying ‘for the sake of contemplating the heaven and the order of the whole cosmos’; and Aristotle contrasts this raison d’être with the ones given by those who would choose to live for the sake of sensual pleasure and those who would choose to live for the sake of performing virtuous actions (1216a10–27). This idea reappears in VII.12, where Aristotle commences the main argument. For it is clear from the first step that the argument takes the desire to live not as primitive but as something to be explained by the value of the activities in which our living consists.

First step: what is most haireton for each subject is to perceive and to know (1244b26–33)
(A) For each ⟨human being⟩ what is most such-as-to-be-chosen is that he himself perceive and that he himself know. And on account of this the desire for living is innate to all ⟨human beings⟩. For one should take living as a kind of knowledge.

(1244b29–33)

(B) If, then, someone should cut off ⟨?⟩ and should make the knowing ⟨to be knowing⟩ itself in itself and not42 (knowing itself in itself) (but this ⟨sc. that something is cut off⟩ escapes notice, just as it was written in the logos, though in actual fact it is possible for it not to escape notice)43 there would be no difference between another knowing instead of oneself (knowing). It would be similar to another living instead of oneself.

εἰ οὖν τις ἀποτέλοι καὶ ποιήσει τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καὶ θητόν σκέψει καὶ μὴ (ἅλλον τούτο μὲν λογικώς, ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου γέγραπται, τῷ μὲντοι πρόγνωστε ἐστὶ μὴ λογικώς), οὔθὲν ἄν διαφέροι ἢ τὸ γινώσκειν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον· τὸ δὲ ἐμοίν τῷ ζην ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλον.

Following Bonitz: the manuscripts have διατιθέναι (retained by Osborne).

41 It seems to me most natural to take this μὴ as introducing the complement of the immediately preceding talk of ‘the knowing itself in itself’—i.e., to take this as referring, within the realm of knowing, to the knowing that is not itself in itself. This leaves it open in what respect the knowing in question is not itself in itself, whether for example it is the subjects or the objects of the knowing—or perhaps both—that are now part of the mix. The alternative, I suppose, is to take it to negate whatever sort of knowing was in play back in [3](A): either the subject’s own knowing (if we follow Kosman) or the subject’s knowledge of himself (if we follow the OCT). In this case, the subsequent comparison with another’s living instead of oneself would seem to favor taking it Kosman’s way (i.e., as indicating that the subject that has been cut off and is now being thrown back into the mix). But the comparison with living does not require us to take the initial point to be that the subject alone is cut off or ignored: someone who makes claims about knowledge itself in itself ignores both the subject and the object. And while Aristotle may start here in [3](B) by noting a problem he sees in ignoring the subject of the relevant knowing, he may go on (as I think he does in [4]) to raise problems he sees in ignoring the object. So it seems best in the end—and grammatically most natural—to take μὴ to introduce the complement of τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καὶ θητόν.

42 It is tempting to suppose that the idea here is of something that an abstract logos might lead us to overlook even though it is something that is—either in our actual experience or if we look closely at the matter (τὸ πράγμα) in question—fairly obvious, something we can hardly fail to notice. This is presumably why Richards wants to understand ἄνθρωπος ἐστι. I am sympathetic to understanding the passage this way, but read and translate only the weaker claim (which appears in all the manuscripts): namely, that ‘it is in actual fact possible for it not to escape notice’. I wonder however whether a τι might have dropped out after ἐστι, due to haplography, so that the claim was originally ‘though in actual fact it is something that does not escape notice’.

43
There is much controversy about how exactly to read (A), but however we do so the following seems clear: (A) states a premise in Aristotle’s own voice, one about what is most hairer for each individual; and (B) speaks of someone who ‘cuts off’ or ignores an important aspect of what is claimed in (A) without realizing that he is doing so (or without realizing what he cuts off), with the result that he makes—or at least risks making—a claim on a par with the claim that it makes no difference whether it is oneself or someone else who lives. It seems to be assumed in (B) that this is ridiculous and that what is most hairer for each individual is of course that he himself should live. And the point there seems to be that someone who treats the sort of knowing in which our living consists as knowing itself in itself risks losing sight of this obvious truth: he ends up speaking as if it makes no evaluative difference to a subject whose knowing is at issue, his own or that of someone else.\textsuperscript{44}

Of course the talk of ‘knowing itself in itself’ leaves out both the subject and the object of the relevant knowing, but the comparison with another living instead of oneself places the emphasis squarely on the problem with cutting off or ignoring the subject of the relevant knowledge. For the verb ‘to live’ does not take an object. So this comparison seems to rule out one common way (adopted in Walzer and Mingay’s OCT) of resolving disputes about how to read \textsuperscript{[3]}(A), the one according to which \textsuperscript{[3]}(A) specifies the objects of the perceiving and knowing in which our living is supposed to consist (namely, ourselves).

What we find in all the manuscripts—except the second hand of the Marcianus (‘Marcianus.’)—is τὸ \textit{κυτὸ} αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ \textit{γνωρίζειν} (which is most naturally rendered ‘the same perceiving and the same knowing’).\textsuperscript{45} But it is difficult to make sense of this in context.\textsuperscript{46} So many readers—including I assume Marcianus,—have sought an alternative reading.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{44} For a recent translation and interpretation of this passage that seems (as many do) to miss this point, see Sorabji, \textit{Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about Individuality, Life and Death}, 234–239.

\textsuperscript{45} Jakub Kraiczynski suggests taking \textit{κυτὸ} as an accusative pronoun in the neuter, intended to make the point that for each \textit{animal} its own perceiving and its own knowing are most hairer. But this seems to me difficult given the combination of the overall context (which is clearly about human subjects) and (B)’s immediate use of the masculine in its talk of \textit{another} knowing and \textit{another} living (instead of oneself). Perhaps, however, as Pieter Sjoerd Hasper suggests, the \textit{κυτὸ} is used more abstractly to refer to \textit{any} x in \textit{whatever} domain is relevant, the talk being of x itself perceiving or x itself knowing. If the relevant domain is human subjects, then this is much the same as what I propose.

\textsuperscript{46} The most plausible ways of construing the received text seem to me as follows.

\textsuperscript{47} (a) \textit{numerically the same} perceivings and knowings are most choiceworthy \textit{for each of two friends} in the sense that each friend values the other’s perceivings and knowings in
Marcianus, has τὸ αὐτόν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν γνωρίζειν (i.e., to perceive oneself and to know oneself), which is adopted in the OCT, perhaps because the editors think it likely that Marcianus was correcting Marcianus, by appeal to some more authoritative manuscript. But it seems to me more probable that Marcianus, unable to make sense of τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γνωρίζειν in this context, looked ahead to [4](A)’s talk of τὸ ἐκείνου αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν (i.e., to perceive oneself and to know oneself) for signs of the point here in [3](A). This would explain his converting the first αὐτό to αὐτόν and the second to αὐτόν (αἰσθάνεσθαι requiring a genitive and γνωρίζειν an accusative object). But this assimilates the point of [3](A) to that of [4](A), which is pretty clearly a point about the objects (as distinct from the subjects) of the relevant perceiving and knowing. And [4](A) may well be intended to make a distinct point, one representing a separate stage in Aristotle’s argument. For given the comparison with living, the emphasis in [3](B) is clearly on the danger of cutting off or ignoring the subjects of the relevant perceiving and knowing. So we cannot simply read the point of [3](A) off the text of [4](A), which is most naturally read as concerned with the objects of the relevant perceiving and knowing.

the same way that she values her own—i.e., above the perceivings and knowings of everyone else;
(b) specifically the same perceivings and knowings are most choiceworthy for each of two friends in the sense that friends value the same kinds of perceivings and knowings—i.e., they like perceiving and knowing the same sorts of things;
(c) specifically the same perceivings and knowings are most choiceworthy for each person (or perhaps for each animal).

And while (b) might conceivably be a premise in an argument for having friends, it is hard to see how (a) could be construed as anything other than what the argument aims to prove. But (b) fails to explain—as the διὰ τοῦτο in the second part of the sentence requires it to do—why the desire for living is innate to all, whether we take this (as the context suggests) as referring to all persons or (as it might conceivably be taken) as referring to all animals. Only (c) seems capable of explaining this. According to (c), the same kinds of perceivings and knowings are most choiceworthy for each person (or perhaps each animal); hence the desire to live—which is necessary if one is to experience such perceivings and knowings—is innate to all. In other words, each person (or perhaps animal) wants to live because each wants above all the sort of perceivings and knowings for which living is requisite. Aristotle may well think this: in fact, he probably does. But I do not see—either on my own or in the extant literature—how this might serve as the first step in any argument for having friends as coherent as the argument afforded (in ways to be explained below) by starting with the premise embodied in Kosman’s relatively conservative proposal. Nor does (c) allow us to make good sense of the comparison with another living instead of oneself. For an alternative attempt to make sense (though somewhat far-out sense) of the manuscript reading, see Catherine Osborne, ‘Selves and Other Selves in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics vii 12’.
It makes more sense of what we find in [3](B)—and is no less conservative than what we find in Marcianus—to follow Kosman in adding υ’ at the end of each ‘αὐτό’ and reading τὸ ἀὐτὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀὐτὸν γνωρίζειν (i.e., that he himself perceive and that he himself know). But Kosman, I think, then makes the converse of the mistake of which I suspect Marcianus. Instead of assimilating [3](A) to [4](A), Kosman takes his reading of [3](A) to require him to read the genitive ἐπὶ τὸ in [4](A) in what he admits is not the most natural way—namely, as a genitive of subject indicating ‘the subject’s own perceiving’. But if [3] and [4] represent different stages in Aristotle’s argument, it is no more legitimate to take [3](A) as a guide to what [4](A) must be saying than to reason the other way round—though Kosman’s mistake is potentially more dangerous insofar as he proposes to read [4](A) in light of his emended version of [3](A), which could lead him to miss the mark in both cases. Still, I think Kosman’s reading of [3](A) the best on offer and I propose to accept it without however accepting the unnatural interpretation of [4](A) that Kosman seems to think required by it. For I think it relatively clear, in ways explained below, that [3] and [4] are supposed to make distinct contributions to Aristotle’s overall argument.

It is worth pausing here to note one further reason for following Kosman in putting the emphasis in [3](A) on the identity of the subject: however obvious it is that what is most choiceworthy for each subject is that he himself should know, it is nowhere near as obvious what object it is most

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47 This is plausible given that one can imagine a scribe failing to understand the somewhat unusual construction τὸ ἀὐτὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀὐτὸν γνωρίζειν—or failing to understand how a claim that sounds so egoistic could figure in a discussion of friendship but thinking that it would make sense in a discussion of friendship to claim that the same perceiving and knowing are choiceworthy to each of two friends—and so dropping each υ’. But this would leave us (as I explain in the preceding note) with something that does not make clear sense in this context.

48 It is worth noting here another more radical (but not unreasonable) proposal which is due to Solomon and adopted in Rackham’s Loeb edition. Solomon proposes to reverse the τὸ and the αὐτὸ in both occurrences of τὸ αὐτὸ and to take αὐτὸ as an intensive pronoun. This yields αὐτὸ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γνωρίζειν, which Solomon renders ‘mere perception and mere knowledge’. Solomon’s Greek fits well enough with what we find in [3](B), which is what makes his proposal reasonable. But his translation suggests he was looking ahead to [3](B), where he renders the talk of τὸ γνῶσκεν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν, αὐτὸ as ‘mere knowledge’. But this seems to me misleading, and I myself would render this ‘the perceiving itself’ and the knowing itself (as in Platonic talk of ‘Beauty itself’). For ‘mere perceiving and mere knowing’ is highly misleading if I am right that Aristotle’s point in [4] is to contrast objects worthy of being perceived and known with objects not so worthy, and to insist that living well is a matter of perceiving and knowing worthy objects: it is precisely ‘mere perceiving and mere knowing’ (as we use the term ‘mere’) that fail to characterize the sort of life Aristotle thinks we all desire.
haireton for him to know, himself or someone (or something) else. So it would make sense for Aristotle to start with the former, more obvious point and to turn only after he has established that to the latter, more controversial one. And the latter is controversial. For why should it not in fact be more haireton for a subject to know someone or something superior to himself—for example God or the starry skies above—than to know himself? We shall return to this question, for it is part of what Aristotle himself seems to address in section [4].

I am now in a position to explain how I understand [3](B)’s reference to what was written in some logos, which might be either an argument or simply an account of some phenomenon (hence my use of ‘logos’ throughout what follows here). The idea seems to be that some written logos leads us to claim that what is most haireton for each subject is ‘knowing itself in itself’ without however attending to whose knowing is supposed to be most haireton for each, her own knowing or that of someone else. And this is supposed to be like saying that living is most haireton for each subject without attending to whose living is supposed to be most haireton for each, her own living or that of someone else. But the fact that what is most haireton for each subject is his or her own living is the sort of thing that only an abstract logos could lead one to overlook.

But what exactly is the logos that might lead one to overlook this? I assume both that the burden of proof is on anyone who proposes (as Dirlmeier does) to read this as referring to something written elsewhere and that the burden is even higher if we can make sense of this as referring to something written here. And there seem to me two candidates here: either what was written in [2](B), where Aristotle identifies living with perceiving and knowing, without specifying whose perceiving or knowing he is talking about; or what was written in [3](A), assuming that we read it with Kosman as concerned with the subject’s own perceiving and knowing.

But if we take what was written in the logos to be what was written in Kosman’s version of [3](A), then the rest of [3](B) does not make sense. For the rest seems to assume that what was written fails to mention the subject, which is precisely what Kosman’s version mentions. And though one might think this a reason for following Marcianus and taking [3](A) to identify only the object of the relevant perceiving and knowing, this

49 Reference to the subject is not built into Solomon’s reading, so if we follow Solomon we could take the argument referred to in [3](B) to be the one written in [3](A). But Solomon’s emendation is the most radical on offer and there is (even apart from that) good reason to reject it: see note 48.
would be misguided—and not simply for the reasons already mentioned. For insofar as the object mentioned in Marcianus₂ is the subject himself, reference to the subject is built into Marcianus₂’s version of [3](A). So what is written there is unlikely to lead the reader to forget that it is the subject’s own perceiving and knowing that is supposed to be most haireton for him.⁵⁰

For these reasons, I take ‘what was written in the logos’ to refer back to what was written in [2](B), where Aristotle identifies living with perceiving and knowing without mentioning either the subject or the object of the relevant perceiving and knowing. (This is why I call what we find there ‘the basic logos’.) And I read the μη that precedes the parenthesis in [3](B) as negating ‘the knowing itself in itself’ rather than ‘the subject’s own knowing’ or (as the OCT has it) ‘the subject’s knowing himself’. In other words, I take what escapes notice to include the fact that it is the subject’s own knowing that is in question, which is what the comparison with talk of another’s living is supposed to make clear. But what escapes notice need not be limited to this fact: it remains open to Aristotle to make an additional point about the relevance of the object to the value of any given activity of knowing. And this is precisely what I take him to do in [4]. But before turning to that, let me summarize briefly how I read [3] and say a few words about the role I think it plays in the ensuing argument.

[3] calls to our attention something that the logos written in [2](B) might lead us to forget—namely, that what is most haireton for each subject is not simply that there should be perceiving itself in itself and that there should be knowing itself in itself; what is most haireton for each subject is she herself should perceive and that she herself should know. And this is crucial to showing, in the end, why the subject should (as the basic logos claims) value perceiving together with and knowing together with her friend. For it is only if she is present with her friend when her friend is perceiving and knowing that her friend’s perceiving and knowing enter the sphere of what is most haireton for her—namely, her own perceiving and knowing. In other words, it is only if she is conscious of her friend’s perceiving and knowing that her friend’s perceiving and knowing become, so to speak, part of her life.

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⁵⁰ This might seem to us so obvious that not even an abstract logos could lead one to forget it: but it may not have gone without saying in Aristotelian circles, where it was sometimes claimed that the lives of some subjects, for example slaves, should be devoted to facilitating the perceiving and thinking done by others (something Aristotle himself is not beyond saying). See for example EE 1241b17–22 (quoted in the discussion of [6](A) below) where Aristotle denies that there is any koinônia between master and slave because (at least in the context of this relationship) the slave has no independent good of his own.
Note, however, that I do not think that the friend’s perceiving and knowing become part of the subject’s life in the way Kosman suggests, by becoming in some sense her own perceiving and her own knowing: they do not become part of her life in the sense that she becomes in some way their subject. Rather, they become part of her life in something like the way her own first-order perceiving and knowing become part of her life: namely, by coming to be among the objects perceived and known by her, objects that help if they are good to make her second-order activities of perceiving and knowing not simply good but also pleasant, and indeed pleasant because they are good. In other words, just as perceiving and knowing her own perceiving and knowing is pleasant if her own perceiving and knowing are good, so too perceiving and knowing her friend’s perceiving and knowing is pleasant if her friend’s perceiving and knowing are good.


It will be easier to appreciate all of this if we keep the Philebus background firmly in mind. So let us recall the passage early in the Philebus where Socrates asks Protarchus whether he would be content to go through life enjoying the greatest pleasures without however any form of nous, and Protarchus replies that he most certainly would. Socrates then presses Protarchus to concede that without nous he would not only fail to remember past pleasures and to anticipate future ones: he would also fail to recognize that he was enjoying himself at the time when he was actually doing so. He would—as Socrates puts it and Protarchus immediately agrees—be living ‘the life of a jelly-fish or one of those encrusted creatures that lives in the sea’. And this—like the converse life of pure nous without any pleasure—is something they agree is not hairéton for a human being.\footnote{The points made here, in 21a–d, are restated in 60a–c, where Socrates speaks explicitly (in a way whose relevance will become clearer in my discussion of [4]) about the nature of the good (τὴν τάγαθον ... ψύχην) and says that ‘any creature that was in permanent possession of it (sc. the good), entirely and in every way, would never be in need of anything else (μηδενὸς ἕτερον ποτὲ ἐπὶ προσδεῖχσαι) but would live in perfect self-sufficiency (τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεσιατὸν ἑχεῖν)’ (translation by D. Frede). The language in both places is similar to the language used by Aristotle in the initial presentation of our aporia: see the talk in [1](B) of the good person being ‘adequate company for himself’ (αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἰκανὸς συνεῖναι) and in [1](C) of God ‘needing nothing (in addition to himself)’ (συνεῖναι προσδείχεις). So there should be little doubt about the relevance of these passages to the argument of EE VII.12.}
The basic idea here is that just as a life of pure thought fails to count as the good for a human being because there are forms of pleasure such that adding them to a life of pure thought makes that life more hairer for its subject than it would otherwise be, so too a life of pure pleasure fails to count as the good for a human being because there is a form of nous such that adding this form of nous to a life of pure pleasure makes that life more hairer for its subject than it would otherwise be. The relevant form of nous seems to be a form of self-awareness or what we might call ‘self-consciousness’. So the idea seems to be that adding self-awareness (or self-consciousness) to a life makes that life more hairer for its subject than it would be in the absence of such awareness (or consciousness).

Aristotle, I think, makes use of this basic idea in EE VII.12 when he argues that the self-sufficient agent does not simply want it to be the case that her friend perceives and knows. The idea, as we shall see in [5](C), is that the self-sufficient agent wants to be present with her friend when her friend is perceiving and knowing and to be present with her friend in something like the way in which she is typically present with herself when she herself is perceiving and knowing. For just as her own perceiving and knowing, when they are good, make her awareness of her own perceiving and knowing not just good but also pleasant (and pleasant because its objects are good), so too her friend’s perceiving and knowing, when they are good, make her awareness of her friend’s perceiving and knowing not just good but also pleasant (and pleasant because its objects are good).

This, I think, is why Aristotle shifts in [4] to a point about the objects of the perceiving and knowing in which the subject’s life is supposed to consist. [4] begins—in all the manuscripts—as follows:

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52 It is not entirely clear whether this is supposed to be at least partly because of the way in which adding self-awareness is taken to add new forms of pleasure or whether that is excluded by the terms of the thought experiment. For the life of pure pleasure is supposed to be imbued throughout with ‘the greatest pleasures’. But whether or not the terms of the thought-experiment are supposed to rule out the possibility that self-consciousness might increase the subject’s pleasure, Protarchus may not fully appreciate these terms. So even if Socrates takes self-awareness to make a non-hedonic contribution to the value of any life involving it, Protarchus may accept Socrates’ point because he takes the addition of self-awareness to yield new forms of pleasure and so greater pleasure overall. And Plato may well intend for his readers to conclude that self-awareness can make both hedonic and non-hedonic contributions to the value of a life. So we should keep both sorts of contribution in mind as we return to VII.12. For further discussion of this point, see Cooper’s contribution to the Fourth Keeling Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, ‘Plato and Aristotle on ‘Finality’ and ‘(Self-)Sufficiency’’, section II.
εὐλόγως δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἱρετώτερον.

I render this (as it is mostly naturally taken):

it is plausible that to perceive oneself and to know (oneself) is (for each) more such-as-to-be-chosen (than to perceive and to know another).\(^3\)

Many commentators fail to see any shift here, perhaps because they assume that Aristotle's use of εὐλόγως at the start of [4] is meant to indicate that he is simply confirming the point made in [3], however exactly one takes that point. But there are good reasons for supposing that [3] and [4] represent distinct stages in Aristotle's argument and that we should neither assimilate [3] to [4] (as Marcianus, does) nor assimilate [4] to [3] (as Kosman does). For the assumption that Aristotle is making the same point in both places is problematic whichever direction one moves. And it is problematic for two reasons, each of which applies on its own but is reinforced by the other.

First, taking Aristotle to have the same focus in both [3] and [4]—whether that focus is on the subjects or on the objects of the relevant perceivings and knowings—requires us to read Aristotle as moving from the superlative claim that the relevant perceivings and knowings are most haireton for each person, to the comparative claim that these same perceivings and knowings are more haireton for each person than some other unspecified perceivings and knowings (which they must of course be if they are for her the most haireton ones). But it is difficult to see what point would be served by making such a move. There might however be some point to moving from the claim (i) that each person’s own perceivings and knowings are for her most haireton in the sense that they are generally more haireton for her than anyone else’s perceivings and knowings, to the claim (ii) that among her own perceivings and knowings, some are more haireton than others. For this would shift the focus from the special sort of value that resides for each person in her own perceivings and knowings to the sort of differences in value among her own perceivings and knowings that might stem (for example) from the differences in value of their respective objects. In other words, even if a person’s own perceiving is always more haireton for her than anyone else’s is, it is surely more haireton for her to perceive herself in a good condition than to perceive herself in a bad condition; and it may well be more haireton for her to perceive a friend in a good condition than to perceive a stranger in the same condition. These, I think, are the sorts of points Aristotle seeks to make in [4], where I read him as finally—after

\(^{3}\) This is probably intended to refer to other persons, but could perhaps be intended to refer simply to other objects, whether persons or not.
reintroducing in [3] the subjects that were left out of the logos written in [2](B)—reintroducing the objects that were likewise left out of that logos.

Second, the idea that [4](A) simply confirms the point made in [3] is clearly undermined by the conjunction of two things: namely, the naturalness of taking [4](A)'s universally attested ἐμφασις as referring to the object of perception, and the difficulty (given the parallel with living) of taking the point back in [3] to be about the identity of the objects of the relevant perceiving and knowings. This conjunction makes it natural to read Aristotle as turning from the point in [3], about the subjects of the relevant perceiving and knowings, to some point in [4] about the objects of these perceiving and knowings. And this natural reading is supported by what follows the εὑληγως claim. For the next sentence (δειγμα ...) is clearly meant to introduce the reason for accepting the εὑληγως claim. And it is pretty clear that the reason Aristotle goes on to give, in the remainder of [4], has something to do with objects of the perceiving and knowings in which the subject’s living is supposed to consist.

But the reason given is obscure and the remainder of [4] exceptionally difficult. So I shall present and discuss [4] one stage at a time. First, however, I want to note some general reasons Aristotle might have for thinking it plausible to suppose that it is more haireton for a subject to perceive and know herself than to perceive and know others, reasons best approached once again through the Philebus discussion of the value of nous construed as a form of self-awareness.

The Philebus suggests two ways in which self-awareness might contribute to the value of its subject’s life, thus suggesting two ways in which it may be more haireton for a subject to perceive and know herself than to perceive and know others. For readers may reasonably take Protarchus to think that nous makes a subject’s life more haireton by adding new kinds of pleasure while taking Socrates to mean that nous makes a life more haireton in some non-hedonic way. Readers may, for example, take Socrates to think that performing a stereotypically virtuous action with a certain kind of awareness of what one is doing has a kind of moral value that is lacking in the performance of such an action without such awareness of what one is doing. And this example suggests that the two kinds of value may even complement one another: an agent’s awareness of the moral value of her action may give rise to the distinctive sort of pleasure that Aristotle thinks virtuous agents take in virtuous activity. And the same goes for any other

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54 For the talk of stereotypically virtuous actions, see my ‘Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions’.
sorts of value there prove to be, for example aesthetic value. So the *Philebus* can be read as suggesting both hedonic and non-hedonic ways in which a subject’s perceiving and knowing herself and her own activities makes her life *more hairerōn* than it would otherwise be.

But most pertinent here is the kind of non-hedonic value that Aristotle himself sees in self-awareness and associates with intentional action and so (in his view) with the sort of behavior that is the appropriate object of praise and blame. In many cases, *what* I am doing is partly a function of what *I take* myself to be doing, where this in turn is partly a function of what I am *aiming* to do. In this sense, a certain kind of self-awareness is partly constitutive of the kind of agency that Aristotle takes to be distinctive of rational animals. And this yields a sense in which it is in fact reasonable to say that it is *more hairerōn* for a human subject to perceive and know herself than to perceive and know others. For an agent’s awareness of herself and what she is doing is partly constitutive of what *she* is doing in a way in which her awareness of others and what they are doing is *not* generally speaking even partly constitutive of what *they* are doing: it is *their* awareness of themselves and what *they* are doing that is partly constitutive of *that*. In this sense an agent’s awareness of herself and what she is doing is partly constitutive of rational (and so responsible) agency. So there is an important sense in which it is in fact *more hairerōn* for each human being to perceive and know herself than to perceive and know others. For without such perception and knowledge, she would not *be* a rational agent: she would not be able to engage in any sort of *prohairesis* at all.

Here, however, it is important to note two ways in which Aristotle may limit the priority he assigns to perceiving and knowing oneself. First, there are some activities in which perceiving and knowing others, and being perceived and known in turn by them, are partly constitutive of *what one is oneself* doing: for example, having a conversation or playing a game of squash. And second, even apart from such ‘joint activities’, the claim that it is *more hairerōn* to perceive and know oneself than to perceive and know others may well be one that Aristotle thinks true (as he thinks most claims about sublunar phenomena are true) only ‘for the most part’. So Aristotle’s point in what follows may well be that although this claim is *for the most part* true, the activities of one’s *friend* may in some sense constitute an important exception (at least if he is a character friend). In that case there may be

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55 See *NE* X.5. For an example involving awareness of aesthetic value, see section 11 of Whiting ‘NAP’.

56 For more on this, see my ‘Lockeanism’.
VI. The Eudemian Text Continued:
[4] in the Light of Metaphysics XII.7 and 9

Let us turn then to [4], keeping these points in mind. It will also help if we
keep in mind what has been claimed so far: namely, that what is generally
most hairéton for each human being is the perceiving and knowing in which
its own living consists, i.e., its own perceiving and knowing.

[4] Second step: to perceive oneself and to know oneself is for each subject more
hairéton (than to perceive or know another) (1244b33–45a10)

(A) And it is plausible that to perceive oneself and to know (oneself) is (for each)
more such-as-to-be-chosen (than to perceive and to know another). For it
is necessary at the same time (a) to posit two things together—both that
the living is actually

εὐλόγως δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν αἰρετῶτερον. δεὶ γὰρ ἦμα συνδεῖ-

ναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τε τὸ ζῆν καὶ αἰρέτον, καὶ ὃτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων [ὅτι]
to auto αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν60 τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. (1244b33–45a1)

respects in which it is as hairéton—or at least nearly so—for an individual
to perceive and know her friend’s activities as it is for her to perceive and
know her own.57

57 For the ‘nearly so’ claim, see the parallel passage in NE IX.9, regarding the way in which
the existence of the friend is hairéton in the same way—or nearly so (παραπλησίως)—as one’s
own existence (1170b8). If the NE parallel is (as I think) later, then this qualification may
suggest increasing theoretical caution and/or increasing psychological realism on Aristotle’s
part.

58 For καί, going with what follows it, as ‘actually’, see J.D. Denniston, The Greek Particles

59 It is not necessary to my argument to take τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν to refer to the nature
of the good, but I think it plausible, especially given NE IX.9, 1170a20–21 (where Aristotle
speaks of the determinate as being of the nature of the good) together with Philebus 60b10.
I am on the other hand somewhat tempted to suppose that the nature in question is that of
being an object of self-perception and self-knowledge, which would make the point here a
version of the Philebus point that self-aware activities are more hairéton than their non-self-
aware analogues. This would afford a clearer connection with the shift here to perceiving
and knowing oneself. Still, it seems easier to connect what follows, especially in section (B),
with Metaphysics XII.7’s emphasis on the goodness of the objects of perception (whether
the objects are one’s own activities or not). For the connections with Metaphysics XII.7 are
clear, especially given the talk there of the column of what is hairéton. So I am on the whole
somewhat more inclined to take τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν to refer to the nature of the good than to
refer to being an object of self-perception and self-knowledge. But see note 66.

60 I suggest deleting the third ὅτι so as to make sense of the infinitive ὑπάρχειν, which I
I have underlined ‘them’ (αὐτοῖς) because one of the problems here is to
determine its referent. But this problem is best treated in the context of two
more fundamental problems posed by the text as I have chosen to read it.

The first is the problem of determining what two things must be put
together in the argument. The second is that of determining what is sup-
possed to follow from putting them together (which subsumes the problem
of determining the referent of ‘them’). Let me begin with the first. Since I
take the burden of proof to fall on any reading that declines to take the
first two ἃτι (or ‘that’) clauses as specifying the two things that must be
put together, I shall start from this assumption and turn immediately to the
question of how to understand these two clauses.

It is syntactically most natural to take τὸ ἀγαθὸν as the subject of the sec-
ond ἃτι clause while understanding αἰρετόν (from the first) as its implicit
predicate, thus yielding ‘that living is haireron and that the good is ⟨haire-
ton⟩’. Each conjunct is no doubt something Aristotle believes, though he
take to be governed (together with the συνθεναι δῦο clause) by the initial δεί. And I read τὸ
αὐτὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν where the manuscripts have τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν. The fact that deleting
the third ἃτι helps with the infinitive is a reason for deleting it rather than the second, as
Solomon’s original translation seems to do (see my next note). For one can see how the third
ὃτι might have been added by someone puzzled about what follows from putting the first two
together and so both looking to (b) for the content of the second of the two claims that must
be put together and expecting this content to be signaled by ἃτι. One can perhaps imagine a
scenario in which it was the second ἃτι that was inserted, but this would require one to posit
an original with ἃτι plus the infinitive. So it seems better to suppose that it was the third, not
the second, that was mistakenly introduced.

Please note that I follow Dirlmeier in adding the letters (a) and (b) so as to indicate how I
now take the ἄμα—namely with δεί γὰρ and as joining (a) and (b)—and not (as I once took
it and as Décarie takes it) with συνθεναι and as joining the two ἃτι clauses internal to (a). In
other words, I take the basic structure of the sentence to be: ‘δεί γὰρ ἄμα (a) συνθεναι δῦο ...
καὶ (b) τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν …’.

Décarie (who takes τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν to refer to ‘une nature bonne ou une vie bonne’) has:
“Car il faut poser ensemble deux points présentés dans le discours: que la vie est désirable et
que le bien l’est aussi, et en conséquence, qu’il est désirable qu’une telle nature appartienne
à tous pour la même raison.” Dirlmeier gets the basic structure right but takes τὸ ἀγαθὸν
as the subject of the second ἃτι clause rather than—as I argue it should be taken—as the
predicate. So he ends up with the following claim, which is true but too trivial to advance the
argument: “Man muß nämlich zwei in dem Buch enthaltene Dinge vereinigen: (a) daß das
Leben und daß das Gute wählenswert ist, und (b)—was daraus folgt—daß sie wählenswert
sind, weil ihnen jene bekannte Werthaftigkeit eigen ist.”

61 This is how almost all commentators and translators seem to take it: but I now wonder
about Solomon, whose original translation (as distinct from the version in Barnes’ Revised
Oxford translation) seems to leave open the possibility for which I argue. He has: ‘Naturally,
perception and knowledge of oneself is more desirable. For we must take two things into
consideration, that life is desirable and also the good, and thence that it is desirable that such
a nature should belong to oneself as belongs to them.’ The revised Oxford text disambiguates,
may in the end accept only a qualified version of the first.62 But the second conjunct would seem to go without saying and to contribute little if anything towards a conclusion worth establishing; what follows from these two claims is simply that both living and the good are haireton. And while we could perhaps construe what follows the two ὅτι clauses as telling us something like that—namely that being haireton must belong both to living and to the good—is it hard to see what point would be served by saying that.

So I think it better to take τῷ ἀγαθῶν as the predicate of the second ὅτι clause, with τῷ ζῷῳ as its implicit subject. This is syntactically less natural but grammatically possible.63 On this account, Aristotle’s argument is a variation on an argument of the Philebus. Aristotle first says that the living in question—the one that [3](A) takes to be most haireton for its subject—is not just any old living: it must be haireton, presumably in the sense of being worthy of being chosen. Aristotle then adds—again in accordance with saying: ‘... that life is desirable and also that the good is ...’. This has the virtue of translating the second ὅτι, but I think it possible (in the way my translation indicates) to translate that without losing the point that Solomon’s original translation leaves open—namely, that the life in question is not only haireton but also the good of its subject. It is also worth noting that Solomon’s translation (both original and revised) seems to read the δὲ γὰρ ἀμα as I read it—namely, as applying to (a) and (b). So Solomon’s original seems to me the best anyone has done so far to get this bit right.

62 The claim that Aristotle accepts only a qualified version of the first conjunct receives some support from the Nicomachean parallel to [4], where Aristotle says: “To live is defined for animals by the capacity for perceiving, and for human beings (by the capacity for) perceiving or thinking. But the capacity is referred back to the activity, and the real (living) is in the activity. It seems in fact that to live is really to perceive or to think. For (to live in this sense) is determinate, and the determinate is (characteristic) of the nature of the good. But what is good by nature is also (good) for the decent person. Whence (to perceive or to think) seems to all (humans) to be pleasant. But we should not take a wicked life or a corrupt one, nor (one lived) in pains, for such (a life) is indeterminate, just like the things belonging to it.” (τὸ δὲ ζῷῳ ὄριζονται τοῖς ζῴοις δυνάμει αἰσθήσεως, ἀνθρώπων δὲ αἰσθήσεως ὡς νοησεως· ἡ δὲ δύναμις εἰς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀνάγεται, τὸ δὲ κύριον ἐν τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ· ἐοίκε δὴ τὸ ζῷῳ εἶναι κύριος τὸ κισθάνασθαι ἦ νοεῖν. τὸ δὲ ζῷῳ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἱδέων· ὄρισμένον γὰρ, τὸ δὲ ὄρισμένον τῆς τάγαθου φύσεως· τὸ δὲ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῷ ἐπεικεῖ· δίσπερ ἐοίκε πάντως ἡδο εἴει· οὐ δὲ τῇ λαμβανεῖν μοχθηρὰν ζωῆν καὶ διεφθαρμένην, οὐδὲ τῷ λύπας ἀδριστος γὰρ ἤ τοιοῦτο, καθάπερ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτῆς (1170a16—24).) I am reading the argument of EE VII.12 as aimed at making much the same point. So I take argument there to be not about ‘mere life’, but about the sort of life that is not only haireton for its subject but in fact the good of that subject. And I take Aristotle to be talking about the conditions a life must satisfy if it is to count as such.

63 See Smyth, Greek Grammar § 152: ‘Even in the predicate the article is used with a noun referring to a definite object ... that is well known, previously mentioned or hinted at, or identical with the subject.’ τὸ ἀγαθῶν clearly satisfies the first two conditions: it refers to an idea that is familiar from Philebus 20b–d and that Aristotle has previously mentioned (at the start of the EE). My claim here is that τὸ ἀγαθῶν also satisfies the third condition: Aristotle is identifying the sort of living he is talking about with the good of its subject.
[3](A)'s claim that the living in question is *most haireton* for its subject—that the living in question is in fact the *good* of its subject, where this means that nothing further can be added to it to yield a life that would be even better for that subject.\(^{64}\)

It is easy to see the remainder of the sentence (κα/uni1F76/uni1F10κτο/uni1F7Bτων ...) as spelling out something that follows from this. There are in fact multiple possibilities here. The first and most common is to take α/uni1F50το/uni1FD6/uni03C2 in the final sentence to refer to the subjects of the relevant perceiving and knowing. On this reading, it is supposed to follow from the conjunction of the first two δτι clauses that something or other must belong to these subjects. The idea would then be that if their living is to be not only haireton for them but in fact the good for them, then something or other must belong to these subjects themselves.

The something or other is whatever it is to which την τοιαύτην φύσιν (taken in apposition to τό α/uni1F50το/uni1FD6) refers, probably the nature of the good, perhaps the nature of what is haireton, and just maybe the nature of the sort of self-awareness introduced in the initial ε/uni1F50λ/uni1F79γω/uni03C2 claim. So Aristotle may be saying that the nature of the good (or perhaps the haireton) must belong to the subjects themselves if their lives are to count as the good for them; or he may be saying, as Socrates says in the Philebus, that self-awareness must belong to these subjects if their lives are to count as the good for them. But either reading is awkward given that Aristotle has hitherto spoken of the subject in the singular.\(^{65}\)

The second line of interpretation, which I prefer, involves taking α/uni1F50το/uni1FD6/uni03C2 to refer to the perceiving and the knowing in which a subject’s living is supposed to consist. We can then read the remainder of the sentence as saying that it follows from putting the first two claims together that something or other must belong to the perceivings and knowings in which the subject’s life

\(^{64}\) I think this explains the first κα/uni1F76 in the second sentence of [4](A). The idea (with each κα/uni1F76 indicated here by italics) is that we must at the same time (a) put together that the living in question is actually choiceworthy and that it (sc. the living in question) is in fact the good of the relevant creature; and (b) recognize that it follows from putting these together that something (probably the nature of the good) must belong to the perceivings and knowings in which the living has been said back in [2](B) to consist. If this is right, then there is no need to bracket (or delete) the first κα/uni1F76.

\(^{65}\) It must be conceded that [4](C) shifts quickly to the plural ('we are not each of these things in ourselves') and then back again to the singular ('but the one perceiving comes to be such-as-to-be-perceived ...'). So we cannot rule this line out. But if one adopts this line, it seems best to take what is supposed to belong to the subjects themselves to be not the nature of the good or the haireton, but rather the sort of self-awareness mentioned in the initial ε/uni1F50λ/uni1F79γω/uni03C2 claim. Still, the second line of interpretation (to which I now turn) seems to me to provide a smoother argument, one which assumes self-awareness and then says what else is required if the subject’s life is to satisfy the conditions for being its good.
consists. Once again, the ‘must’ (δε/uni1FD6) should be understood as referring to a condition that must be satisfied if the subject’s life is to be not only haireton for it but in fact the good for it. And the condition seems once again to be either that the nature of the good (or perhaps the nature of the haireton) should belong to the perceivings and knowings in which the subject’s living consists or that the sort of self-awareness mentioned in the εὐλόγως claim should belong to these perceivings and knowings. And while I cannot rule out the latter possibility, I am inclined to prefer the former in large part because of the way in which it receives support from the previously quoted portion of *Metaphysics* XII.9, which is clearly related—in ways I shall now explain—to [4] as a whole.

Recall section (B) of the passage from *Metaphysics* XII.9, where Aristotle makes it clear that he does not think that all perceivings and knowings are in themselves good and such-as-to-be chosen: ‘some things’, he says, ‘it is better not to see than to see’. Aristotle makes this point in support of his conclusion that it is not actual thinking, simply as such, that is the best activity, since actual thinking ‘belongs even to one thinking the worst (object)’: it is only thinking the best object that is the best activity. Aristotle clearly takes perceiving and thinking to be similar in that the value of either is partly a function of the value of its object. And he does not simply think it is better to perceive and/or know good objects than to perceive and/or know bad ones; he thinks some objects are so bad that seeing (and presumably also knowing) them is itself to be avoided. So even if perceiving and knowing oneself are generally more hairer-ton than perceiving and knowing others, this claim may not hold without qualification: it is surely not more hairer-ton to perceive or know oneself to be doing something shameful than to perceive or know another—especially if the other is one’s friend—to be doing something kalon. For whatever sort of constitutive and/or hedonic value we assign to self-awareness, it is surely a bad thing—and painful for anyone who is not altogether corrupt—to perceive herself to be doing the sort of thing that Aristotle says one should rather die, after the most horrid suffering, than do: for example, slaying one’s mother (*EN* 1110a25–29).

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I am however reluctant to dismiss entirely the latter possibility because it might shed light on what remains for me the most difficult point in all of this—namely, to see how the point about the value of perceiving and knowing oneself is supposed to be connected with the point about the way in which the value of the activities of perceiving and knowing is supposed to depend on the value of the objects perceived and known (where these objects include but are not limited to the subject herself, who is presumably perceived only ἐν παρέφω). See note 59.
The remainder of [4] confirms the relevance of these points from *Metaphysics* XII.9 to our chapter. For [4](B)’s puzzling talk of the column (sustoichia) of what is haireton is best understood by appeal to the similar talk in *Metaphysics* XII.7, which is where the argument of *Metaphysics* XII.9 is launched. XII.7 is about the need (if we are to explain the range of movements we see in both superlunary and sublunary spheres) for at least one being that moves other things without itself moving. Aristotle begins by suggesting that we know from our experience that there can be such things, since objects of thought and objects of desire both move other things without themselves moving. He continues as follows:

[ST1][a] *Metaphysics* XII.7 (1072a29–b1)

[a] ... it is more the case that we desire (things) because they seem (kalon) than that they seem (kalon) because we desire (them). For thinking is a source (of desire). And *nous* is moved by the object of thought, and one column is (of that which is) in itself an object of thought (νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοίχια καθ' ἄυτὴν). And in the case of this (column) substance is first, and in the case of this (sc. substance) the one that is simple and in activity (is first). But surely also what is and what is on account of itself such-as-to-be-chosen are in the same column (ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοίχίᾳ). And the first (in each column?) is always the best or analogous (to the best).

As we saw in [ST1][b]–[e] above, Aristotle proceeds from here to speak of divine *nous* and to identify it with an activity of thought, as distinct from any receptivity to objects of thought. He says that this activity is in fact a form of life—indeed the best and most pleasant life there is. And in *Metaphysics* XII.9, he explicitly contrasts this activity with human forms of cognition: divine noetic activity, which is eternal, is such as the best of which we are capable for only a short time, only better (1072b18–28).

Let us turn then, with these passages from *Metaphysics* XII in mind, to the remainder of [4]:

[4](B) If, then, in such a pair of columns one (member) is always in the column of what is such-as-to-be chosen, both what is such-as-to-be-known and what is such-as-to-be-perceived are generally speaking (in that column) by partaking of some determinate nature. So, to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be such (sc. partaking of some determinate nature).

εἰ δὲν ἐστιν ἂεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοίχιας ἢ ἑτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἰρετοῦ τάξει, καὶ τὸ γνωστὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῆς ὁρισμένης

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67 The idea, I think, is that the primary object of thought (which has been said to be the same as the primary object of desire) is that substance which is simple and in activity (i.e., God).
I think most commentators take the columns referred to here as opposing living, perceiving and knowing (qua *haireton*) to not-living, not-perceiving and not-knowing (qua not *haireton*). But the talk in *Metaphysics* XII.7 of what is ‘in itself’ such-as-to-be-thought/known and ‘what is on account of itself’ such-as-to-be-chosen’ suggests that the distinction is instead between different sorts of objects of thought and choice: those which are in *themselves* such-as-to-be-thought or chosen and those that are not in *themselves* such-as-to-be-thought or chosen. And the *Metaphysics*’ association of the former with what is *kalon* is significant.

The idea there, I think, is that one column contains objects that are *in themselves* worthy of being thought and chosen, while the other contains objects that are such-as-to-be thought or chosen only (if at all) on account of other things. So it seems best to take the columns referred to in the *Eudemian* chapter not as opposing the activities of living, perceiving and knowing to the absence of these activities, but rather as opposing the sorts of living, perceiving and knowing that are *in themselves* worthy of choice to the sorts of living, perceiving and knowing that are not *in themselves* such-as-to-be-chosen (where these include but are not limited to the sorts of living, perceiving and knowing that are, as *Metaphysics* XII.9 puts it, *pheukton*).

The point of [4](B), then, is to signal that however *haireton* it may be for a subject to perceive herself, she does not wish to perceive herself in any old condition: she wishes to perceive herself in a *good* condition, which involves partaking of some determinate nature. This suggests that it is not enough for the subject to perceive herself engaged in activities (such as contemplation or virtuous action) that are *in fact* good; she must perceive herself engaged in activities the goodness of which she herself recognizes as such. These activities will moreover always involve some object or objects distinct from herself—for example, the starry skies above or the needs of

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68 This seems to me to provide some support for taking τὴν τοιούτην φύσιν in [4](A) as referring to the nature of the good. The idea here, I think, is that the wish to perceive oneself is implicitly a wish to perceive oneself in a *good*—and hence a *determinate*—condition.

69 It is worth noting here that ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ (or more and less ‘theoretical’) forms of inquiry are contrasted both at the end of *Metaphysics* XII.9 (1075a1–5) and towards the end of the *Philebus* (55df).

70 This fits both the question in *Metaphysics* XII.9 about whether it makes any difference (presumably to the value of thinking) what divine *nous* thinks (i.e., whether the object must be *kalon* or whether any random object will do); and the question in *Eudemian Ethics* I.5 about that for the sake of which one would choose to live rather than not. The affinities of the *EE* with *Metaphysics* XII clearly extend beyond VII.12.
those around her. In this respect, even the most self-sufficient human being differs from God. As Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* XII.9, we do not perceive or know ourselves except ‘peripherally’, in perceiving and knowing other things.

Aristotle makes this point from the *Metaphysics* somewhat differently in [4], where he seems to draw on the accounts of perception and thought presented in his *de Anima*. [4] continues as follows (with the main sentence underlined, so that it can be taken in at a glance without the parenthetical interruption):

[4](C) Since, then, we are not in ourselves each of these things (sc. to *gnôston* and to *aisthēton*), but (we become each of these things) by partaking of the powers (of things) in the (activity of) perceiving and knowing (them) (for when perceiving one becomes *aisthētos* in this way and in accordance with this: (namely) just as the things one perceives prior (to perceiving oneself) are, one becomes (such) according to the way in which (one perceives these things) and what (one perceives); and when knowing (one becomes) such-as-to-be-known (in the same ways)) so, on account of this too one wishes always to live, because one wishes always to know, and (one wishes) this because one (wishes) oneself to be to *gnôston*.

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\text{ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ κατ’ αὐτούς ἐσμέν ἔκαστον τοῖτων, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μετάληψιν τῶν δυνάμεων ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἡ γνωρίζειν (αἰσθανόμενος μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητός γίνεται ταῦτα καὶ κατὰ τούτο, καθά πρότερον αἰσθάνεται, καὶ ἢ καὶ οὐ, γνωστὸς δὲ γινώσκων)- ὡστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἄει βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται ἄει γνωρίζειν, τούτῳ δὲ ὤτι αὐτὸς ἐναι τὸ γνωστὸν. (1245a5–10)
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I have simply transliterated forms of *γνωστός* and *αἰσθητός* because there are serious questions about how exactly they should be understood here, in particular about how *γνωστόν* is used at the very end.

The idea in the parenthesis can be understood in two ways, each corresponding to a common way of taking the -tos /-ton suffix. The idea may be that the subject is not in herself such that she can be perceived or known (presumably by herself), but comes to be a possible object of (her own) perceiving and knowing only in the act of perceiving and knowing other things. Or the idea may be that the subject is not in herself actually perceived or known (again, I assume, by herself), but comes to be an actual object of (her own) perceiving or knowing only in the act of perceiving and knowing other things. The latter seems to me more likely, given that the sort of pleasure on which the argument will ultimately turn is something that comes about only when the subject is actually perceiving or knowing. But this is not decisive,

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71 Supplied from 1245a2, as supported by the parenthetical remark that follows here (about becoming *aisthētos* when perceiving and *gnôstos* when knowing).
since the point here could be that it is only in actually perceiving or knowing other things that the subject becomes a possible object of her own perceiving or knowing. Still, to the extent that the argument turns in the end on the net pleasure a subject derives from perceiving or knowing herself to be in the better of two conditions, the argument seems in the end to require that the subject be an actual (even if only peripheral) object of her own perceiving or knowing.72

In sum, I am inclined to take the idea in the parenthesis to involve the subject’s being an actual object of her own perceiving and knowing. But whichever way we go here, it will be in accordance with the other things perceived and known, and with the way in which the subject perceives and knows these other things, that the subject herself comes to be an object (whether possible or actual) of her own perceiving and knowing. And either way, it is important that the other things perceived and known be good things, since there is a sense in which the subject becomes like the objects perceived and known: the better the objects she perceives, the better in some sense the condition in which she can or does perceive herself, even if only ‘peripherally’. And, as we shall soon see, the better the condition in which a subject perceives herself, the more pleasant her concomitant self-perception. But this idea is yet to come: it is articulated only in [6](C).

Still, anticipating the connection with pleasure may help to explain the emphasis I see in [4](C) on actual perceiving and knowing; for it is only when there is actual perceiving and knowing that the relevant pleasure occurs. And if the connection with pleasure is what explains the emphasis on actual perceiving and knowing, then we should perhaps be thinking of the talk of ‘living in activity and as an end’ (back in the basic logos) as involving a genuine conjunction and not simply epexegesis. For the emphasis in [4](B) is on a distinction between objects that are in themselves worthy of being perceived and known and objects that are not in themselves worthy of being perceived and known, which suggests a distinction between perceivings and knowings that are in themselves such-as-to-be-chosen and perceivings and knowings that are not in themselves such-as-to-be-chosen. So there seem to be two distinct points in [4], one corresponding to κατ’ ἐνέργειαν and the other to καὶ ὡς τέλος: if living is supposed to constitute

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72 See NE IX.12: περὶ αὐτὸν δ’ ἡ αἰσθήσεις δὴ ἐστίν αἰρετή, καὶ περὶ τὸν φίλον δή· ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια γίνεται αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ συζήν, ὡστ’ εἰκότως τούτου ἔριεται. (1171b35–72a1) ‘Concerning oneself, the perception that one exists is haireton, and concerning one’s friend too (the perception that he exists is haireton); and the actuality of this (perception) comes to be in living together (with the friend), so that friends reasonably aim for this (sc., living together).’
the good of its subject, then it must involve perceiving and knowing that is not only (as (C) tells us) actual but also (as (B) tells us) in itself such-as-to-be-chosen. The emphasis here in [4] seems to be on the κατ’ ἐνέργειαν; Aristotle will make more of the ὧς τέλος claim in [6](C), where he argues that the association of self-sufficient agents is above all of things ἐν τέλει.

We must at this point return to the question how τὸ γνωστὸν is used at the end of [4](C). Is Aristotle saying that each human being wishes always to know because she wishes to be an object of her own knowledge? Or could he be saying that each human being wishes always to know because she wishes in some sense to be the object known where this object is something distinct from herself? In other words, could Aristotle be saying that each ultimately wishes to be—perhaps in the sense of being like—whatever object it is she knows (assuming of course that the object is good)?

The chapter so far supports only the first interpretation. The latter possibility arises mainly because of what is yet to come: it arises in light of [6](A)’s talk of the friend wishing to be ‘another Heracles’, where this seems to embody a wish on the part of Heracles’ friend to be—if not Heracles himself then at least—like Heracles. But to the extent that the default reading of our chapter should be forwards, not backwards, we should at present stick with the first interpretation and take the point to be that the subject wishes to be the object—or at least an object—of her own knowledge.

It is important to see that any knowledge in question here must be the subject’s own. For it is sometimes supposed that the final sentence refers instead to the subject’s desire to be known or (in the Hegelian terms that are sometimes used) ‘recognized’ by others. But however one resolves the issues about [3], the only perceiving and knowing thus far mentioned are the subject’s own. There is nothing so far about her being an object of anyone else’s perceiving and knowing. In fact there has been no mention since the argument was launched in [3](A) of the friend (or anyone else) perceiving or knowing. So if Aristotle is concerned with a wish for recognition, it must be a wish for self-recognition, the wish to be an object of one’s own knowledge.73

But it is not obvious that the passage is concerned with the subject’s wish to be known or recognized, either by herself or by anyone else. For the subject’s wish to be to gnôston seems to me to be related to the way in which the subject, in knowing some object, in some sense becomes—or becomes

73 Unless Aristotle simply introduces the talk of another’s perceiving and knowing here out of the blue. But given that he presents what he is saying as following from what precedes (ὡσπερ δὲ τοῦτο ...), it would be uncharitable, as long as there is a way to construe this as following from what precedes, to accuse him of doing so.
like—the object known. That is why the focus in [4] is on the object’s being in the column of what is hairieton: because the subject becomes like the object, it is important that the object be kalon and not just any random thing.

I realize that VII.12 is often read as arguing that the self-sufficient agent needs a friend in order to achieve self-knowledge. But this sort of reading—which seems to be based primarily on a dubious assimilation of VII.12 to the famous mirror passage in Magna Moralia II.15—does not do justice to the role played by pleasure throughout the Eudemian argument, from the talk in [1](E) of the virtuous agent’s seeking companions in enjoyment to the talk in [6](B) of its being even more pleasant to enjoy divine pleasures with others than it is to enjoy ‘lower’ pleasures with them. Consider moreover how puzzling it would be if the idea in [4](C) were that the subject comes to know herself by coming to know another who is like herself. For—to steal a line from Plato’s Meno—how will she recognize the other’s likeness to herself if she does not already recognize that she herself possesses those characteristics in respect of which the other is supposed to resemble her?

It is also worth noting here how dubious it would be to rely at this point in the chapter on the general idea of the friend as an ‘other self’, an idea that appears in this chapter if at all only when we get to [6](A). I say ‘if at all’ because the versions of ‘another self’ (e.g., ‘second self’ and ‘ein zweites Ich’) that are found in virtually all modern translations of this passage are based on an emendation that substitutes άλλος γινόμενος for άλλος ωτός (which is found in all extant manuscripts of our chapter). We shall return to this issue when we reach [6](A). But however we resolve it there, the point here in [4] concerns the objects of some generic subject’s perceiving and knowing. And the subject is now being singled out

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74 Another reason for doubting that Aristotle speaks here of a desire to be known is the fact that he elsewhere belittles the desire to be known, comparing it—together with the desire to be honored, which (being honored) seems to be chosen not for its own sake but only incidentally (in order, for example, that we might be assured of our own goodness or receive the sort of favors that tend to be attached to honor) (1159a15–27). In the same passage—which claims (in a way relevant to EE VII.12) that philia is in itself hairieton—Aristotle goes on to say that philia consists more in loving than in being loved and to cite in support of this the enjoyment mothers take in loving: some mothers, in cases where it is not possible for them both to love and to be loved in turn, give up their children to be raised by others, it being enough for them to see their children doing well even if the children fail on account of not knowing their mothers to give to their mothers the sort of things (including no doubt love) that are due to a mother (NE 1159a27–33). I emphasize the seeing here because Aristotle presumably thinks it important for reasons similar to those for which it is important to live together with one’s friend—namely, because the seeing, like the sort of awareness of the friend provided by living together, gives rise to pleasure.
(after [3]’s silence on this point) as among the objects—indeed one of the more hairéton objects—of her own perceiving and knowing. There has been no explicit mention—at least not since the argument proper was launched in [3](A)—of friends as objects of perceiving and knowing. The talk so far has been entirely general: the better the object, whatever it is, the better the perceiving or knowing of it. And the only human object of perceiving and knowing that has been explicitly identified is the subject herself.

It is of course true, given [ST2][c], that Aristotle’s introduction of the subject as an object of its own perceiving and knowing presupposes objects of perception and knowledge that are prior (logically if not temporally) to the subject herself. For it is perception and knowledge of these objects that renders the subject herself an actual (or at least possible) object of her own perceiving and knowing. But nothing has been said so far about the identity of these prior objects. We know that they must be kalon; but that is entirely compatible with their being strangers, works of art, or the starry skies above.

Friends are of course common objects of human perceiving and knowing. But Aristotle cannot without begging the question take it for granted that friends must count among the objects of the self-sufficient person’s perceiving and knowing. For if a human subject becomes better to the extent that the objects she perceives and knows are better, why suppose that the best human subject will want to perceive and know friends, however good they may be? Will she not prefer to contemplate something even better, for example God? And if that is what she prefers, what reason will she have to do that in the company of a friend?

VII. The Eudemian Text Continued: [5]’s Reintroduction of the Friend

The point of [5], I think, is to raise such questions and then to hint at their answer, which turns—as [5](C) suggests and [6] confirms—on the role played, even in the best sort of friendship, by pleasure.

[A] Now choosing to live together might seem to those considering ⟨the matter⟩ in a certain way foolish, ⟨starting⟩ first in the case of things ⟨we share⟩ in common also with the other animals, such as eating together and drinking together. For what difference does it make if these things ⟨i.e., eating and drinking⟩ occur among those who are near ⟨to one another⟩ or separate ⟨from
one another), if one takes away speech? But surely also to partake of random speech is (yet) another such activity (as merely eating and drinking together without speech).

tὸ δὲ συζήν αἰρεθήσατο δόξειε μὲν ἂν εἶναι σκαπομένους πως εὐθείας· ἐπὶ τῶν κοινών75 πρῶτον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῷοις, ὅσον τοῦ συνεδρίειν ἢ τοῦ συμπίπτειν· τί γάρ διαφέρει τὸ πλησίον ὑστερα τυποβεῖν ἢ χωρίς, ἂν ἀφέληστ66 τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνεῖν τοῦ τυχόντος ἕτερον τοιοῦτον. (1245a11–16)

(B) (At the same time it is not possible for friends who are self-sufficient either to teach (one another) or to learn (from one another). For if one is learning, then he is not in the condition he should be in, while if he is teaching, his friend (is not). And the similarity (between them) is philia.)77

(ἀμα τε οὔτε διδάσκειν οὔτε μανθάνειν τοῖς αὐτορκέσι φίλοις ὁμοίως τε· μανθάνων μὲν γάρ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔχει ὡς δεῖ, διδάσκοντος δ' ὑπὸ φίλος, ὡς δ' ὑμικότητος φιλία).

(1245a16–18)

(C) But surely it at least appears (to make a difference to do these things together) and we all partake of goods more pleasantly with friends (than apart from them), insofar as (these goods) belongs to each and (are the) best (good) of which (each) is capable. But of these (best goods), it belongs to one person (to partake) of pleasure, to another (to partake) of artistic contemplation, and to (yet) another (to partake) of philosophy. It is also necessary to be together with78 the friend (when partaking of these things)—whence the saying 'distant friends are trouble'. So (friends) ought not be apart from one another when this (sc. partaking of the relevant good) is happening. (Whence erōs too seems to be similar to philia. For the lover desires living well,79 but

75 Although I once thought that the frequent use of κοινωνία in surrounding chapters and even three lines hence provided reason to resist following the OCT in adopting τῶν κοινών (suggested by Bonitz), I now think the opposite. For the difficulty of understanding κοινωνία here—especially the implausibility of taking the point to be about our winning and dining with the other animals—persuades me that a scribe who was thinking along the same lines I once thought mistakenly decided that κοινωνία probably belonged here as well. Still, for a great scene of a man dining with other animals, see chapter 43 of Trojanow, Der Weltensammler.

76 P has ἂν ἀφέλεσι; C ἀναφέρεις; and L ἀναφέρει.

77 Cf. NE 1159b13ff., where Aristotle associates teaching and learning with friendship for advantage.

78 ἄμα does not apply only to simultaneity; it can also (as Metaphysics 1068b26 makes clear) connote being in the same place (presumably at the same time), which is clearly Aristotle's point here.

79 Though my overall line of interpretation does not depend on this, I follow the manuscripts here in reading ἐν ζήν rather than συζήν, which is due to Casaubon (cited in Susemihl's edition) and is followed in all of the editions and translations I have consulted, presumably on the basis of the two occurrences of συζήν coming up in [6](C). But this seems to me both unnecessary and to miss the flow of the argument, which moves (in a way that [6](C) makes clear) from a point about the agent's own ἐν ζήν to a point about the intelligibility of the agent's desire for συζήν. So we might well expect [5](C) to make points about ἐν ζήν
not in that respect in which he should most (desire this) but according to perception.\(^8^0\)

\[\text{allā ἢν φά vehement θειον τῶν ἄγαθων μετὰ τῶν φύλων κοινωνοῦμεν, καὶ \text{δ}ον \text{θ}ειότων τῷ μὲν \text{θ}ειότης \text{σωματικῆς} \text{τῷ δὲ \text{θ}εωρίας \text{μουσικῆς}, τῷ δὲ \text{φ}ιλοσοφίας. καὶ τῷ \text{ά}μα \text{δ}ε \text{ν} \text{η}ν \text{τῷ φύλω. διὸ \text{φ}ησι \text{ψοχος οὐ \text{τ}ηλοῦ \text{φύλοι', \text{ωστο'}} \text{οὐ \text{δ}ε \text{ν} \text{γενέσσαι ἀπ' \text{ά}λλων \text{τ}ουτού \text{γινομένου}. \text{δ}εν καὶ \text{δ ἔρως δοκεῖ φιλία \text{δ}ημοιον \text{ε}ναι· τοῦ γὰρ \text{εὐ} \text{ζην} \text{δρ}εγμεται \text{δ ἔρων, ἀλλ' \text{οὔς} \text{η} \text{μ}αλίστα \text{δ}ει, \text{ἀ}λλα \text{κατ' αἴσθησιν.}} (1245α18–26)\]}

(D) The argument\(^8^1\) then says those things, raising puzzles. But the fact is evidently thus (sc. as we have just said). So it is clear that the (argument) raising these puzzles leads us somehow astray.

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\^8^0\ I.e. mere perception of the sort in which the living of non-rational animals consists, as distinct from the sort of perceiving and knowing of good objects in which distinctively human living consists.

\^8^1\ The argument is most plausibly taken to be the one presented in [1], perhaps together with the one presented in [5](A) and (B) to the extent that they restate the argument of [1]. It is different from what I am calling ‘the basic logos’ of [2](B), referred to in [3](B). But there is nothing untoward about this, given the frequency with which Aristotle (like other authors) uses ‘logos’ in different ways in different sentences within relatively short stretches of text.
I do not think that [5] simply reformulates the initial *aporia*, this time without the potentially misleading comparison with God. For the problem raised here is raised mid-stream, so to speak, in the course of Aristotle’s response to the initial *aporia*. In rejecting the idea that the value of eating or drinking together can be increased by adding random speech, [5](A) seems to assume the point of view established in [4]: the value of speech is partly a function of the value of its *subject matter*. So adding random speech cannot explain the preference of *self-sufficient* agents for sharing meals with one another: such agents may well prefer eating alone to eating in the company of idle chatter.\(^\text{82}\)

It is clear from [5](B) that Aristotle is searching here for what would serve to explain why even self-sufficient agents prefer—like other human beings—eating and drinking with their friends to eating and drinking alone. The point in (A) is *not* that conversation can make *no* difference to such agents: it is simply that random speech—i.e., small talk or chit-chat—is not of sufficient value to explain the preference of these agents for eating and drinking together. In other words, it is from the point of view of self-sufficient agents that adding random speech simply yields ‘another such thing’ as the sort of speechless eating and drinking together that Aristotle has just mentioned. But it does *not* follow from this that there is *no* form of speech whose addition would explain a preference on the part of self-sufficient agents for wining and dining together; perhaps edifying conversation would do the trick.

This proposal is taken up and rejected in [5](B). The preference of self-sufficient agents for eating and drinking together *cannot* be explained by appeal to what either might thereby *learn* from the other. For the assumption that either one stands to learn from the other conflicts with the sort of self-sufficiency that each is supposed, by hypothesis, to display. The hypothesis makes these agents as god-like as possible in what seems to be a *Philebus*-influenced way: neither is supposed to have any (perceived) epistemic deficiency that might be remedied by her association with the other.\(^\text{83}\) In this

\(^{82}\) I take the talk of ‘random speech’ to be an echo of the talk in *Metaphysics* XII.7 of a random object of thought, though the latter may well be an echo of the former, if *EE* VII.12 is earlier than *Metaphysics* XII.7. I do not myself have a view about which is earlier; nor do I think that anything in my argument depends on assuming either order.

\(^{83}\) See *Philebus* 52, but note the way in which Socrates there seeks to allow *some* ignorance, provided that its subject is *not aware* of it (which would be painful for the subject). The
sense, the hypothesis itself speaks against common interpretations according to which the relationship allows each agent to achieve a kind of self-knowledge she would otherwise lack. Aristotle’s point has more to do (in ways that [5](C) begins to reveal) with pleasure. But not with the pleasures of eating and drinking, where these are associated with the filling of some bodily lack. Nor even with the pleasures of learning, where these are associated with remedying some epistemic deficiency. Aristotle is working here towards the sort of ‘pure’ pleasures that the Philebus grants to human—as distinct from divine—subjects.

What [5] contributes to the positive argument comes in [5](C), where Aristotle prepares to show why it is not in fact foolish—as [5](A) concedes it may seem—for self-sufficient agents to prefer living together to living alone. [5](C) prepares the way for this by introducing purported facts about human nature, starting with the fact that we all—I suppose this is ‘for the most part’—find it more pleasant to partake of good activities together with friends than to partake of them alone, especially when these activities are the best of which each is capable.\(^8^4\) Aristotle is building here, even if only implicitly, on another purported fact: namely, that each of us tends—again I suppose ‘for the most part’—to get more enjoyment from engaging in the more rather than the less challenging activities of which he or she is capable.\(^8^5\) That Aristotle is building on some such fact is suggested by the way he allows that differently-abled individuals will have different preferences here, each wanting (at least for the most part) to engage together with friends in the best activities of which he or she is capable: for some it will be bodily pleasure that will prove more enjoyable when they pursue it with others; for others it will be artistic contemplation or philosophy.

Aristotle is alluding here to the different activities that differently-disposed and differently-abled individuals take as their respective ends—the activities for the sake of which they would choose to be born rather

\(^{8^4}\) Aristotle makes similar appeals to facts about human nature in the Nicomachean discussion of philia. For more on this see section 8 of Whiting ‘NAP’.

\(^{8^5}\) Something like this was actually dubbed ‘the Aristotelian principle’ by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice, 426, n. 20. As Rawls puts it, ‘the more enjoyable activities and the more desirable and enduring pleasures spring from the exercise of greater abilities involving more complex discriminations.’ Rawls also notes that J.S. Mill ‘comes very close to stating [this principle] in Utilitarianism, ch. II, pars. 4–8’.
than not. If this is not yet clear, it becomes clear when Aristotle speaks in [6](C) of the association of self-sufficient agents as being ‘most of all’ an association of things (probably activities) ‘in the end’. For the relevant end appears to be either eudaimonia itself or (what comes to much the same thing) whatever specific activity the parties take to constitute their eudaimonia. But here in [5](C) Aristotle is simply presenting what he takes to be widely acknowledged tendencies of human nature: first, the tendency of each to get more pleasure from the ‘higher’ activities of which he or she is capable than from the ‘lower’ ones; and second, the tendency of each to find the pleasure they take in these ‘higher’ activities to be increased by engaging in them together with friends. It remains for [6] to make sense of these tendencies.

Unfortunately, the relevance of these points to the overall argument tends to get lost in the interpretive fuss about how to understand [6](A)’s reference to the friend as ‘another Heracles, another this’. The problem is not simply that some editors emend [6](A) so that it reads (like NE 1166a32) ἄλλος αὐτός instead of ἄλλος οὗτος. The problem is mainly that readers—including those who do not emend—fail to read [6](A) in its proper context, which is the context provided earlier in EE VII, especially VII.6.


Aristotle’s argument in VII.6 is that so-called friendship with oneself is not without qualification a form of friendship, but only analogous to the form of friendship that obtains between virtuous agents. The reason for this is that in friendship strictly so-called, the loving and the being loved are in two distinct subjects each of which is divided from the other. So it is only insofar as a person is in some sense two that he can be called a friend to himself and be said to exhibit in relationship to himself any of the attitudes characteristic of friendship strictly so-called. These attitudes include (i) wishing goods (or what one believes to be goods) to another not on account of oneself but for the sake of that person (ἐκεῖνοι ἐνέκυκλος); (ii) wishing existence for another on account of that person (δι’ ἐκεῖνον) and not on account of oneself; and (iii) choosing to live together with the other on account of the association itself (δι’ αὐτὴν τὴν ὀμολογίαν) and not on account of some other thing.  

86 I have italicized ‘that’ (ἐκεῖνοι) here to highlight the way in which Aristotle often uses it (not just here but elsewhere) to refer to the friend in the sense of the one who is loved as distinct from the one who does the loving. This is relevant to the interpretation of [6](B).
clarifies the last point by saying that fathers wish existence for their children but live together with others. He continues a few lines later as follows:

[ST3] Eudemian Ethics VII.6 (1240a33–37)

[a] Further, we shall count it as loving to feel pain together with the one who is pained, not on account of some other thing (as slaves feel pain) in relation to their masters because (the masters) are harsh (with the slaves) when they are in pain but on account of (the ones being pained) themselves (as mothers feel pain together) with their children and the birds that suffer together (feel pain with one another). For the friend wishes above all (βούλεται γὰρ μᾶλλον) not just to feel pain together with his friend but in fact (to feel) the same pain (e.g., to thirst together with the (friend who is) thirsty) if this is possible and if not (to feel a pain) as close as possible to it. And the same account applies in the case of enjoyment. (For to enjoy) not on account of some other thing, but on account of that person, because he enjoys (ἀλλὰ δὲ ἔχεινον, ὅτι χαίρει), is philikon ...87 (1240a33–b1)

[b] All of these (characteristics)88 refer to the individual (πρὸς τὸν ἴδιον). For he wishes goods to himself in this way (sc. on account of himself and not on account of something else). For no one does well to himself on account of some other thing ...89 And existing together and living together, and enjoying together and being pained together, and indeed (being) one soul, and not being able even to live without one another but to die together (all refer to the individual). For the individual (ὁ ἰδίος) is like this, and presumably keeps company himself with himself (ὁμιλεῖ ἀὑτὸς ἀὑτῷ). (b3–11)

[c] And all these (characteristics) belong to the good person in relation to himself. For in the bad person there is a discrepancy, as for example in the akratès. And on account of this, it seems possible for him to be an object of hate to himself. But insofar as (the individual) is one and undivided (ἡ δὲ ἰδία καὶ ἄδιαιρητος) he is himself to himself such-as-to-be-desired (ὁρακτὸς ἀὑτὸς ἀὑτῷ). Such is the good person and the friend in accordance with virtue, since the bad person at any rate is not one but many, and even on the same day different (from himself) and unstable (from one moment to the next). So the friendship of oneself in relation to oneself boils down to the friendship of the good person (in relation to himself). For because (the good person) is in a way similar and one and himself in relation to himself good (ὅτι γὰρ τὸν ὁμοιὸν καὶ εἶς καὶ ἀὑτὸς ἀὑτῷ ἄγαθὸς), in this way he is himself to himself a friend and such-as-to-be-desired (τὰύτη ἀὑτὸς ἀὑτῷ φίλος καὶ ὁρακτός) ...90 (b11–20)

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87 On 'philikon' as 'characteristic of or productive of philia', see section 6 of Whiting 'NAP'.
88 Starting with (i)–(iii) in my paraphrase of what precedes this passage.
89 The text is corrupt here, but the crucial point is clear enough in what follows the ellipsis.
90 This talk of an individual being orektos himself to himself may sound odd. But it should be clear from my earlier remarks about the multivocity of the ‘-tos’/-ton’ suffix that this may mean simply that he sees the sort of person he is as a desirable sort of person to be. One may of course find such self-admiration morally dangerous (for more on this, see Whiting 'Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for themselves'); but
But everyone seems himself to himself good. And the person who is good without qualification seeks to be ⟨good⟩ and ⟨to be⟩ himself to himself a friend, just as was said, because there are two ⟨things⟩ in him that by nature wish to be friends and that it is impossible to separate (ὅτι δὲ ἔχει ἐν ἑνίκιν ἄντων ἄνευ νευτεί βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διασπάσαι ἀδύνατον).91 Wherefore in the case of man each seems to be a friend to himself, while in the case of the other animals (this does not seem to be the case); for example a horse ⟨does not seem to be a friend⟩ itself in relation to itself, nor therefore is it a friend ⟨to itself⟩. But neither are children ⟨friends themselves in relation to themselves⟩. But ⟨friendship with oneself arises⟩ whenever one is actually capable of prohairesis. For it is only then that nous disagrees with appetite. And friendship in relation to oneself seems to be like the ⟨sort of philia spoken of⟩ according to kinship (κατὰ συγγένειαν). For it is not up to the parties themselves to dissolve either ⟨sort of relation⟩; but if they disagree with one another, nevertheless in the one case they are still kin (ἐν τῇ συγγένεια), and in the other case (the man) is still one individual (ἐν αὐτῷ) as long as he lives. (b27–37)

It should be clear from a quick comparison of the language used here with that used in [6](A) that this passage sets the stage for [6](A). For there too Aristotle speaks of what the friend ‘wishes’ (βούλεται); of the friend as ‘separated’ (διεσπάσται) from his friend; of things in some sense coming to be in one thing or a single individual (ἐν ἑνίκιν) of the friend as the one who is ‘most akin’ (τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ); of the friends as ‘similar’ (ὁμοίοις) in some respect to one another; and of the individual as in some sense ‘divisible’ (διαιρετός). So let us turn at last to the culmination of Aristotle’s argument.

[6] The pleasures of perceiving and knowing together with friends (1245a29–b9)

(A) We must consider whence the truth ⟨emerges⟩. For the friend wishes to be, as the proverb says, another Heracles, another this ⟨so and so⟩.92 But he is

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91 The idea is apparently that because a human being has parts that are ‘inseparable’ from one another, each human being seems to be a friend ‘himself in relation to himself’ even when this is not in fact the case (as for example with the ἀκράτης, whose parts struggle against one another); but the soul of a non-rational animal does not admit the sort of duality required even for the illusion of its being a friend ‘itself in relation to itself.’ The text here, especially in the following lines, is uncertain, but the basic idea seems relatively clear.

92 Dirlmeier, who reads Ἐλλάς Ἥρακλης, Ἐλλάς αὐτός, actually translates ‘ein zweiter Heracles, ein zweites Ich’, which (in introducing the ‘Ich’) pulls in two different directions. This is puzzling: if the initial idea is that Heracles’ friend wants to be another Heracles and in that sense more like Heracles, then what are we to make of the idea that he wants to be ‘another himself’ (or as Dirlmeier puts it ‘another I’)? The point here does not seem to be a point about what is required for self-knowledge. It seems to be about what Heracles’ friend wishes—namely, to be another Heracles (presumably in the sense that he wants to be like Heracles). So looking at Heracles is far less like looking in a mirror than like looking to a role model. For this and other reasons, I do not think we should read this passage in light
Although ὁ γὰρ φίλος βούλεται at the start of the second sentence is sometimes taken as a claim about what the term 'φίλος' means, I think it pretty clear that 'βούλεται' is used here to pick up the thread from VII.6 about what a friend characteristically wishes or wants. But there is disagreement about what it is she is supposed to wish or want. For as noted above, virtually all modern translators read ἄλλος αὐτός here in place of ἄλλος οὗτος.

93 See Rhetoric 1386a10 for this sense … διὸ καὶ τὸ διασπάσθαι ἀπὸ φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλεείνων.
94 I take this to be justified by the fact that Aristotle has been using εἶς (as we saw in [ST3]) to refer to the individual as such.

It is difficult to know what to read here. All but the Marcianus have χαλέπον τὰ ἐφ’ ἐνὸς γενέσθαι, leaving the subject of γενέσθαι unclear. The Marcianus has χαλέπον τὰ ἐφ’ ἐνὸς γενέσθαι, perhaps because the scribe took the point to be about the difficulty of getting everything one needs or at least wants from a single individual. But that would be misguided if (as I argue here) Aristotle's point is that the self-sufficient person neither needs nor wants things from her friend, but simply takes a kind of pleasure in perceiving the good activities of her friend that is like the kind of pleasure she takes in perceiving good activities of her own.

Both the OCT (citing Richards) and the Loeb read πάντα instead of τὰ, and so print χαλέπον πάντα ἐφ’ ἐνὸς γενέσθαι. But this does not provide much guidance as to the sense: it is difficult for all the what's to come to be in one what? Many assume (in a way that is perhaps suggested by what follows) that the point is about the bodily and psychic characteristics of the friends, and that the idea is that not all of the characteristics of one's friend can come to be in one individual. But I wonder whether the point could be picking up on the point of [ST3][a] and so concern the difficulty of having all of the experiences that one's friend has—i.e., to thirst (in some sense) when he thirsts, to have one's thirst quenched (in some sense) when his thirst is quenched, et cetera. For even if we take this (as I think we should) to involve having numerically distinct experiences of the same kind, we might reasonably think it 'difficult' for even the best of friends to share experiences in this way. It is here that I am most tempted to reconsider the manuscript reading τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γνωρίζειν back at [3][A]; but I still do not know how to make sense of that in context.
Instead of ‘another this’ or ‘another this ⟨so-and-so⟩’, we find ‘another self’ (Rackham; Kosman; Sorabji; Osborne; Kenny; Inwood and Woolf); ‘a second self’ (Solomon); ‘un autre soi-même’ (Décarie); and ‘ein zweites Ich’ (Dirlmeier). But all the manuscripts have ἄλλος οὕτως, which is also what we find in all ostensible occurrences of the proverb (paroimia) to which the text alludes. Especially in the light of this last point, about ostensible occurrences of the proverb, I think it best to follow the manuscripts, if we can make sense of what they say. For I find it easier to imagine someone recalling the Nicomachean talk of the friend as ἄλλος οὕτως, and supplying that here, than to imagine someone seeing that here and changing it to ἄλλος σάτως. Moreover, I think we can make sense—indeed good sense—of what the manuscripts say. The idea seems to be that Heracles’ friend wishes to be ‘another Heracles’ in the sense that she wishes to be, if not Heracles himself, at least like Heracles. And the reason for this seems to be that being like Heracles is a good way to be (which means it is a good way to perceive oneself, even if only peripherally, being). The point of the οὕτως may be simply to invite generalization by encouraging the reader to substitute for Heracles his or her own friend (i.e., the person he or she most wishes to be like) or the friend of whomever he or she takes the primary subject of the argument to be (i.e., whomever that subject most wishes to be like).

96 For general discussion of the paroimia, see Dirlmeier (1958), 470–477 (ad MM 1213a10 ff.). Both Aelian 12.22 and Plutarch Theseus 29.3–4 have (in very different contexts) ἄλλος οὕτως Ἡρακλῆς. Kosman, ‘Desirability’, discusses the Plutarch passage, where he suggests something like the idea I see in [6](A)—namely, that Heracles is someone worth emulating. But the point in Plutarch is not the one I see here (namely, that Heracles’ friend wants to be like Heracles because that is a good way to be): the point is rather that Theseus sees his friend Meleager not as another Theseus (i.e., another himself), but as another Heracles: i.e., as someone who can help Meleager do the sort of things that Heracles could help him do. (Kosman suggests translating ‘a regular Heracles’). And Kosman takes the application to [6](A) to lie in the fact that friends are supposed to do things together (which of course involves perceiving and thinking together) in a way such that what each does (and perceives and thinks) forms part of what they—as a pair—do (and perceive and think). And Kosman (who, somewhat mysteriously in light of his discussion of Plutarch, follows tradition in substituting οὕτως for οὕτως in [6](A)), takes the point in [6](B) to be not (as it is most naturally taken) that perceiving one’s friend is in a way perceiving oneself, but rather that one’s friend’s perceiving is in a way one’s own since it is part of what the two, as a pair, perceive. See section VI of Kosman, ‘Desirability’.

97 This argument is not decisive, since someone thinking of the paroimia might substitute οὕτως for οὕτως, as ὡσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν would in fact seem to license. But ὡσπερ ἡ παροιμία φησίν, unless it too was a later insertion, suggests that οὕτως is what belongs here. So it is possible that οὕτως was intended but ‘corrected’ early on, thus explaining the fact that it appears in none of the extant manuscripts. But that seems to me very unlikely.

98 I am grateful to Jakub Krajczynski for discussion of this point. He suggests, quite
Why exactly the friend wants this is not entirely clear. It is possible that she wants this at least partly because she wants to have the sort of powers that enable her to come to the aid of Heracles in the way that he can come to the aid of his friends. But the way in which Aristotle describes the giving and receiving of benefits at the end of [6](C)—i.e., as what people fall back on when they cannot live together sharing in the best activity or activities of which they are capable—casts doubt on the idea that this is the main reason why the friend wants to be ‘another Heracles’. For it seems pretty clear that Aristotle introduces the wish to be ‘another Heracles’ as part of his explanation of why self-sufficient agents will want to live together. So let us assume for the moment that the friend admires Heracles and wants at the very least to be like Heracles because that is a good way to be (and so of course a pleasant way to perceive oneself being). Does this allow us to make sense of what comes next?

Aristotle’s next claim is that the friend is separated from what I shall henceforth call ‘her Heracles’ and that this makes something or other difficult. But what exactly is the difficulty supposed to be? Is Aristotle alluding, as McCabe suggests, to the lamentable fact—at least according to Plato’s Aristophanes—that the friend and ‘her Heracles’ are separate individuals and so cannot strictly speaking become one?

I doubt this for two reasons. First, the language used here is far closer to the language of EE VII.6 than to that of the Symposium, where Aristophanes uses the verbs χωρίζω (at 192c1–2) and διασχίζω (at 193a5), instead of διασπάω, and speaks explicitly (as Aristotle does not) of halves and wholes and of things growing together (see e.g., συμφυσάσαι at 192e1). Second, and more importantly, I find it hard to believe that becoming one with her friend is what the friend is supposed to want, since it would in that case be a grotesque understatement to describe what she wants as ‘difficult’ (χαλεπόν). And there are other things, more aptly described as ‘difficult’, that I can imagine Aristotle supposing the friend wants, including coming to be exactly like ‘her Heracles’. For (as the text goes on to say) different people resemble an individual in different respects: some resemble her in body, some in soul, and even with regard to these two things, different people resemble different parts or aspects of her body or soul. In other words, the

plausibly, that the οὕτος in ἀλλάς οὕτος may be meant to connect with [4](B)’s point about wanting to be of some determinate nature. Unfortunately, there is not space here to explore this promising suggestion, which however seems to me compatible with taking the οὕτος to invite generalization: the friend wants to be another this determinate character (for whatever determinate character it is that she herself admires and wants to be like).
fact that any similarity there is between friends tends to be only partial limits the extent to which one can come to be exactly like ‘one’s Heracles’ (or exactly like whoever it is she most wants to be like).

This is the best I can do to make sense of the difficulty to which Aristotle refers in the third sentence of [6](A). So I interpret [6](A) as first conceding, in light of the fact that the friends are separate from one another, that ‘it is difficult for all (aspects of the friend) to come to be in an individual; and then pointing to various respects in which friends, though being separate individuals, can nevertheless be sungeneis. The point here, I think, is the one stressed in VII.6 and elsewhere: namely, that friendship strictly speaking presupposes the separateness of the friends. So while I am happy to see here some allusion to Aristophanes’ suggestion (in Plato’s Symposium) that the friends literally becoming one is the ideal, it seems to me that any such allusion is at least as likely to be rejecting Aristophanes’ suggestion as to be endorsing it.

Let me note in support of this another passage, even closer to VII.12, where Aristotle emphasizes the separateness of friends: namely, the following passage from EE VII.9.

[ST4] Since in similar ways soul stands to body and craftsman to tool and master to slave, there is no koinōnia of these with one another, but the one is an individual and the other is something belonging to the individual. Nor ⟨in these relationships⟩ is the good divided between each, but the ⟨good⟩ of both is for the sake of the individual. (οὐδὲ διαφερέται τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἁμφοτέρων τοῦ ἐνὸς σύ ἐνεκα ἐστίν.) (1241b17–22)

The point here seems to be that a koinōnia involves two distinct goods, one for each of the individuals involved. If there is to be a genuine koinōnia, then neither party’s good can be subsumed by the other’s in anything like the way the slave’s good is supposed to be subsumed by the master’s. Nor, I think, can either’s good be subsumed by the good of some composite entity in the ways that Kosman and McCabe suggest. For we should recall here the criticisms leveled in Aristotle’s Politics against the sort of community of women, children and property that is proposed by Socrates in Plato’s Republic: Aristotle objects that a polis—which he calls a koinōnia—is by nature a multitude and is destroyed by excessive unity (1261a6–22). And Aristotle explicitly compares what Socrates proposes in the Republic to the desire that Aristophanes ascribes to lovers in Plato’s Symposium: the desire ‘to grow together and from being two to become one’; this, Aristotle objects, would spell the destruction of both (or at least of one of them) (1262b10–14).

We should thus take the emphasis in the phrase ‘allos Heraklēs’ to be on the ‘allos’. The friend does not want to become Heracles, nor even to become
one with Heracles. He wants to become another Heracles: 'ein zweiter Heracles' as Dirlmeier renders it. For as we saw in VII.6, friendship strictly so-called requires the existence of two parties: the loving and the being loved must be in things that are divided from one another, and divided in a more literal way than the parts of a person (or her soul) are divided from one another. So it seems plausible to interpret the wish expressed in the last sentence of [6](A) as assuming the sort of duality that is presupposed by friendship while seeking forms of epistemic and hedonic intimacy with the other that might be viewed as analogous to the forms of epistemic and hedonic intimacy that Aristotle takes to hold among the parts of a virtuous agent's soul.

By ‘epistemic intimacy’, I mean more than the interpersonal analogue of the sort of relatively constant awareness that a rational agent has of what she is doing and experiencing. I mean also the sort of comprehending awareness of what the other is doing that is—like the comprehending awareness of what oneself is doing—based on a grasp of the agent's prohairesis. And I mean further the kind of openness and transparency that is afforded by absence of conflict: that there be no need or incentive in the intrapersonal case for repression or self-deception and no need or incentive in the interpersonal case for any analogues of these. This sort of epistemic intimacy is connected with what I call 'hedonic intimacy'. Because there is no conflict among the parts of the virtuous agent's soul, it does not happen that one part reproaches another part for what it does or feels, or that one part is embarrassed by or regrets behavior driven by another part. And so too in the interpersonal case, at least where the friends are good: each approves of the other's attitudes and actions, and so is pleased by the other's attitudes and actions, in much the same way that each approves of and is pleased by their own. In this sense, each takes in the attitudes and actions of the other something like the sort of pleasure she takes in her own. But the kind of pleasure she takes requires her to have a relatively immediate understanding of the attitudes and actions of the other: they must have achieved the sort of epistemic intimacy mentioned above (including perception of the other's prohairesis). This helps to explain why we cannot, in perceiving or contemplating the attitudes and actions of strangers (however good they may be) take anything like the sort of pleasure we can take in perceiving and contemplating the attitudes and actions of our friends.

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99 See EE VII.2, especially 1236b2–6.
100 For more on this, see sections 9 and 11 of Whiting 'NAP'.

In sum, I read the last sentence of [6](A) as saying that the friend, while recognizing the sort of duality that is presupposed by friendship, nevertheless seeks a kind of epistemic and hedonic intimacy that can be attained only if the friends live together. For only then can each have the sort of more or less immediate, constant and comprehending awareness of the other’s activities and experiences that is analogous to her more or less immediate, constant and comprehending awareness of her own.\textsuperscript{101} But the wish characteristic of the friend is for far more than this: it is for reciprocal understanding and reciprocal appreciation, for the sort of harmony involved in hedonic intimacy, where each approves of and so is pleased by the other’s activities and experiences in something like the way that each, being by hypothesis virtuous, approves of and so is pleased by her own.

This allows us to make sense of [6](B) without having to suppose (as Kosman supposes) that my friend’s activity of perceiving is in some sense my own. The point in [6](B) is that perceiving my friend, where this involves perceiving her activities and experiences, necessarily occurs together with perceiving myself in some way and with knowing myself in some way. The relevant way may well be the one mentioned in Metaphysics XII.9, where Aristotle speaks of the way in which human beings, in perceiving and knowing other things, perceive and know themselves peripherally [en parergôi]. In that case, the main idea is the one articulated above: that in perceiving some object I in some sense take on the form of that object, so that the better the objects I perceive, the better the condition in which I perceive myself (even if only peripherally) being. And the better the condition in which I perceive myself being, the more pleasant my self-perception.

So in cases where the object is my friend successfully engaged in some activity, the better the activity in which I perceive her engaged, the better (ceteris paribus) the condition in which I perceive myself (even if only peripherally) being and the more pleasant (as a result) my self-perception. And in cases where I myself am enjoying the same good, perceiving my friend enjoying that good together with me is pleasant in ways such that I come to be in (and so perceive myself being in) an even better condition than I would be in were I enjoying that good on my own. This, I take it, is what is going on in [6](B) and (C), which are (as I have said) the culmination of Aristotle’s argument.

\textsuperscript{101} Two important facts make the analogies between self-consciousness and consciousness of one’s friend and her activities closer than it might at first seem: (1) the fact that there can be lapses of self-awareness (as for example when one acts mindlessly); and (2) the fact that the proper interpretation of one’s own behavior is not always transparent to oneself.
To perceive one's friend, then, is necessarily to perceive oneself in some way and to know oneself in some way. So it makes sense \(^{102}\) that enjoying even mundane \(^{103}\) things together and living together with the friend (in the enjoyment of such things) is pleasant (for the perception of that one always happens at the same time) \(^{104}\) and even more so in the case of the more divine pleasures.

\[\text{τὸ σῶν τοῦ φίλου αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ αὐτοῦ πως ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐναι, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸν πως γνωρίζειν. ὥστε καὶ τὰ φορτικὰ μὲν συνήθεις καὶ συζήτης τῷ φίλῳ ἡδονή εὐλύγως (συμβαίνει γὰρ ἔχειν, ἀμα αἰσθήσεις ἀεὶ), μᾶλλον δὲ τὰς θειότρας ἡδονάς.}\]

(1245a35–39)

(C) The reason for this (viz. its being more pleasant to enjoy more divine pleasures with friends than to enjoy mundane ones with friends) is that it is always more pleasant to observe oneself (being) in the better (of two) good (conditions). (And this (sc. the better condition) is sometimes an affection, sometimes an action, and sometimes something else.) But if (_____ ) himself to live well and in the same way also (_____ ) his friend (to live well), and (if _____ ) to act together in living together, then their communion will be above all of the

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102 Here, Aristotle aims to make sense of the purported facts cited back in [5](C).
103 τὰ φορτικά is generally taken as referring to pleasures (which, as neuter, it cannot strictly do) and is often rendered in ways that have negative connotations: 'vulgar' / 'vulgaire' (Solomon, Rackham, Décarie); 'base' (Inwood and Woolf); 'crude' (Osborne). There is little problem with taking it to refer to pleasures (as the contrast with τὰς θειότρας ἡδονάς suggests) if we understand 'pleasures' in the sense of the things or activities in which pleasure is taken (a distinction often made in discussions of the Philebus). But it is problematic to take τὰ φορτικά as having negative connotations, since the argument seems to assume that the things one perceives the friend enjoying are in some sense good: the idea is that seeing one's friend enjoy some good is pleasant in some way and to know oneself in some way. So it makes sense

104 There are two ways to fill this out: perception of that one (i.e., the friend) is simultaneous (a) with perception of oneself; or (in cases where the friends live together) (b) with the friend's enjoyment of the mundane things just mentioned. See below, note 110.
105 I follow all the manuscripts here in reading ἐχειν (which, though it often refers to the remoter of two antecedents, is also used regularly in Aristotle's discussions of friendship to refer to the object rather as distinct from the subject of φιλεῖν). I am not sure that I fully understand the difficulties commentators have had understanding this, difficulties that have led to their proposing either (1) to understand ἐχεῖν as referring not to the one loved but to the one who loves (which is the more distant term: see Dirlmeier ad loc., followed by Décarie) or (more radically) (2) to substitute αὐτόν for ἐχεῖν (Robinson, reported by Walzer and Mingay). But the difficulties seem to stem from taking the simultaneity in question (as it is traditionally taken) to be that of perceiving oneself and perceiving one's friend, and these difficulties can be avoided (in a way I explain in the main text) by taking the simultaneity in question to be that of the subject's perception of his friend enjoying mundane pleasures and the friend's enjoyment of those pleasures. For more on the difficulties of taking the simultaneity in the traditional way, see note 110.
(activities belonging) in the end; whence (it will be) to contemplate together and to feast together. But such associations seem not to be on account of nourishment or necessary things, but rather (to be) enjoyments.\textsuperscript{106} But each wishes to live together (with another) in (the pursuit of) whatever end he is capable of attaining. If this (living together in the pursuit of whatever end each is capable of attaining) is not possible, people choose above all to do well and to be (well) treated by their friends.\textsuperscript{107}

\begin{quote}
αἵτων δ' ἄτι ἀξί ἡδίκον ἐκαύτοιν θεωρέν ἐν τῷ βελτίστοι ἀγαθῷ, (τούτο δ' ἐστίν ὡτὲ μὲν πάθος, ὡτὲ δὲ πράξις, ὡτὲ δὲ ἐτερόν τί.) εἴ δ' ἀυτόν εὖ ζήν, καὶ οὕτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζήν συνεργεῖν, ἢ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστα γε. διὸ συνεωρεῖν καὶ συνευχεῖσθαι. οὐ (δὲ)\textsuperscript{108} διὰ τροφὴν καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα αἰ ταιοῦται ὑμῖλαι δισκούσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπολάυσεις. ἀλλ' ἐκαστός οὐ δύναται τυγχάνειν τέλους, ἐν τούτῳ βουλέται συζήν· εἴ δὲ μή, καὶ ποιεῖν εὖ καὶ πάσχειν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλῶν αἰροῦνται μάλιστα. (1245a39–b9)
\end{quote}

I assume that each of the blanks left in (C) should be filled in the same way, but find it difficult to decide between what seem to me the two most plausible ways (to which I shall return). But we need to start with (B), where I have also left a blank that remains to be filled in.

The claim that to perceive (or to know) one's friend is \textit{necessarily} to perceive (or to know) oneself in some way is puzzling, but it is intelligible if we suppose that one cannot perceive (or know) one's friend without in some way—perhaps peripherally—perceiving (or knowing) oneself.\textsuperscript{109} And the idea seems to be that whatever sort of self-perception is involved here helps to make sense of the fact that it is \textit{pleasant} to perceive a friend enjoying even mundane things and to live together with him in the enjoyment of such things. But how exactly is this supposed to make sense?

As explained in note 103, I prefer ‘mundane’ to ‘vulgar’, ‘base’ and other common ways of rendering \textit{φορτικός} that have negative connotations. For the argument assumes that the things one perceives one’s friend enjoying

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Taking ἀπολαύσεις to be nominative, rather than accusative with διὰ understood.}
\footnote{This is one of many points where we can see that friendships based on pleasure are—contrary to what is often supposed—closer to friendships based on character than to those based on advantage. The point here is that when people cannot live together with their friends sharing in the pursuit of whatever activities each takes to be part of his or her end, they fall back on friendships of advantage.}
\footnote{The manuscripts have οὐ τὰ διὰ τροφήν. Walzer and Mingay insert γὰρ and bracket τὰ: σοῦ γὰρ ἵδε διὰ τροφήν. Others make adjustments in the text that follows: see below, note 115. I see no reason to insert γὰρ and suggest instead a weakly adversative δὲ in place of τὰ: the idea is to make it clear what sort of contemplating and feasting together he does \textit{not} mean.}
\footnote{If the point is about \textit{comprehending} perception, then it may even be something like Davidson's point about the problem of radical interpretation (which is, very roughly, that it is difficult if not impossible to make sense of another except by one's \textit{own} lights). See D. Davidson, ‘Radical Interpretation’.}
\end{footnotes}
are in some sense good: that is part of the point of the talk of ‘the better good’ at the start of (C). The idea is that the divine pleasures (perhaps in the sense of activities in which pleasure is taken) are not just better, but better goods, than mundane pleasures are. This allows us to explain the pleasure that is associated with whatever sort of self-perception necessarily accompanies the perception of one’s friend enjoying some good: because it is some good the subject sees her friend enjoying, a good by the subject’s own lights, the subject herself is pleased by the image of her friend enjoying this in something like the way the subject would be pleased by seeing an image of herself enjoying it. And insofar as the image of her friend enjoying this good is the subject’s own, the subject’s perception of the friend’s enjoying this good involves a kind of self-perception: awareness of a form that she herself has in some sense taken on in a way such that her own condition is (ceteris paribus) better than it would have been had she not taken on this form. So the self-perception that necessarily accompanies perception of her friend yields some pleasure (however great or small). And in cases where this pleasure is added to the pleasure of seeing herself enjoy the same activity, the subject’s pleasure is even greater than it would be if she perceived herself enjoying that activity on her own.

The simplest and least theory-laden way to take the parenthetical remark that follows (συμβαίνει γὰρ ...) is to take the point to be that when one lives together with a friend one’s own perception of the friend’s enjoyments is simultaneous with those enjoyments in a way that helps to explain why living together with one’s friend is pleasant: to see in real time (so to speak) one’s friend enjoying things—even relatively mundane things—is pleasant. But this way of filling in the blank threatens to render idle the premise according to which it is more pleasant to perceive oneself being in the better of two good conditions. For so construed, the parenthetical remark appeals primarily to the pleasure associated with witnessing the friend’s enjoyment in action. But it may be that the point about self-perception being involved (presumably in the way indicated in [4](C)) is now taken for granted and the point here is to explain the friends’ desire to live together by appeal to the way in which it is especially pleasant to witness first-hand one another’s enjoyment in action.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\) The alternative (which I cannot rule out) is to take the parenthetical point (as most commentators seem to take it) to concern the simultaneity of perceiving the friend and perceiving oneself. But this makes it more difficult to understand how the point about simultaneity is supposed to help explain the preceding claim about enjoying mundane
The ‘even more so’ at the end of (B) is deliberately ambiguous. For it is not clear whether the μᾶλλον is meant to pick up ήδυ or εὐλόγως. Granted what Aristotle has just said, the point may be either that it is even more pleasant to enjoy divine pleasures with friends than to enjoy mundane ones with them; or that it makes even more sense that enjoying divine pleasures with friends is pleasant than that enjoying mundane pleasures with friends is. But given that Aristotle speaks immediately at the start of [6](C) of what is more pleasant, I think it best to read (B) as claiming that it is even more pleasant to enjoy divine pleasures with a friend and to live with a friend in the enjoyment of such pleasures than to enjoy mundane things together with a friend and to live together with a friend in the enjoyment of them.

This could be for either of two reasons. The point could be simply that divine pleasures (construed perhaps as activities in which pleasure is taken) are more pleasant than mundane ones, so that even if divine ones are no more increased than mundane ones are by being shared with friends, sharing divine pleasures is on the whole more pleasant than sharing mundane pleasures. Or the point could be that divine pleasures are increased even more than mundane pleasures are by being shared with friends. The latter would of course provide a stronger explanation of the evident fact that self-sufficient agents do have friends. But Aristotle does not need so strong a claim: even if divine pleasures are increased to the same extent as vulgar things together (as the γὰρ demands it do). This difficulty helps I think to explain why commentators tend either to take ἔξεινον to refer to the subject of the perception (rather than the friend who is perceived) or to substitute αὐτό for ἔξεινον: they think it obvious that self-perception is pleasant in a way it is not obvious that perception of the friend is pleasant. But given that we can understand the simultaneity claim in the way afforded by the first sentence of [6](B) (i.e., as saying that whenever one perceives the friend, one in some way (perhaps peripherally) perceives oneself) there is no problem here, especially not if we invoke the de Anima theory that seems to lie behind [4](B), (i.e. the theory according to which perceiving some object involves in some sense becoming like the object). In this case, there is little rationale for the proposed substitution. Either way—whether we take the point to be that perception of the friend is simultaneous with perception of oneself or vice versa—we must suppose that the subject of both sorts of perception takes whatever she sees her friend enjoying to be good, with the result that she takes pleasure in perceiving her friend enjoying it. And this pleasure is presumably due to the way in which the subject, in becoming like the object perceived, comes to be (and so perceives herself being) in a better condition than she would otherwise be in, with the result that she enjoys some pleasure she would not enjoy were she not perceiving this object. So provided that we are willing to appeal to the de Anima theory, there is little (if any) explanatory advantage to substituting αὐτό for ἔξεινον. And it may be best in the end to go for the simpler explanation set out in my main text. The main question is whether that explanation allows us to explain the crucial role that self-perception seems to play in Aristotle’s overall argument.
pleasures by being shared with friends, it would still make sense that people who enjoy divine pleasures choose to enjoy them together with friends.

Aristotle may nevertheless accept the stronger claim. For he seems to think that however much most folk take ‘random speech’ to increase the pleasures of dining together, self-sufficient agents do not share their sentiments. The pleasures of ‘random speech’ are too trivial to bring such agents together; they may even prefer dining in contemplative silence to dining in the company of idle chatter. But self-sufficient agents do in fact choose to dine with other such agents, which suggests that the pleasures of dining in conversation with like-minded others about things that are kalon are weighty enough to tempt them away from dining in contemplative silence.

One reason for thinking that the ‘more divine’ pleasures tend to be disproportionately increased by being shared with others may be tied to the claim back in [4](A) that it is plausible that perceiving and knowing oneself is more haireseton than perceiving and knowing another. Let me start with that claim. On the Philebus inspired story we have seen so far, self-perception and self-knowledge are pleasant partly on account of the value the subject sees in the first-order activities in which the subject perceives herself engaging. The idea is roughly that however good it is to lose oneself in contemplation of the starry skies above, it is even better to contemplate the starry skies above with some sort of awareness (even if only peripheral) that that valuable activity is precisely the activity in which one is engaged, where such awareness involves some appreciation of the value of doing that. And part of what makes self-conscious enjoyment of any worthwhile activity, however mundane, better than self-blind enjoyment of the same activity (assuming such enjoyment is possible) may be the increased pleasure the subject gets when she enjoys that activity in full realization that she is doing so (as compared, for example, with cases where she engages in that activity in the way a depressed person, operating on something like ‘automatic pilot’, might engage in it).\footnote{For more on this, see section 11 of Whiting ‘NAP’, a section much indebted to chapter 2 of C. Bobonich Plato’s Utopia Recast: His Later Ethics and Politics.}

This yields another sense in which (as [4](A) suggests) it is reasonable that it should be more haireseton to perceive and know oneself than to perceive and know another. For there is a special sort of enjoyment that comes with self-conscious activity, a kind of enjoyment that kicks in even at the lowest level, where the activities are ones we share with other animals. This kind of enjoyment may even seem peculiar to the perception of one’s own
For however much one might enjoy perceiving a friend enjoying a good meal, there is a special sort of pleasure involved in perceiving oneself enjoying a good meal, a pleasure to which the actual having of a good meal (with the first-order pleasures that that involves) is arguably internal.\(^{112}\)

But the prevalence of this sort of pleasure, which is bodily-based and to that extent difficult (if not impossible) to share, may recede as one moves from the mundane to the more divine pleasures. In perceiving one's friend performing a virtuous action or working out a mathematical proof one may experience something more like the sort of pleasure the friend himself experiences in doing these things than one experiences in perceiving one's friend enjoying a good meal. For in the comprehending perception of one's friend working out a mathematical proof one takes on the form of what the friend is doing in a more literal way than one does in the comprehending perception of the friend enjoying a good meal: really following someone doing a proof is arguably much closer to actually doing a proof than watching one's friend eat a fine meal (or engage in some especially satisfying sex) is to eating that meal (or engaging in such sex) oneself. And though an abstract argument written here might obscure the difference between the comprehending perception of one's friend doing such things and the comprehending perception of one's friend proving a mathematical theorem or performing a virtuous action, the difference is harder to deny when it comes to actual experience.

In sum, it is plausible to suppose that the enjoyment of divine pleasures is increased even more than the enjoyment of mundane pleasures is by their being shared with friends, and that [6](B) is making this point, which [6](C) goes on to explain. The first part of [6](C) is relatively clear. The problem is to see how the first step—i.e., the claim that it is more pleasant to perceive oneself in the better of two good conditions—is connected with what follows.

\(^{112}\) I think we can see here the seeds of the Stoic theory of oikeiôsis, discussed in Whiting 'Lockeanism'.

\(^{113}\) One might object here that one can get the same sort of pleasure from hallucinating that one is having a good meal. But one can equally well hallucinate one's friend enjoying a good meal. And in the case where I hallucinate that I am enjoying a fine meal, I am not really having the pleasure of having fine meal: I am merely hallucinating having such a pleasure, which hallucination may itself be pleasant even if it is not the pleasure of having a fine meal. (I am somewhat tempted to see disjunctivist views in Plato's and Aristotle's treatments of pleasure, which is according to each of them a form of aisthêsis: but I cannot discuss this here.) For more on these issues, see Whiting 'Fools Pleasures in Plato's Philebus' (forthcoming).
It is not entirely clear whether the unusual phrase ἐν τῷ βελτίωνι ἀγαθῷ is predicative and so part of the content of what it is more pleasant for the subject to contemplate (i.e., *himself being in the better good*); or whether it is adverbial and so telling us something about the condition the subject is in when he contemplates himself. One (by no means decisive) reason to prefer the former is that the closely parallel passage in *NE* IX.9 speaks clearly of a case in which *oneself being good* is part of the content of what is perceived (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ὑντος), which content helps to explain why this perception is pleasant in itself.\(^{114}\) The idea there is surely that one is pleased *because* one sees one’s own condition as *good*. And that seems to be the idea in [6](C) as well, especially given the insistence back in [4](A) that the objects of our perceiving and knowing be *good*. But even if we adopt the second, adverbial reading, we seem to be moved in the direction of the first if contemplating oneself when one is in a certain condition is supposed to involve awareness of that condition (whether, as the immediately following parenthetical remark tells us, the condition is one of being affected, of acting, or of something else). So there is little to be gained by insisting on the first reading.

The crucial point is that the ‘better good’ is meant to contrast *more* divine with *less* divine pleasures. The parenthetical remark may even be meant to suggest a hierarchy, with ‘pathos’ pointing to bodily pleasures, ‘praxis’ pointing to the psychic pleasures afforded by virtuous (and other such worthwhile) activities, and ‘heteron τί’ hinting at the pleasures of contemplation. But however exactly we take the parenthetical remark, the idea is surely that it is more pleasant to contemplate or see oneself—even if only peripherally—when one is enjoying the pleasures of contemplation than when one is enjoying mundane pleasures. The challenge is to construe the conditional claim that follows this remark in a way such that it connects the initial point about perceiving oneself in the ‘better good’ with the apparently

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114 See *NE* 1170b7–14: ‘Then just as his own being is *haireton* for each, in the same way also—or nearly so—his friend’s being (is *haireton* for each). But (his) being was (said to be) *haireton* on account of perceiving himself being good, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He must therefore *sunaisthanesθαι* his friend as well, that he is (or is good?); and this would come about in living together and sharing speech and thought. For this is what living together would seem to mean in the case of human beings and not simply, as in the case of cattle, that they feed in the same place.’
straightforward conclusion that the association of self-sufficient agents will involve contemplating together and feasting together. In other words, the challenge is to fill in the blanks in (C) in a way that yields a coherent train of thought, preferably a coherent argument.

Dirlmeier supplies δὲ, suggesting some sort of conditional or deontic necessity, tied perhaps to the assumption that the self-sufficient person is maximally god-like. This yields something like ‘if he [viz. the self-sufficient person] is assumed to live well, and in the same way also his friend is assumed to live well, and if they are assumed to act together in living together, then their association will be above all of things in the end, whence it will be to contemplate together and to feast together’. But there is nothing in the context to suggest δὲ and reading the conditional this way leaves the initial claim—about its being more pleasant to observe oneself in the better good—out of the argumentative loop. So Collingwood’s suggestion that we understand, sub audiendum, (ἐστὶ) Ἰδίω from 1245α38 is better: ‘if it is pleasant for him to live well, and in the same way also for his friend to live well, and if it is pleasant for them to act together in living together, then their association …’. The alternative is to supply either (i) ἵνα ὑπερεῖν or (ii) simply θεωρεῖν (both from the more immediate 1245b1) and to read ἀρτὸν instead of ἀὐτὸν (which we are free to do without argument since this distinction would not have been marked in the original manuscripts). This yields either:

(i) if it is ⟨more pleasant to observe⟩ himself living well (than merely living) and in the same way also ⟨more pleasant to observe⟩ his friend ⟨living well than merely living⟩, and ⟨if it is more pleasant to observe⟩ their acting together in living together (than to observe their acting apart in living apart), then their association will be above all of activities in their end.

or:

(ii) if ⟨he observes⟩ himself living well and in the same way also ⟨observes⟩ his friend ⟨living well⟩, and ⟨if he observes their⟩ acting together in living together, then their association will be above all of activities in the end.

But (ii) shares the disadvantage of Dirlmeier’s δὲ: it leaves the claims about pleasure out of the argumentative loop. The idea seems to be that living well (as distinct from merely living) involves activities in the end (as distinct from things that contribute to the end) so that what self-sufficient agents observe when they observe themselves living well (and doing so together)
is their sharing activities \textit{in the end}. This is no doubt true, but it depends in no way on the points about pleasure that are labored in the surrounding context. So it seems better to take the conjunctive antecedent to make claims about pleasure that are explained by the truth of the consequent. The idea will then be that \textit{because} self-sufficient agents share above all things in the end, self-sufficient agents will get whatever kind or degree of pleasure reference to which is implicit in the antecedent.

The end is presumably \textit{eudaimonia} itself or (what comes to much the same) the activity or activities in which their \textit{eudaimonia} consists. The point of the \textit{μᾶλλον \γε} seems to be that their association consists primarily in sharing things in the end as distinct from things that contribute to this end, which are no doubt taken care of by others. There is of course an implicit contrast here with the associations of less self-sufficient agents, which may be devoted, to greater and lesser degrees, to things in the ends of these agents: friendships based on pleasure will presumably be devoted more—and friendships based on advantage less—to sharing things in the respective ends of the friends. So it will also be true that the association of self-sufficient agents is—\textit{above all other associations}—devoted to activities in the end whose pursuit they share. But this is a consequence of what the \textit{μᾶλλον \γε} seems aimed to capture—namely, that their association consists \textit{to the highest degree possible} in sharing things in the end. These are things like \textit{contemplating} together and \textit{feasting} together, activities whose goodness is \textit{maximally non-instrumental}.

In other words, the more self-sufficient the friends are, the more their association can be devoted to such activities, with the result that in living together and perceiving one another engaged in such activities, they perceive one another (their selves included) in \textit{better} conditions than those in which they would perceive one another (their selves included) if what they shared were \textit{more instrumental}. So the more self-sufficient the friends are, the more pleasant it is for \textit{them} to perceive one another engaged (and engaged \textit{together}) in the sort of activities they share. The association of maximally self-sufficient agents is thus \textit{maximally pleasant}. This is not to say that pleasure is the end for the sake of which self-sufficient agents associate with one another—unless perhaps the pleasure in question is to be \textit{identified} with the activity (unimpeded of course) in question.

It is here that the advantages of (i) over Collingwood’s (\textit{ἐστὶ} \textit{ἡδὸν}) become clear. For (i) gives a role in a way (\textit{ἐστὶ} \textit{ἡδὸν}) does not to the initial claim that it is more pleasant to observe oneself in the better of two good conditions. The idea is not—as (\textit{ἐστὶ} \textit{ἡδὸν}) suggests—that two individuals each of whom lives well will thereby live pleasantly, both individually and together. For
this, though no doubt true, does not guarantee that their association will be above all of things in the end. The idea is rather that each party gets a degree of pleasure not just from observing both himself and his friend living well, but from observing their acting together in a shared life: and the degree of pleasure each gets from observing this acting together in a shared life is supposed to be greater than the degree of pleasure each would get if he did not observe their acting together in a shared life. But in order for that to be true, it must not be possible for either to get more pleasure from living well, and observing himself living well, on his own. And the only way for that to be true is for the activities they share to be above all activities in the end. Otherwise, either might get more pleasure by pursuing on his own activities even more in the end than the ones he pursues together with his friend.

This way of understanding the argument gives roles both to the comparative claims about pleasure and to the apparent basis of these comparative claims in the friends’ observation of one another’s individual and joint activities. It is the greater pleasure experienced by friends who perceive one another living well and who share together in that sort of living—as compared with the lesser pleasure experienced by friends who perceive one another merely living or living less well—that drives the argument: and the greater pleasure ascribed to maximally self-sufficient friends is tied to the fact that they observe themselves engaged together in activities that are maximally non-instrumental.

I think that the role played by pleasure here has been missed in part because editors have taken ἀπολαύσεις (in 1245b6–7) in a pejorative sense (as Dirlmeier explicitly does) and so associated the ἀπολαύσεις in question not with the association of self-sufficient friends but rather with mundane forms of social intercourse, those on account of nourishment and other necessities. But it is difficult to make sense of what we find in the manuscripts (οὕ τά διὰ τροφήν καὶ τά ἀναγκαία αἱ τοιαύται ὀμιλίαι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἄλλα ἀπολαύσεις) if we take ἀπολαύσεις in a perjorative sense. For the text appears to be saying that the association of self-sufficient agents involves not the pleasures of nourishment and other necessities, but rather ἀπολαύσεις. So the idea that ἀπολαύσεις are base has led to various proposals, all involving the insertion (based on speculation about the sense of the passage) of some negation.115

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115 Fritzsche took οὕ τά διὰ τροφήν καὶ τά ἀναγκαία with the preceding διὸ συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευοχεῖσθαι and proposed to read αἱ (γάρ) τοιαύται ὀμιλίαι (οὕ όμιλαι) ἄλλα ἀπολαύσεις, yielding something like ‘for such affiliations (as those involving the pleasures of nourishment and other necessities) are not (true) affiliations but (mere) pleasures’. Susemihl (who also
But the problem dissolves if we take ἀπολαξέως in a positive sense: the claim will then be that the affiliations of self-sufficient agents seem not to be on account of nourishment and other necessities, but rather to be enjoyments. And this reading receives support from what Aristotle said back in [1](E): namely, that it is whenever we lack nothing that we all seek companions in enjoyment (τούς συναπλαξομένους) and people who receive benefits rather than bestow them. For the bit about people who receive benefits rather than bestow them suggests that [1](E) is closely related to [6](C), which ends with a similar claim—namely, that those who are unable to live together with friends in pursuit of whatever end they are capable of attaining choose (clearly as a kind of second best) benefiting and being benefited by their friends.

In sum, the idea of [6](C) is that everyone wants to live together with friends in pursuit of whatever end he or she is capable of attaining because living together with one’s friend in the pursuit of this end is more pleasant than living alone in the pursuit of this end. Implicit in this is a hierarchy of ends such that the association of maximally self-sufficient agents will be maximally pleasant not just because their association consists above all in the pursuit of this end but because this end is itself maximally pleasant. But these agents do not pursue this end because it is pleasant: they pursue it because it is good—indeed better than any other good. That is why observing themselves enjoying it, and enjoying it together, is more pleasant than observing themselves enjoying (indeed enjoying together) any other good. But not everyone can enjoy what they enjoy. So each will aim to enjoy—and to enjoy together with friends—the best activity of which he or she is capable, the activity the successful pursuit of which will yield the most pleasant life of which he or she is capable. And failing that, people

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116 I am agreeing here with Kosman 148–149. Osborne’s reading is similar, though she follows the OCT in adopting Collingwood’s γάρ.

117 That this is a kind of second best is clear from Rhetoric II.12–13, where Aristotle contrasts the friendships of younger people (which seem to be more on account of pleasure) with those of older people (which seem to be more on account of advantage): younger people enjoy one another’s company and sometimes even pursue it to their own detriment. Cf. NE 1156a31–35.

118 Here again the relevance of Metaphysics XII should be clear. See for example [ST1], especially [ST1][a].
will fall back on the sort of friendship based on advantage that Aristotle clearly regards as inferior not just to friendship based on character but also to friendship based on pleasure.\footnote{This is one of several texts showing that—contrary to what is often supposed—Aristotle takes friendships based on pleasure to be more closely associated with friendships based on character than with friendships based on advantage. See also \textit{NE} VIII.4.}

Another (perhaps surprising) reason for taking ἀπολαξισίς in a positive sense is that doing so will make the maximally self-sufficient agent even more like God, but in a way that will allow us to see why the comparison with God might nevertheless mislead us into thinking that the maximally self-sufficient agent will not have a friend. Recall [ST1][b], where Aristotle says that the unmoved mover's \textit{diagôgê} is like the best of which we are capable for a short time, since it is also a pleasure (ĥêdonê), and then goes on to say (in a way that should call the \textit{Philebus} to mind) that on account of this—i.e., the unmoved mover's \textit{diagôgê} being a pleasure—waking, perceiving and thinking are most pleasant (presumably for us), while hopes and memories are pleasant on account of these things (i.e., the perceivings and thinkings we either hope to have or remember having had in our waking moments).

I mention the connection with the \textit{Philebus} simply to reinforce the connections I have been seeking to establish between our Eudemian text, \textit{Metaphysics} XII and that work. But my focus here is on the way in which [6](C) as I read it involves a claim parallel to the claim that the \textit{diagôgê} of Aristotle's God is a pleasure—namely, that the associations of self-sufficient agents are themselves \textit{enjoyments}. In other words, contemplating together and feasting together are themselves enjoyments. But such forms of enjoyment are not available to an unmoved mover, whose only so-called object of thought is its own thinking, which helps to explain why assimilating the self-sufficient agent too closely to God may lead us to overlook the sort of enjoyment that allows us to make sense of the fact that self-sufficient persons, unlike Aristotle's divine thinkers, have friends.

Forget for now the enjoyment of feasting together, for which there seems to be no parallel in the case of unmoved movers. Let us focus simply on the enjoyment of contemplating together. This enjoyment depends on the conjunction of several facts explained in the preceding argument: first, the fact that perceiving one's friend necessarily involves a kind of self-perception; second, the fact that perceiving oneself in a good condition is pleasant—indeed the better one's condition, the more pleasant one's self-perception; and third, the fact that in perceiving good objects (including
one’s friend enjoying some good) one thereby comes to be in a better condition, ceteris paribus, than one would be in if one were not perceiving such objects. It follows from the conjunction of these facts that perceiving one’s friend enjoying goods is itself pleasant in ways such that we can make sense of the fact that people—including self-sufficient people—want to live together with their friends in the enjoyment of the best goods they are capable of attaining. For it is only if they perceive themselves living together with a friend and engaged together with a friend in the best activities of which they are capable that they will experience the pleasures (a) of perceiving their friend enjoying that good and (b) perceiving themselves in a better condition than they would perceive themselves in were they enjoying that good on their own.

But it is easy to forget about such pleasures if we assimilate the self-sufficient agent too closely to a divine thinker whose only object (as it were) of thought is its own activity of thinking. For in this case, we risk forgetting about the way in which contemplating other things—our friends and their activities included—can when these things are good bring it about that our self-perception, even if only peripheral, is more pleasant (and to that extent more hairéton) than it would otherwise be. But it does not follow that the self-sufficient agent needs friends: there are other possible objects of contemplation, such as the starry skies above, which he can contemplate on his own. Still, insofar as contemplating such things it itself more pleasant when he does it—and sees himself doing it—together with friends, it makes sense that he will want to do it together with friends, a kind of sense the comparison with God may render obscure. For such pleasure is not available to Aristotle’s God, whose contemplative activity is not made more pleasant by the company of others.

We are now in a position to understand the final stage of Aristotle’s argument and to do so without introducing the gratuitous negation that commentators are sometimes disposed to introduce.

7 Recapitulation (1245b9–19)

(A) That, on the one hand, we ought to live together (with others), and that all wish (for this) most of all and that the most eudaimón and best person is most of all (such as to wish for this), is clear; that, on the other hand, this did not appear (to be the case) according to the (initial) argument (is also clear), and this happened reasonably enough although (the argument) says (something) true. For although the comparison (with God) is true, the solution is in accordance with the sunthesis (sc., the one introduced in [4](A)).

ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν καὶ δεῖ συζήν, καὶ ὁτὶ μᾶλλονται βούλονται πάντες, καὶ ὧτὶ ὁ εὐθαμονέστατος καὶ ἄριστος μᾶλλονται τοιοῦτος, φανερῶν· ὧτὶ δὲ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἐφαίνετο,
 καὶ τοῦτ’ εὐλόγως συνέβαινε λέγοντος ἄληθεν, κατὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν γὰρ τῆς παραβο-
λῆς ἄληθος οὖσις ἡ λύσις ἐστὶν.  

(B) For because (as the argument says truly) God is not such as to have need of a
friend, we think the one who is similar (does not need a friend). Yet according
to this argument the excellent person will not even think. For it is not in this
way (by thinking something else besides himself thinking himself) that the
God has well (being/doing), but he is better than to think something else
besides himself (thinking?) himself. The reason is that for us (doing) well is in
relation to (something) different, but for that one (sc., God) he himself is his own (doing) well.121

The manuscripts all say that the solution, presumably to the initial aporia,
is in accordance with the sunthesis. But the OCT, following Rieckher, inserts
an οὐκ in the last clause of (A), supposing perhaps that the sunthesis in
question is of the self-sufficient man with God. But the term Aristotle uses
in referring to the comparison of the self-sufficient person with God is
‘parabolê’. So it seems more reasonable to take the talk of the sunthesis as
referring back to [4](A), where Aristotle speaks of the need to suntheinai
two things—namely, that the living in question be haireton and that the
living in question be the good of its subject. We can then dispense with the
gratuitous οὐκ.

What the sunthesis in [4](A) tells us is that the sort of perceiving and
knowing in which the self-sufficient agent’s life consists must be not only
haireton but in fact the good of their subject in the sense that nothing can
be added to them to yield something even more haireton for her. It follows
from this not only (as [4](A) tells us) that the objects of the self-sufficient
subject’s perceiving and knowing must be the best possible ones, but also
(as [5] and [6] go on to explain) that the self-sufficient agent must per-

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120 The OCT supplies οὐκ here, following Rieckher. But this seems to me, for reasons explained below, both unnecessary and misguided.

121 Cf. de Motu Animalium 700b32–35: ‘But the eternally noble and that which is truly and primarily good, and not good at one time but not at another, is too divine and too honorable to be relative to anything else (πρὸς ἄλλα)’ (translation by Nussbaum).

122 Rackham prints οὐδὲν and translates ‘will not think of anything’; Dirlmeier thinks οὐδὲ
νοήσει requires an object and suggests that τι has fallen out due to haplography. But this seems
to me to miss Aristotle’s point, which is that without objects distinct from themselves human
subjects will not even think!

123 P and C have ἀλλάτριον.
ceive and know these objects together with a friend. For insofar as per-
ceiving and knowing such objects together with a friend is *more pleasant*
than perceiving and knowing such objects on her own, the solitary con-
templation of such objects *cannot* be her good: for such contemplation *can* be improved by engaging in it with like-minded others. But the activity of Aristotle’s God admits of no such improvement: divine thinkers are *completely* self-sufficient, requiring nothing else—not even an object of thought distinct from themselves—for their activity, which is their plea-
se.

So there are at least two ways in which the comparison of the self-
sufficient agent with God threatens to mislead us. It can lead us to forget the need for objects of perception and thought distinct from ourselves, objects without which we would not even perceive or think, let alone perceive or think ourselves. And even if we do not forget the need for such objects, the comparison may lead us to forget about the way in which our thinking, unlike that of Aristotle’s divine intellects, can be improved by the company of others. Most of VII.12 seems to me concerned to make the second point, about the way in which contemplating together with our friends is more pleasant and so—given the completeness criterion—more *haireton* than contemplating on our own. In [7](B) Aristotle simply adds the final twist, so to speak, of his knife: if we forget about the self-sufficient subject’s need for objects of thought distinct from herself, we will end up with a subject that does *not even think*. And what could be *less* God-like than that?

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In EE VIII.2, the penultimate chapter of our editions of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle sets out to discuss good fortune (*eutuchia*) and its origin. Why does he discuss this? Is this discussion of any interest within the context of the *EE*? Is good fortune of any interest *simpliciter*? Simply put, does it matter? The point of asking these questions is a heuristic one. They may help to put the focus on the main question of whether there is a link between *eudaimonia* and good fortune, and whether the discussion of good fortune—which otherwise seemed to be rather isolated—may be integrated with the larger framework of the discussion of *eudaimonia* and thus with the larger framework of the *EE*.

1 For the *EE* I quote the OCT (for reasons of convenience). For all other texts I use the usual standard editions (including the Teubner for *MM*). I do not regard the *MM* as authentic in form, but as close to Aristotle in content. For very useful remarks I am very grateful to Brett Bisgrove, Markus Heuft and to the participants of the Keeling Colloquium, especially to Bob Heinaman and Sarah Broadie, to the participants of the Cologne-Bonn Philosophy Colloquium, to the anonymous referee and to Fiona Leigh.

2 A brief survey of EE VIII.2 may be helpful. Aristotle first refers to the claim that *eutuchia* is a cause for doing well and sets out to discuss the question of whether *eutuchia* exists by nature or not. There is something like *eutuchia*. What, then, is its origin (1246b37–1247a13)? A first argument for *eutuchia* existing by nature proceeds by exclusion: neither *phronēsis* nor some *theos* could be the cause for it. Hence it must exist by nature (1247a13–31). However, there are problems with this result from exclusion: for instance, *eutuchia*, but not nature, seems to be linked to *tuchê* (1247a31–b1). Yet there are also problems with *tuchê* as a cause (1247b1–18). Aristotle makes a new start. He introduces impulses which are in the soul, some of which stem from reasoning, the others from non-rational inclination. Acting on an inclination of the latter kind, we may succeed without or even contrary to *logismos* (and may thus be fortunate). In this way, good success, or *eutuchia*, is due to nature. Non-rational success of this kind counts as *eutuchia* (1247b18–28). At this point, we need a disambiguation. There are at least two kinds of *eutuchia*: one based on impulse and choice, the other not based upon them. Only the first is based on nature (the second, presumably, on *tuchê*) (1247b28–1248a2). How are *eutuchia* and *tuchê* related? Natural *eutuchia* and *tuchê* are both contrary to reason, but an instance of success due to natural *eutuchia* is not an instance of success due to *tuchê*. Still, *tuchê* may be a cause of something (1248a3–16). Is *tuchê* perhaps the cause of right desire (and impulse) and thus for natural *eutuchia*? Or would it then need to be the...
In NE I.8, 1099b6–8, Aristotle seems to accept the view that *eudaimonia* in some way relies on the availability of external goods.³ He also shows some sympathy for the view which identifies *euchê* with *eudaimonia*, though he does not share it (NE VII.13, 1153b21–25). Thus, *eudaimonia* depends on external goods, but this does not imply that it is connected with *euchê*.

The *Magna Moralia*, whose chapter on good fortune (*MM* II.8) resembles *EE* VIII.2, is more positive about the relation. The opening lines of *MM* II.8 read:

> As we are discussing happiness, we are next led to speak of good fortune or luck. For the many suppose that the happy life is the fortunate life, or at any rate is not without good fortune. And perhaps they are right. For without external goods, which are under the control of luck, there cannot be *eudaimonia*. We are obliged, therefore, to speak of good fortune; and in fact to define its nature, seat, and province.

(*MM* II.8, 1206b30–36; tr. Armstrong, modified)

The *MM* refers to a general supposition (of the *hoi polloi*) as its reason for discussing good fortune: ‘The happy life is the fortunate life’, or ‘no life is happy without good fortune’. The *MM* tends to agree, stating that it is not possible to be happy without external goods. Good fortune matters since it is concerned with external goods which are required as a means for *eudaimonia*. In contrast to the *NE*, the *MM* thus seems to identify the dependency on external goods and the dependency on *euchê*.

*EE* VIII.2, however, seems to be a different case. Let us begin, again, with a look at the opening lines of the chapter:

> Since not only do practical wisdom and excellence produce doing well, but we say also that the fortunate do well, as if good fortune produces doing well and the same things that knowledge does, we must inquire whether it is by nature that one man is fortunate, another unfortunate, and how the matter stands in regard to these men.⁴

(*EE* VIII.2, 1246b37–1247a3, tr. Woods, modified)

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³ See also *NE* I 8, 1098b26, 1099a31–b8, I 10 f., VII 13, 1153b14–19. For an account of the relation of external goods and excellence (and thus *eudaimonia*) in the *NE* see Eric Brown, ‘Wishing for Fortune, Choosing Activity: Aristotle on External Goods and Happiness’.

⁴ At 1246b37 f. I read ‘*kai aretê*’. ‘*aretê*’ (mss. *P, L, A*) is better attested than ‘*aretê*’ (mss. *C*), but is rather difficult to understand (it also requires Jackson’s change of ‘*kai*’ to ‘*kat*’—
The EE states that it is not only *phronësis* and excellence that are productive of doing well (*eupragia*). This implies that there is something else that—either alternatively or additionally—is productive of doing well. The implication is expressed in a reference to the general view (‘we say’): the fortunate do well (cf. *MM* II.8, 1206b31: ‘the many suppose’). The assumption, then, is that good fortune and knowledge are productive of the same state, namely *eupragia*. This—Aristotle somewhat vaguely says—is the reason for inquiring whether it is by nature (or is not by nature) that one person is fortunate, the other unfortunate. Note that in these opening lines of VIII.2 it is not made clear whether in every case, good fortune serves as an alternative to *phronësis* and excellence in being productive of the agent’s doing well (for which case see 1247a3–5), or whether there are cases in which it may serve merely as an addition (a ‘co-cause’) to *phronësis* and excellence. It is telling that this possibility is left open. Note further, that neither here nor elsewhere in the chapter is the object of good fortune properly specified: the origin, not the object of good fortune, is Aristotle’s main concern.

The opening lines of VIII.2 raise several questions, for instance: what is meant by ‘doing well’ (*eupragia*), the supposed result of *eutuchia*, but also of *phronësis* and excellence? Is there just one kind of doing well? If not, which kind is produced by *phronësis* and excellence according to Aristotle in this chapter? If so, could *phronësis* and excellence really produce the same kind of doing well as good fortune? How would they do this? Could good fortune in turn produce the same kind of doing well as *phronësis* and excellence? Would Aristotle take the risk of using ‘*eupragia*’ in some unspecified, in fact, ambiguous sense (one sense for good fortune, the other for *phronësis* and excellence)? Or does he mean that *phronësis* and excellence as well as good fortune are all productive of doing well, though for different parts or aspects of it?

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5 There is not much help for answering those questions from analysing the meaning of ‘*eupragia*’, which denotes the product or result of *eutuchia* in 1246b37–1247a2. In general, Aristotle is somewhat flexible in his use of ‘*eupragia*’, especially in its relation to ‘*eudaimonia*’ (for which relation see, for instance, *EE* II.3, 1219b1f., *Pol.* VII.3). There is also not
I think that we should not press the point here as to whether good fortune does indeed produce the same state of doing well as phronēsis and excellence do. It may well be that Aristotle here—at the beginning of the chapter—simply presents, both, a more philosophical cause as well as an important traditionally acknowledged cause of doing well, namely, good fortune. He may have proceeded this way in order to provide a starting point for his discussion, which was not yet committed to any further specification of doing well. Nonetheless, there could still be a problem regarding the motivation of discussing good fortune. If this discussion is to be an integral part of the *Eudemian Ethics*, we would expect good fortune to relate to *eudaimonia*. However, it is not easy to see how it would relate to it.

There are two possibilities to be distinguished. (1) There is no strong overlap between *eupragia* and *eudaimonia*. In this case, it is not easy to see why we should discuss something that does not (not significantly) contribute or relate to something which is the main topic of the treatise. (2) There is a strong overlap between *eupragia* and *eudaimonia*; *eutuchia* is thus supposed to produce or, at least, to support *eudaimonia*. Now, even if it is only to support it, how could it achieve this? Two objections may be raised:

First, *eudaimonia* depends on certain means, but not on good fortune: we may just as well acquire the means necessary for *eudaimonia* by deliberation and appropriate action. Why should *eudaimonia* depend also on a different way of obtaining those goods, if the first way for obtaining them is sufficient as well as available to us?

Second, and more important, *eutuchia* does not seem to fit well together with *eudaimonia*. It does not seem to fit well together with it, specifically, because it is described as something non-rational or even irrational: the fortunate person is *alogos* (1247b26, 1248a31, b6) and *aphrôn*: silly, foolish, senseless (1247a4, a16, a21, b25). Good fortune seems to be something non-rational in such a way that an agent whose actions lead to success, which may be said to be due to good fortune, succeeds even contrary to reason with regard to the very object of his action. This is certainly not the *eudaimôn* to

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much help from analysing the meaning of ‘eutuchia’ (for which see, for instance, *Rhet.* I.5, 1360b23, 1361b39–1362a12, but also, as background, Plato *Euthydemus* 279d–282d and in general Edmund Grindlay Berry, The History and Development of the Concept of theia moira and theia tuchê down to and including Plato, at 49–85, and Cornelis de Heer, *Makar—eutaimôn—olbios—eutuchês. A Study of the Semantic Field Denoting Happines [...][sic! [... in Ancient Greek to the End of the 5th Century B.C.*, 46 f., 54, 72–75, 99).]

6 For an interpretation that identifies doing well (of VIII.2) and *eudaimonia* see Kent Johnson, ‘Luck and Good Fortune in the *Eudemian Ethics*’, at 94 and 97. For an interpretation that keeps them apart see Anthony Kenny, *Aristotle on the Perfect Life*, 57.
whom the definition of eudaimonia applies (for which s. II.1, 1219a38f.). But then it seems that good fortune cannot matter for eudaimonia.

A reply to both objections could jointly run along the following two lines: (1) Given that some people do identify eutuchia and eudaimonia—a traditional view reported in EE I.1, 1214a24f.—Aristotle explores the possible relation between both and tries to detect the truth that may underlie that view. He thus follows his own methodological advice put forward in EE I.6, according to which we have to find out whether there is something in the views proposed by others and we have then to proceed from what is true in them, but not yet clear, to what is true and clear (cf. 1216b26–35). So we should expect on Aristotle’s part some interest in the question of how eudaimonia and good fortune are related, even though it may turn out that the traditional view does not prove to be as plausible as some have thought.

(2) Aristotle takes the traditional view seriously, since—good fortune properly understood—there is some common ground between good fortune as it is discussed in VIII.2 and eudaimonia as it is introduced in I.7 (that is, at the beginning of the main part of the EE). This common ground is the individual’s nature, to which good fortune, as well as eudaimonia, are related. In VIII.2, the result of the long discussion of whether one is fortunate by nature is that at least one kind of good fortune is natural which means that good fortune of this kind depends on the individual’s nature. And in I.7 Aristotle also links eudaimonia to the individual’s nature. Eudaimonia is the best state available for any human being (it is the best prakton)—a state which is available for a human being due to its nature (see the references to phusis in EE I.7, 1217a24f., a28). Since there is only one nature of an individual human being, we might want to know what it is for this individual to do well and how seemingly different aspects of its doing well cooperate, if they do. In short, we might want to know whether and, if so, how good fortune matters.

True, questions concerning the relation between eudaimonia and eutuchia are not dealt with in EE VIII.2. Nonetheless the chapter is concerned with some kind of ‘doing well’. But a kind of doing well, namely eudaimonia, is the overall topic of the EE. If it is not clear whether both kinds of doing well are connected, this is, all the same, something we might be interested in given the overall topic of the EE.

In what follows, I will proceed in three steps: (1) First, I will look more closely at the natural origin of good fortune as something being due to impulses of a certain kind (according to EE VIII.2). (2) Second, I will examine the compatibility of good fortune and eudaimonia. (3) Third, I will discuss the question of whether good fortune matters for eudaimonia.
According to the view I will argue for here (with regard to the EE), good fortune matters insofar as it makes it easier to obtain some of those external goods that are required for eudaimonia. It is not a necessary means for this, but it provides—if rooted in the nature of the individual—an effective, effortless way. Since good fortune, as well as eudaimonia, is grounded on the individual’s nature, the theory here developed allows for an integrated account of an individual who is both eudaimôn and a naturally fortunate person.

1. The Natural Origin of Good Fortune

Aristotle’s discussion of the natural origin, or ‘naturalness’, of good fortune may be systematically divided into two parts: in the first part, he discusses the main traditional and philosophical views regarding the origin of good fortune, namely, knowledge, theos, luck, and nature. For the kind of good fortune he has in mind, nature seems to be the only adequate source (he argues for this by excluding the other candidates: good fortune cannot be of rational or divine origin—and since it is said to be continuous, its origin cannot be luck either). In the second part Aristotle gives a positive account of nature as a source for good fortune. My focus will be on this account of the natural origin of good fortune. This is also the aspect which is crucial to our understanding of that kind of good fortune that seems to matter for eudaimonia.

1.1. How Nature Works: The Impulses

Nature becomes a source for good fortune, insofar as good fortune is due to certain inner impulses. These impulses are introduced as a source for good fortune:

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7 Some remarks with regard to the other candidates for the cause for eutuchia: (1) The view that logos (or phronêsis) causes eutuchia goes back, for instance, to the Euthydemus. Aristotle completely rejects the view (see 1247a13–15, b13–15): contrary to logos, eutuchia is non-rational, the eutuchês cannot give an explanation of his actions and eutuchia is not a matter of learning. (2) That tuchê is a cause of eudaimonia (probably via a cause of eutuchia) is one of the main views about the source of well-being referred to in EE I.1 (see 1214a24f.; in EE VIII.2 ‘tuchê’ is used similar as in Phys. II.5, for which claim see Johnson, ‘Luck’). However, this view is rejected since tuchê is not a cause of that which happens always, or for the most part, in the same way. It therefore cannot be a cause of something regular, such as natural good fortune, but only of the other kind of eutuchia (that is, of non-regular good fortune). (3) With regard to a divine cause of eutuchia see the discussion in 1.3 below.
What follows then? Are there not impulses in the soul, some issuing from reasoning, others from non-rational inclination, and are not these, at least by nature, prior? If the impulse due to desire is for the pleasant, and also is inclination, by nature, at any rate, everything proceeds towards the good. So, if some people are naturally well endowed (as singers who lack knowledge of how to sing are well endowed in that respect) and, without reason, are impelled in accordance with nature, and desire both what they ought and when they ought—and these people will succeed even if they are actually foolish and unreasoning, as men may actually sing well who are not capable of teaching it; but certainly it is such men who are fortunate—men who, without reasoning, succeed in most cases. It is therefore by nature that the fortunate are fortunate.⁸

(EE VIII.2, 1247b18–28, tr. Woods; modified)

Aristotle seems to have in mind the following claims (among other things). The impulses in question are internal impulses: they are in the soul. There are two sources for them: reasoning and non-rational inclination (for these two sources s. also EE II.8, 1224a24–b1). These are sources for impulses; they are not identical with the impulses.⁹ The impulses in which Aristotle is interested for his account of natural good fortune are those originating from non-rational inclination. The non-rational inclination for the pleasant is something natural, which is why non-rational desires, at least naturally, are oriented towards something good. Someone may thus have a natural drive towards the good and have a desire which is right with regard to its object, the time it occurs and the way it is. Such a person is said to be ‘impelled’ in accordance with nature. Even if lacking reason, this person succeeds in

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⁸ In 1247b19–21 my reading goes along the lines of Λ²: ‘et primi ipsi sunt natura quidem si propter concupiscenciam delectabilis et appetitus natura quidem ad bonum tendet semper’ (Jackson, ‘Eudemian Ethics’, 188; see also Franz Dirlmeier, Aristoteles. Eudemische Ethik, 2nd ed., 486, who basically follows Λ² and reconstructs: ‘καὶ πρῶται εἰσὶν φύσει γε. έι […] δ’ ή δί’ επιθυμίαν τ’ έν ήθεδος καί ήθες έρεξις, φύσει γε επί το άγαθον βαδίζωι αν πάν’).

⁹ The MM, which uses ‘hormê’ more often, closely links impulse with inclination (orexis; see L.12, 1187b36f. with L.16, 1188b25; L.17, 1189a30, a32, in a24–33). It regards the existence of impulse as a necessary condition for the existence of energeia and, hence, for the contribution to eudaimonia. The threptikon does not have an impulse and, hence, no energeia and it does not contribute to eudaimonia (cf. L.4, 1185a26–35). In this, the MM may be more restrictive in its use of ‘hormê’ than the EE, which does assume an impulse of non-living things (cf. MM L.14 and EE II.8, 1223b37–1225a1, esp. 1224a13–30). Franz Dirlmeier, Aristoteles. Magna Moralia, 3rd ed., 258, claims that Hans von Arnim, ‘Die drei aristotelischen Ethiken’, in Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 202 / 2, at 24–37, had ‘shown exactly, that ‘hormê’ is used in the same sense in the MM and in the EE’. Dirlmeier also claims that EE VIII.2, 1247b34 uses ‘hormê’ and ‘(alogos) orexis’ as synonyma (ibid.). In any case, they are not used as synonyma just a few lines before (in 1247b18f.), when Aristotle speaks of ‘hormai apo orexeis’.
most cases. It is due to her nature, not to her reason, that she succeeds. This person is by nature a fortunate person.

To understand what it means that someone is by nature a fortunate (or, unfortunate) person, we need to know what it is for someone to have those kinds of impulses, for instance: What causes do they have? How do they work? How are they related to inclinations and to desire? How are they related to reasoning? How do they figure within the whole range of impulses of an individual human being? How deeply are they entwined within its motivational structure? How could they be directed appropriately? Persons of what kind would have such appropriately directed impulses? And so on. It is rather difficult to find an even remotely satisfying answer to any of these questions and to develop a theory of impulses on the basis of the EE.\textsuperscript{10} And even though the decisive feature of the naturally fortunate person, namely having impulses of a certain kind, is quickly established in VIII.2, we do not learn how the impulses relate to nature or to the psychic structures causing them.

1.2. What Makes the Impulses Special?—Awareness and Assessment

Aristotle claimed that fortunate people who are endowed with impulses of a special kind (internal, non-rational) succeed in most cases, that is, on a regular basis. In order to understand how impulses may regularly, not accidentally, lead to success in the case of the fortunate person, we have to take a closer look at the origin of the impulses in question, specifically, the impulses connected with non-rational inclination. Since Aristotle does not give us much information here, it is up to us to determine the conditions for the occurrence of those impulses.

If the impulses regularly lead to success, it seems to me to be likely that there is some kind of ‘awareness’ and ‘assessment’ that precedes, accompanies and directs them. This is not awareness and assessment as involved in deliberation, choice or prudence: it is not awareness and assessment that include a conscious grasp of details relevant for action. The impulses are not caused or led by anything rational. Aristotle repeatedly says that the fortunate person is non-rational (at least in that regard in which she is

\textsuperscript{10} The only other place in the EE (besides EE VIII.2) where Aristotle mentions impulse is EE II.8. But this chapter, too, provides no answer to those questions. Rather, it raises additional questions, for instance, questions such as whether people are forced to act on their impulses or questions about people endowed with enthousiasmos (cf. 1225a27–33) who are in some way forced to do what they do (for the enthouisiasts see also VIII.2, 1248a33).
fortunate): she succeeds without, or even contrary to, *logos* or *logismos*. Her good fortune cannot be due to reasoning.

Furthermore, there cannot be second order awareness in this case, that is, there can be no awareness of the awareness involved in those special impulses (though there will be awareness of the special impulses): otherwise, the fortunate person could give an account of the content of the awareness which induces her to act in that particular way, instead of merely, and at most, having some kind of gut feeling or intuition about the rightness of a particular action. She simply does not know why she thinks that this is the right thing to do. But she is more or less confident about the appropriate what, when, and how of her action.

We cannot know whether Aristotle—when writing the *EE*—had any view about the possibility of *inattentive* awareness. If he had any such view, this possibility would presumably require, among other things, the availability of complex perception. In the case of perception of this kind the areas, for instance, of the visual field may differ in their focus. Similar questions arise for the *assessment* of the perception—which would even be more difficult to explain. Still, there has to be a manner in which the impulses are appropriately adapted to the situation in which they lead to success: blind desire or blind impulses could not by any means be successful or lead to success (or could be successful only accidentally, but could by no means be as continuously successful as natural good fortune is supposed to be). Being appropriately adapted requires awareness and assessment of the situation at hand, the end to be achieved, the means leading to it, and the circumstances under which the end is to be achieved. So, even if we cannot prove that this is what Aristotle had in mind, assuming this kind of awareness and assessment of the situation at hand, the end to be achieved, the means leading to it, and the circumstances under which the end is to be achieved, seems at least to provide a promising explanation of the appropriate adaption of the naturally fortunate person and her desire and of the success of her actions (cf. also *EE* VIII.2, 1247b24 f.).

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11 For a perception of this kind compare, for instance, *Sens.* 7, 447a12–24. See also *Insomn.* 3, 460b28–461a3, according to which there may be movements within us which are based on percepts, some of which come from outside. They may also occur when the person is awake, though they may be obscured then by the activity of (proper) perceptions and thinking. Aristotle thus acknowledges that some of the movements which are connected with perception, may go unnoticed. But this requires, first, that there is awareness of some kind which is responsible for the movement and, second, that this awareness itself goes unnoticed.

12 On the opposite side, this holds for the naturally unfortunate person accordingly. The special negative quality of her impulses is also due to her particular nature: her impulses are
In any of these aspects the awareness and assessment may add to ‘normal’ cognition in some way or other, so, for instance, in the case of the navigator or the general. These are Aristotle’s examples for someone performing a technē, where, according to the traditional view, much depends on luck: the people to whom this applies are fortunate people (1247a5–7, together with 1246b37–1247a13). In the case of the ordinary navigator or the ordinary general, there may be ‘normal’ cognition with regard to the end, the means and the circumstances. This cognition may be complemented by the awareness and assessment of the fortunate person. They may complement the ‘normal’ cognition in various degrees, and they may do so with regard to different fortunate people or also with regard to one fortunate person concerning different fields of her activity. Someone may be more or less oblivious to any aspect concerning her action and may still be successful (and a fortunate person), while someone else will be an expert with excellent knowledge of all relevant aspects of her action and will still be even more successful in her action due to that special awareness and assessment that guide those impulses which make her a fortunate person.

1.3. Aristotle’s Own Explanation of the Special Impulses: The Divine in Us

So far we have introduced some features to be presupposed in an explanation of the special impulses. However, EE VIII.2 does not mention anything like them. How, then, does Aristotle frame his own answer to the question of what accounts for the special quality of the impulses in the case of the fortunate person? What explanation did he have for the naturally right (or wrong) impulse? Why do some have the right impulse, others the wrong impulse? The text relevant to this is 1248a16–32:

The question might be raised ‘Is luck the cause of this very thing—desiring what one should or when one should?’ Or will luck in that way be the cause of everything? For it will be the cause both of thinking and of deliberating; for a man did not deliberate having deliberated and deliberated about that, but there is some starting-point. Nor did he think having thought to think, and so on to infinity. Intelligence (nous), therefore, is not the starting-point of thinking, nor is counsel the starting-point of deliberation. So what else is there save luck? Thus everything will be by luck. Or is there some starting-point beyond which there is no other, and can this—because it is of such a sort—have such an effect? But what is being sought is this: What is the starting-point of change in the soul? It is now evident: as in the whole [the starting-point of change] is a god, so [a god is the starting-point of change] also for that [i.e., the
things in the soul which are under consideration here], and [the god is this
starting-point of change] in every regard; for, in a sense, the divine element
in us moves everything; but the starting-point of reason is not reason but
something superior. What then could be superior to knowledge but a god?
For excellence is an instrument of intelligence. And for that reason, as I was
saying earlier, they are called fortunate who succeed in what they initiate
though they lack reason. And it is of no use for them to deliberate; for they
possess such a starting-point as is superior to intelligence and deliberation.\(^{13}\)

\((EE\ VIIL.2, 1248ai6–32, \text{tr. Woods, modified})\)

Aristotle not only wants to explain the naturalness of good fortune. He also
wants to explain where the right impulses come from (he does not say
much about the origin of the wrong impulses). He assumes for all psychic
or mental activities a divine principle in us. An activity of a certain kind
cannot ultimately be caused by an activity of the same kind. Adopting an
Aristotelian principle, we may add that the ultimate starting-point for an
activity has to be something superior to this activity. So if the best activity
available for human beings were the starting-point for all other human
activities, we still needed a better starting-point for this best activity. Luck
is to be ruled out: it is neither a better principle, nor is the best human
activity unsteady in the way it would be if it were caused by luck. (Aristotle
may have further reasons for excluding luck, but they need not concern us
here.)

Hence, we need a different principle. This principle holds for all psychic
activities and it is thus also the principle for the impulses. The principle
Aristotle comes up with is a \emph{theos} or a divine principle in us. However,
simply saying that the impulse—as well as any other psychic activity—is
due to some divine influence or principle would not count as a sufficient
explanation. How does this divine influence work? Unfortunately, Aristotle
does not give any details on this point. He thinks that it is ‘evident’ that, as
in the whole, a \emph{theos} is also the principle of change for the psychic or mental
activities of the soul, and is this in every regard. Within us a divine element
takes the place of this \emph{theos} or acts as an intermediary of some kind.

What is this divine element, this \emph{theion} in us? Here we can only guess: If the
\emph{theion} is to be a starting-point which is stronger or better than every-

\(^{13}\) At 1248a18f. I follow the manuscripts \textit{PCL} (for which see also Philip J. van der Eijk,
‘Divine Movement and Human Nature in \textit{Eudemian Ethics} 8.2’, 34 n. 22). At 1248a24 I follow
van der Eijk (ibid., 34 n. 26) in reading ‘\textit{to toiautê einai toiotu}’o’. In 1248a25–27 (‘\textit{dêlon ... theion}’)
I follow \textit{PCL}. I understand this passage as an answer to the question of what the principle of
change is for the ‘things in the soul’ which are under consideration here. ‘\textit{Pan}’ (a26) is to be
retained, as it is emphasised and is taken up again in the following argument. At 1248a28f. I
follow \textit{PCL} and van der Eijk (ibid., 35 n. 29) in omitting ‘\textit{kai nou}’.
thing it moves, including the cognitive faculties and activities, the only candidate for this principle within us is something that belongs to us (that is, to our cognitive capacities), but is also intrinsically related to something better than us (that is, than our cognitive capacities). The suggestion is that this is a special cognitive principle which consists in a very special opening up to the world as it is governed by the theos. The special awareness and assessment of the fortunate person then constitutes at least an important part of this principle. Just as the divine principle is responsible for all cognitive activities and any psychic activity caused by them, awareness and assessment are themselves a very special opening up to the world and, as such, are responsible for the impulses leading to success (or, for the non-rational inclination from which the impulses arise). This is what the special awareness and assessment accomplish, and this is how they relate to the divine principle within us that moves everything.

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14 Van der Eijk and others regard it as an ‘equivalent’ of nous (logos), thus saying that nous—in a way—moves everything within us. He understands ‘nous’ generically here, that is, as referring to the ‘cognitive faculties’ in general (see van der Eijk, ‘Divine Movement’, 35, referring to MA 6, 700b18–20, and for this see Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle’s De Motu Animalium, 333, comment ad 700b17).

According to van der Eijk, ‘Divine Movement’, 31, the divine movement ‘should … be conceived as a psycho-physiological mechanism: in virtue of their particular natural constitution … the alogoi are more open to the divine movement (which turns the hormai into the right direction so that the eutuchês make the right choice).’ See also Stephen A. White, ‘Natural Virtue and Perfect Virtue in Aristotle’, at 151, according to whom Aristotle ‘locates the source of natural luck in a kind of insight or intuition, an ability to recognize directly what one should do.’—Still, there seems to be a difficulty about the theos as a cause for eutuchia: first, Aristotle claims that eutuchia cannot be due to the theos (since the theos would not specially love a person who is not excellent—as the eutuchês is not; cf. 1247a23–29). Later on, however, he claims that eutuchia is due to a principle, namely the theos or the divine (cf. 1248a25–34). According to van der Eijk (‘Divine Movement’, 31; s. also Michael J. Mills, ‘Tuchê in Aristoxenus, fr. 41, and Eudemian Ethics Θ.2’, at 206) we have to take account of the way of how the theos is said to engage in the affairs of the eutuchês. He is said not to love the (non-rational) eutuchês, he does not care for him. But still he might ‘operate’ (in a special way) on someone who is open to this (in a special way).—The EE is interested in the theos or the divine, only because of the traditional view that eutuchia is due to some divine influence. Aristotle does not need to develop a theory of the divine. Rather he takes up the traditional view, looks for the kernel of truth in it and elaborates on it as far as he thinks it necessary. It then turns out that the theos is responsible for eutuchia, though in a quite different way.

15 Bodéüs has suggested a somewhat different understanding of the origin of the right impulse, namely divine self-presentation. According to Bodéüs, the theos guides thinking and desire (including desire of the eutuchês) by way of self-presentation (he presents himself in the desired object). He also refers for this (for instance) to Phaedrus 244aff, 249d, 252e–253a (see Richard Bodéüs, Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals, 165). This is a fascinating suggestion. However, first, it is not easy to see how it could account for the fact that Aristotle stresses differences in the nature of human beings to be the reason for some to be eutuchês, while others are not. Even if the theos presents himself to some, not to others,
The Compatibility of Good Fortune and Eudaimonia

2.1. Good Fortune and Reasoning

By introducing the special awareness and assessment as a supplement in our theory of good fortune, we have given, at least, a speculative explanation of how the impulses of the fortunate person are special. But we also wanted to know whether good fortune matters, and in particular, whether it matters in relation to eudaimonia. An important question we need to ask in this regard is: ‘how does good fortune, something non-rational, relate to eudaimonia, something rational?’ This question arises in particular, though not exclusively, in the case of irrational good fortune. The question behind this question is whether good fortune could possibly play a role with regard to eudaimonia, that is, whether they are compatible.

Yet before we discuss the question how good fortune and eudaimonia may be related, we need to discuss, what ‘non-rational’, or ‘alogos’, here refers to. For this it may be useful to compare the fortunate person with the experienced person, since they have some important features in common. Both are alogos in a certain way. Both succeed in a certain way. The experienced person is alogos insofar as she does not know the principles or reasons of what is to be done. She cannot explain why something is to be done (cf. Met. I.1, 981a28–30), presumably, since her knowledge does not have the same degree of coherence nor the same level of generality (concerning the object in question) as the knowledge of the respective technician (NE VI.7, 1141b16–21). Yet she knows the details that are relevant for the object or the situation at hand and she also knows how to fit together the object or how to manage the situation (cf. NE X.9, 1181a19–21, Met. I.1, 981a15 f.): this is just what makes her an experienced person and explains her success.

As for the naturally fortunate person, she, too, does not grasp the reasons for what is to be done—she could not explain her actions, since as a fortunate person she does not have logos (cf. EE VIII.2, 1247a13–15, b25 f., 1248a30 f.). Her success does not depend on good reasoning, but on impulses
which stem from non-rational inclination (cf. 1247b18 f.). This could mean that she does not know and does not need to know the details of the right procedure: a vague grasp of them might suffice, the impulses will steer her safely through the procedure to the end\textsuperscript{16}.

The fortunate person’s lack of \textit{logos} thus goes very far. As a fortunate person, she has neither the concept nor understanding of the object in question nor does she have a detailed grasp of the procedure which is required in relation to the object. This seems to distinguish her from the \textit{eudaimôn}. Hence the question how good fortune and rationality may be related is important for the question of whether \textit{eutuchia} may matter for \textit{eudaimonia}.

There are, in principal, three possibilities as to how good fortune and rationality could be related. First, good fortune may be caused or constituted by knowledge itself. This is the view put forward, for example, in the \textit{Euthydemus} (279d6 f.) and Aristotle accordingly relates it to Socrates (1247b14 f.). The view is rejected outright in VIII.2: good fortune is not caused by anything rational (since, for instance, it cannot be acquired by learning). Second, \textit{logos} (in any specification) runs parallel to the impulses leading to good fortune. Neither of them causes the other. Third, \textit{logos} (in some specification) follows or closely interacts with the special impulses as a means for the goal at which the impulses aim.

As regards the second kind of relation (the parallelism), I want to restrict my remarks to the question of the compatibility of non-rational impulses and rationality. The question arises, first, because of the repeated remarks in VIII.2 (mentioned above) that the fortunate person is \textit{aphrôn}: ‘senseless’, ‘silly’, ‘foolish’. But the question also arises because some fortunate people are said to succeed better if their \textit{logos} is disengaged (\textit{apoluesthai} in 1248a39, a40, b2). Being \textit{aphrôn} and having one’s \textit{logos} disengaged does not seem to fit well together with \textit{eudaimonia}. Two points deserve attention here. First, Aristotle could be motivated to stress the lack of rationality of the impulses, since he wants to make sure that good fortune does not \textit{depend} on anything rational. However, his account does not depend on the foolishness of the fortunate person either. It only depends on non-rational elements. And when he says that the fortunate person may succeed even bypassing

\textsuperscript{16} This would distinguish her from the experienced person. A further difference could lie in the relevance of the impulses which is, at least, not obvious in the case of the experienced person. Furthermore, good fortune requires that the object in question is generally regarded to be of some importance—which is not required for the object of, say, an experienced shoemaker. Furthermore, the fortunate person, but not the experienced person needs to be successful with regard to an object which is also a good for him himself.
(para) logos (or reasoning; 1248a3f., a9f.; cf. also 1247b34f.), he does not mean that she may succeed only where she bypasses logos, but that she may succeed where she bypasses logos. Second, we have to distinguish degrees or kinds of good fortune. Some kinds of good fortune are compatible with rationality, while others are not (or less so). On one side, there is the good fortune of the general or that of the navigator (1247a5–7), on the other side there is the good fortune in the case of inspiration (enthousiasmos, 1248a33), of divination (mantikê, 1248a35) or of melancholic people (1248a39f.).

Since we are concerned here with the compatibility of rationality and non-rational good fortune, we have to deal only with the first group of people—the fortunate general or navigator: these are people who possess some expertise or knowledge and who are nevertheless fortunate, that is, non-rationally successful, in the area of their particular expertise. How could the two sources of their success—expertise and non-rational good fortune—be combined? It seems that the general or the navigator are non-rationally successful only insofar as it is required for the portion of success which adds to the other part of success which is due to their specific knowledge. They could not lack logos completely, since there are many parts of their respective tasks that could not be done without technê: the general as such could not lack technê if he is to be a fortunate general. In this case, then, the cognitive state of the eutuchês may occur as an ‘addition’ or ‘extension’ to the cognitive state of the experienced person or of the technician. If Aristotle calls them ‘aphrones’, he only wants to make the point that they are fortunate with regard to certain actions or aspects of actions despite their lack of knowledge with regard to these actions or aspects of actions. He only stresses the fact that their good fortune, taken by itself, is not due to knowledge of any kind (see 1247a13–23, b21–28).\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{17}\) An apparent disadvantage of this distinction of cases of eutuchia is a textual one: we have to assume here a change or narrowing down of the topic which is not indicated (at 1248a32): a change from the general divine principle of action to the principle for the eutuchês (1248a29), and from this to the principle for the eutuchês who is an enthousiast (1248a32) and to the principle for divination. This, however, may become less problematic if we understand 1248a32f. as saying that the non-rational and fortunate people have such a principle which is stronger than thought and deliberation, and that among them there are people who also have enthousiasmos. Similarly, it seems best to regard the case of mantikê (1248a34–39) as a further special case of eutuchia. Furthermore, when in this context Aristotle speaks of the logos as being ‘disengaged’ (in the case of non-rational mantikê and in the case of the melancholikoi, see apoluësthai in 1248a39, a40, b2), he probably wants only to clarify these special cases: for instance, one could think that there is some reason involved in these cases. However, Aristotle explains, this is not so—rather to the contrary: people of this kind ‘function’ better in their specific activity, if logos does not play a part in it. In this case, logos is indeed contrary to eutuchia.
The third kind of relation between good fortune and *logos* (in some specification) is the relation in which *logos* follows or interacts with the impulses and serves as a means for the goal at which the impulses aim. There are two cases with regard to this relation. (a) *logos* (presumably in the form or reasoning) works together with the impulses and together they are successful. This case is not discussed by Aristotle, perhaps since he thinks that it does not raise particular problems and perhaps since it would obscure the independence of impulses with regard to reasoning. (b) In the second case the impulses lead to success *contrary* to reasoning, that is, contrary to ‘bad reasoning’ (so Kenny’s translation for *kakós logisasthai*, 1247b31). How is this to be understood? Does what the fortunate person actually does differ from what she badly planned to do? Do the impulses pass by her bad reasoning? Do they change it?

According to Kenny, the meaning of ‘contrary to bad reasoning’ may be illustrated as follows: someone has the right desire, for instance, for distributive justice; he wrongly conceives of distributive justice as being of kind $J_1$; he badly calculates the distribution; he thereby succeeds in the realisation of justice of the right kind, namely $J_2$. We may call this the ‘doubly-wrong case’. I do not think, though, that this is really an appropriate illustration of fortunate success contrary to bad reasoning. We would rather say that in this case good fortune—if this is a case of good fortune—is due to the miscalculation, not to the impulse, though it was the impulses that were supposed to be the cause of good fortune. In the doubly-wrong case, the prospective fortunate person is not saved by her impulse (unless it was the impulse that *caused* her to miscalculate), but by miscalculating. She is, or seems to be, fortunate, because she miscalculated. Now, since in the respective contexts (in 1247b29–30, 30–32, 33–37) Aristotle is talking about being fortunate because of nature (*dia phusin*, b33f.), we would expect that it is nature that gives the action the decisive twist or drive. The nature in question is the impulse implanted in the agent. If this impulse succeeds contrary to reason, the impulse itself has to be the non-rational impulse (that is, the impulse from non-rational inclination). Thus, it has to be the non-rational impulse, and not the miscalculation, that gives the action the decisive twist or drive.

First of all, however, we would not even call this person ‘fortunate’: she might achieve something truly good, but she does not achieve something she wanted to achieve, namely justice as she conceives of it. And we would

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not call someone ‘fortunate’, who does not achieve what she wanted to achieve, but something different from it, which she considered not only not worth achieving, but also wrong to achieve. True, Aristotle does say that (in one case) the fortunate person wishes for something else or for something smaller than she actually gets (1247b32 f.). But this does not have to be understood (unlike Kenny’s illustration suggests) as saying that the lucky person in this case gets something she does not want when she gets it (imagine how she would despair, once she’s realised what she got).

This is not to say that someone can be fortunate only if she knows and understands what is happening to her. In many cases a person does not register what is happening to her (or is not happening) and is still a fortunate person due to those events. Being fortunate does not require knowing that oneself is fortunate. However, it would be awkward to say that someone is fortunate, if something good happens to her (due to her impulses) which she herself considers as unfortunate. One cannot be fortunate against one’s intentions. (The case is somewhat more complicated, though, since we usually would say that someone can be fortunate against her intentions. For instance, if a person is about to harm herself intentionally, we consider her lucky if someone else just happens to come along who then intentionally or accidentally prevents her from hurting herself. Hence, we need to qualify the state which counts as ‘having intentions’ and to determine who in fact is the person who is hurting herself.)

I suggest that ‘bad reasoning’ simply means ‘insufficient reasoning’: this would be the case if someone does some calculating, but does not have an overview of all the relevant aspects of his action, for instance, because

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19 Another proposal for understanding the case in question has been made by White, ‘Natural Virtue’, 146 f. According to this proposal, the case in question may be well illustrated by the case of Sophocles’ Neoptolemus. Neoptolemus has a certain desire (to get hold of the bow of Philoctetes); persuaded by Odysseus, he chooses the wrong means and deceitfully steals the bow: bad reasoning; he has second thoughts, he repents and gives it back: mission not accomplished; it is only by intervention of Heracles as deus ex machina that Philoctetes is persuaded to accompany the others and to travel (with his bow) to Troy: good result. This seems indeed to be a case of success, of the right impulse and of bad reasoning. However, this is not the whole story: for it does not seem to be a case of good fortune. In this case success is only due to Heracles’s intervening, but it is not due to the impulses.—Johnson’s example for the case in question is ‘the person who reasons badly to the conclusion that he can help his city by setting its weapons on fire. Just when he is aiming the flaming arrow at the city’s catapult, he is suddenly overcome by a desire to shoot the enemy’s catapult. This desire overrides the impulse from his reasoning, and as a result of it, he saves the city’ (s. ‘Luck’, 98). If this did ever happen, it would be a rather awkward setting of impulses, reasoning and success. At the very least, it seems unlikely to me that we would call this person a naturally fortunate person.
he does not properly grasp the situation he is placed in. His calculating or reasoning is simply naive, simple-minded, muddle-headed, confused, besides the point, it is too short (êlithios, 1247b35). It is not the aim of the action that is mistaken, but the reasoning about the means—though, being fortunate, the person achieves the aim nevertheless.

However, Aristotle here also says that the reasoning does not seem to be right (logismos mé dokôn orthos einai, b36). He seems to be indicating something other than naive reasoning. Though reasoning that has short-comings (for instance, in not being specific enough) is not right, describing it as ‘not right’ would presumably not have been Aristotle’s first choice of words.\(^{20}\) Should we then again opt for Kenny’s solution, that is, the doubly-wrong case? I do not see yet a satisfying solution. Doubly-wrong reasoning as such is not caused by impulse, so that not luck, but faulty reasoning is the proper cause of success (if this is success). Merely muddle-headed reasoning is not the same as wrong reasoning. Still, I prefer this second version and suggest that we should understand ‘not right reasoning’ in a somewhat loose sense.\(^{21}\)

The cases in question here are cases in which the impulse, as well as the reasoning, precedes the fortunate success. In a way, the success depends on both, that is, on reasoning also. The reasoning may be, say, poor, or it may be confused. Nonetheless, there is some part of it which leads to success: the reasoning shows to some degree to the right direction. This, at least, seems to be the point in question. When Aristotle speaks about succeeding because of the impulses and contrary to, or in spite of, bad reasoning, he is not concerned with success that is due only to the right impulse, but he is concerned with the way the impulse leads to success in the case of relevant, though poor, reasoning.

If we consider this case, we might come to a further question: how wrong may the reasoning be, if the impulse is still to secure the good result? Aristotle does not say that the impulse would always guarantee success, but that it does so in most cases.\(^{22}\) Which cases are excluded here? Certainly

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20 In 1247b35–37 I follow a reading along Dirlmeier’s text (Eudemische Ethik, 488): ‘kai tous mentoi entautha, hotan men logismos mé dokôn orthos einai, tuchêi d’ autou aitia ousa epitumia, hautê orthê ousa esôsen’ (for a detailed discussion of b35–38 see Michael J. Mills, ‘Aristotle’s Dichotomy of Eutuchia (Eudemian Ethics Θ, 2, 1247b18–1248a15)’, at 287–291; for his own text see 290).

21 Dirlmeier (Eudemische Ethik, 100 f.) translates ‘kakôs logisasthai’ (1247b31) as ‘falsch berechnet zu haben’, ‘logismos ... êlithios’ (b35) as ‘Berechnung [war] unverständig’ and ‘logismos mé ... orthos’ (b36) as ‘Berechnung [war] nicht richtig’ (see also Michael Woods, Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, Books I, II, and VIII, 38, who translates ‘they ... reason badly’, ‘reasoning was idle’ and ‘reasoning appears not to be correct’ accordingly).

22 At 1247b37 f., Aristotle says that ‘on some occasions, a man again reasons in this way
the case where reasoning leads one totally astray, say, by leading south instead of north (despite the best intentions): in this case no impulse could secure success. But this means simply that right impulse is at best a means to success. Aristotle never claims that it is sufficient for it.

To sum up, we have seen that the special impulses of the fortunate person, though themselves being non-rational, may be compatible with the rational part of her. The fact that Aristotle stresses their lack of rationality, if not their irrationality, is likely to be due to his aim of showing that the impulses often succeed without logos: they do not depend on logos of any specification. Still, it does not follow that they could do their work only if logos is excluded. There may be some such cases. But in general, there is no need to suppose the incompatibility of the impulses of good fortune and the rationality of eudaimonia. These impulses may work on their own, they may work parallel and in addition to logos (as in the case of the fortunate general or the fortunate navigator) and, finally, they may work their way through bad logos or reasoning and serve as a useful complement or correction thanks to the special awareness and assessment preceding them.

2.2. Good Fortune and Natural Excellence

The question behind the last section was the question whether good fortune could possibly play a role with regard to eudaimonia, that is, whether they are compatible. A further problem concerning the compatibility may arise if we conceive of the impulses in a certain way. The impulses were supposed to be the basis for natural good fortune. But since it is not clear what kinds of goods natural good fortune brings about, it is not clear, either, what the impulses which are responsible for natural good fortune bring about. So one might ask whether these impulses could also lead to actions such as, say, the excellent person would perform or, as it has been suggested, whether the basis for good fortune is even to be identified with natural excellence.23

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23 For the suggestion see White, ‘Natural Virtue’, 153: ‘[I]f natural luck consists in having regularly good desires and regular success in good pursuits, the excellent state of the natural capacities on which it rests turns out to be a natural form of virtue’.—For connecting the impulses and natural excellence, one might want to draw attention also to the MM.
This would, then, suggest a very close link between the impulses and natural excellence.

This is an important point for two reasons. If the basis for both natural good fortune and natural excellence are the same impulses, this would enrich our picture of good fortune, but also show some limits of the impact which natural good fortune could have for doing well in the proper sense. Unfortunately, however, the project of comparing the impulses of natural excellence and of natural good fortune faces serious obstacles: once more we just do not get enough information about either of them from Aristotle. Still, we should not dismiss the project of comparison outright: to assume some connection is not obviously implausible. And it is certainly worth investigating further, if there is at least some chance of enriching our picture of good fortune in Aristotle.

At a first glance, one might doubt that there could be any connection between natural-excellence- and good-fortune-impulses. For instance, one might argue that the success rate of both differs: natural excellence is blind (it does not yet have practical wisdom), and hence it is—so the argument would go—not often successful (and, in some cases at least, it may be even harmful). On the other side, success is just the point of being fortunate: the fortunate person does not succeed due to chance, but due to nature. She may not always be successful, but perhaps only ἕσος ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, that is, almost always or for the most part, as Aristotle says three times (see 1247a32, a35, b27 f.). Still, this is a high rate of success.

This is not, however, a convincing argument. For one thing, more discussion of what the blindness of natural excellence amounts to is needed. Each natural excellence is most likely restricted to a certain range of options for action: the naturally excellent person is not naturally courageous without limits. Rather, her natural courage most likely implies an awareness and assessment of the situation at hand which limits her action or reaction in accordance with her ends.\textsuperscript{24} Children, or at least some children, may have a good sense for what is just, for sharing, for being courageous etc. At least

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\textsuperscript{24} This point has been made by Anselm Winfried Müller, ‘Aristotle’s Conception of Ethical and Natural Virtue: How the Unity Thesis Sheds Light on the Doctrine of the Mean’, 43 and 46.
some children will be able to recognize to a fairly high degree what is to be done. And they may also have the right kind of impulse for doing it. What they lack is a proper understanding of why this or that is to be done. They do not yet have a proper recognition of what their real ends are. There may be differences in success rate, but there may also be naturally excellent people who are just as successful as the fortunate person. What we should be interested in is the question of whether and, if so, how and how far both groups converge.

Again, one could argue in a similar way as above that, if not the success rate, at least the number of fortunate and of naturally excellent people differs. But even if this were true, what would it show? At most, it would show that there are cases of good fortune by nature that have nothing to do with natural excellence (the reverse claim would be more difficult to establish): but this would not be an exciting observation. The fortunate navigator is fortunate at navigating and as such he is not a naturally excellent person. But this does not diminish at all his good fortune at sailing. What matters is, again, the question of whether, and if so: how far, both groups intersect or converge.

25 It is difficult to tell how many people are fortunate by nature. When Aristotle claims that ‘we see that some (tines) are fortunate’ (1247a3f., see also a9), he seems to suggest that there are not many of them. (The comparison with the naturally gifted singer, who has not been taught how to sing, is about being naturally gifted [s. 1247b22, 26], not about the number of such persons.) If it should be the case that not all natural excellent people are regarded as being naturally fortunate (it is not clear, whether it is the case), then this may simply be so because not all or even many naturally excellent people succeed to a degree sufficient for labelling them ‘fortunate’.

26 The few examples given in EE VIII.2, such as the example of the general and the navigator, are just such cases. We also do not have to understand the right desire of the fortunate person as necessarily being directed towards deeds which are excellent or resemble excellent deeds. It may just be the impulse for doing the right thing at the right time etc.: the navigator, for instance, may have a naturally good intuition about the wind.

27 Further arguments for distinguishing natural excellence and natural good fortune (and their impulses accordingly) also fail. For instance, one might argue that—unlike natural excellence—good fortune ‘concerns matters which are governed by chance or in which chance is a major element’, it concerns things ‘not in our control’ (see Michael Pakaluk, ‘Commentary on White’, at 173). But good fortune does not imply that luck rules: it simply concerns objects which might also be objects of luck. Again, one might argue that natural excellence as well as the impulses of natural good fortune are present right at birth (cf. 1247a10, NE VI.13, 1144b1–17, esp. b6), but that only natural excellence gets transformed later into some state of habituation, while the impulses of natural good fortune may continue to be as they are (for a similar argument see Pakaluk, ibid., 176f.). However, it is simply not clear why we should attribute natural excellence not to adults, too (for natural excellence in adults, see e.g. Müller, ‘Aristotle’s Conception’, 45). Rather, NE VII.8, 1151a18f. in its context supports the assumption that adults may have natural excellence. Furthermore, it is likely that there occur changes
At this point the proponent of the connection between natural excellence and the basis of good fortune himself could come up with a further proposal: if good fortune depends on impulses which themselves depend on (preliminary) awareness and assessment, then it seems that this awareness and assessment could just as well precede those impulses which are constitutive for natural excellence. In this case, the basis for success would not equal natural excellence, but natural excellence with the right preceding awareness and assessment.

One could perhaps object to this interpretation on two counts: first, the awareness and assessment required for good fortune simply refer to certain objects such as those of certain technai, they do not refer to the range of objects with which natural excellence is concerned (as for instance, the object of natural courage); second, the impulse required for good fortune is not of the same kind as the impulse involved in natural excellence. In the first case, the objection presupposes that we know what the object of good fortune is and whether it differs from the object of natural excellence. In the second case, we would have to know whether the impulses differ. However, both are just what we wanted to know in the first place, so the objection can be said to beg the question in this sense.

In the end, we can only state that there is no good reason to read a close connection of natural excellence and good fortune into EE VIII.2—even though the possibility of this connection could not be denied outright. First, the MM and the NE explicitly connect only good fortune and external goods (cf. NE VII.13, 1153b14–25, MM II.8, especially 1206b30–36, 1207b16–18). Second, the common view referred to in the first part of EE VIII.2 (1246b37–1247a31) identifies the objects of eutuchia and the objects of tuchê (though not eutuchia and tuchê themselves). The whole section does not give any reason to think that this view is anywhere concerned with natural excellence. Third, if Aristotle were concerned in EE VIII.2 with natural excellence and with the impulses as its basis, it would be surprising that he never makes this explicit—given that it would be a most important addition to his theory of excellence, if one could acquire eupragia via natural impulses. We would at least expect—if not a revocation of this view—a discussion or, at the very least, an indication of some of its difficulties. For these reasons I suggest to stick to the reading suggested by the NE and the MM and to determine external goods as the objects of good fortune (I will

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with the impulses in both cases: for instance, in the case of eutuchia—inducing impulses of, say, a general, these impulses will have to develop—the newborn child is not yet a fortunate general.
argue for this just below). And for the present purpose we may simply leave it open whether we could still extend the range of objects with which eutuchia is concerned to the products and deeds of natural excellence.

3. Does Good Fortune Matter for Eudaimonia?

In 2.1 above, we saw that good fortune could significantly support rational action, and its impulses are compatible with rationality. In 2.2, we speculated about one way in which good fortune may matter for eudaimonia. The question of whether good fortune does matter for eudaimonia now needs some further thought. For this, we have, first, to go back one step and to discuss in more detail what good fortune is concerned with according to the EE: what are the immediate objects of the impulses leading to good fortune? In what kind of success does it consist? Second, given these objects, we will want to know how eudaimonia and good fortune integrate with regard to their common basis, namely the individual’s nature.

First, then, let us take a closer look at what the objects of the impulses are that lead to good fortune. The MM told us that good fortune matters, since eudaimonia depends on external goods. So, good fortune seems to be concerned with external goods of various kinds. As the MM tells us, these external goods are said to be under the control of luck (cf. MM II.8, 1206b33 f.). Similarly the EE tells us that fortunate people succeed in many things, ‘in which luck is decisive’ (EE VIII.2, 1247a5, tr. Woods). The EE leaves it open here as to whether good fortune pertains also to goods which are not under the control of luck, or to goods that may both be due to luck as well as to some other cause. Among the goods of which luck is in control there are (certain) successes in the domain of technai and these, at least, seem to be external goods as well. Examples for these are the technê of the general and the technê of the navigator (1247a5–7), whose goods are, for instance, victory or safe journey respectively. (Again, the EE leaves it open whether there is good fortune for technê of every kind or only for some technai.) In any case, good fortune does seem to cover external goods, though—as in the case of the navigator or the general—also immaterial external goods.

At first, however, it might seem that external goods do not play an important role within the Eudemian theory of eudaimonia. In contrast to the MM, the discussion of good fortune in the EE is not introduced as a dis-

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28 These are also the reasons for my reading of 1246b37 f. (see above).
discussion that would concern external goods. In contrast to the \textit{NE}, there is no special discussion of whether external goods are relevant for \textit{eudaimonia}. Still, this does not mean that they are not relevant for \textit{eudaimonia} in the \textit{EE}.\footnote{The \textit{EE} does mention external goods only twice by name: II.1, 1218b32, VIII.3, 1249a15. They may also fall under other names, for instance, (together with other goods) ‘\textit{physei agatha’}, s. e.g. VII.2, 1237b31, 1238a17, VIII.3, 1248b27, b29, b40.} In \textit{EE} I.2 Aristotle distinguishes necessary conditions and parts of \textit{eudaimonia} and seems to include external goods among the necessary conditions (cf. 1214b11–14). In \textit{EE} VIII.3, external goods more obviously play a role in the discussion of the standard which holds for the good person (the \textit{spoudaios}) in her dealing with external goods (see 1249a21–b23). The standard set there is the very activity which is constitutive for the good person as such. It is with regard to external goods that this standard is elaborated: it is the activity of the good person which is to be optimally supported by those external goods. The \textit{EE} does not discuss the question whether external goods are relevant for \textit{eudaimonia}: it simply assumes that they are.\footnote{For a discussion of \textit{EE} VIII.3, 1249a21–b25 see Friedemann Buddensiek, \textit{Die Theorie des Glücks in Aristoteles’ Eudemischer Ethik}, and ‘Contemplation and service of the god: The standard for external goods in \textit{Eudemian Ethics} VIII.3’.
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Thus, external goods are relevant for \textit{eudaimonia}. But is good fortune relevant as well? After all, there are other ways of obtaining the external goods required for \textit{eudaimonia}. The answer has already been indicated above: good fortune makes it far easier to obtain those external goods. The fortunate person does not have to worry about them—for her, success is effortless. However, good fortune makes access to the external goods far easier only if it is deeply rooted in the nature of the fortunate person. And this may be one reason why Aristotle discusses, and argues at great length for, the naturalness of good fortune (at least of some kind).

That is, Aristotle may have wanted to explore the thought, whether the notion of \textit{eutuchia} could be integrated into a theory of \textit{eudaimonia} (or \textit{eupragia}), for instance, insofar as \textit{eutuchia} significantly facilitates the acquisition of external goods which are required for \textit{eudaimonia}. However, if \textit{eutuchia} is to be helpful, it has to be continuous and steady—which will be the case only if the basis for \textit{eutuchia} is an integral part of the natural, hylomorphic structure of the individual (given that there is no other source for it). This, then, could be the main reason, why Aristotle asks about the natural origin of good fortune: the question is not simply whether good fortune is natural, but whether good fortune is as natural as \textit{eudaimonia}.
The basis for this ‘integral’ view is the idea, put forward in EE I.7, that
doing well depends on the nature of the individual, that is, on the nature of a
human being as such. Anything else that belongs to the individual due to its
nature stands in some relation to the individual’s nature, which is the basis
for the individual’s doing well. I conclude with a brief survey of some aspects
involved in the relation between good fortune, doing well and eudaimonia,
as Aristotle may have thought of them.

First, being due to nature, good fortune is independent of the theoi and
of luck. It is thus not due to some supernatural or external principle. There
is nothing in the kind of doing well caused or supported by it which is not in
some way or other due to the individual’s nature. And if good fortune is due
to nature and if it is a natural supplement to eudaimonia, that is, to the state
of an individual which is its true nature, then there is not anything in the
resulting overall doing well of that individual that would not have its origin
in a principle in the individual itself. Eudaimonia may thus be attributed to
the individual even if it should, to some extent, require good fortune, or if it
should be supplemented by good fortune.

Second, being due to nature, good fortune is open to explanation (at least
in principle). Someone may be merely fortunate (by nature) or someone
may be doing well as an eudaimôn and may additionally be fortunate:
in either case can we understand what it is to be fortunate. But we also
understand better what eudaimonia is, if, and insofar as, it depends on
natural good fortune. There are no explanatory gaps in any kind of doing
well only because good fortune of this kind is involved.

Third, and more important, if in the case of the fortunate person there
is nothing that does not have its principle in the individual in some way or
other, then being an eudaimôn still allows for the unity of the eudaimôn,
even if eudaimonia depends on good fortune. Despite the dependence on
external goods, either for the performance of fine actions, or even as some-
thing with some intrinsic value, the eudaimôn possesses some kind of
unity. There are not two ‘agents’ responsible for the doing well of this one

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31 See the distinction which Annas, Morality, 378, draws between the ‘internal-use view’
and the ‘external-use view’ (taken by herself and others). According to the former view,
external goods have only instrumental value, according to the latter view, they have also
some ‘intrinsic value of their own’ (ibid., 381). I am not yet sure which side we should take
here with regard to the EE. The question is also not easily decided if we take account of VIII.3,
1249a5–14, where Aristotle says that external goods are fine for the kalokagathos. This could
mean that external goods are ‘ennobled’ and thus become noble, if they are used in the right
way.
individual. Similarly, now seen from the perspective of the fortunate person, we would not be justified in calling someone ‘fortunate’, if she succeeds in something that does not fit into the overall structure of her capacities and activities that belong to her as a human being: someone like this would not resemble someone who is doing well. This is also why someone does not count as fortunate who is continuously and intrinsically bad, but who succeeds in anything required for being such a person: his life considered as a whole is not successful. So, good fortune, too, needs some positively qualified unity, and **eudaimonia** is certainly the best unified state available for an individual.

The **eudaimôn**–plus–**eutuchês** is not, or not only, at the mercy of some external fate. She is someone who continuously, and very easily, gets it right when it comes to procuring the material support for the activities that constitute the happy life. She is better off than someone who has to struggle for that material support since he lacks any intuition in obtaining it. The advantage of the person who is **eudaimôn**–plus–**eutuchês** over the person who is merely **eudaimôn** (if there is any such a person) is that the former just does not have to worry about the material support for her being **eudaimôn**: she just gets it right, in most cases. Good fortune matters, because it helps making the good life effortless. It achieves this insofar as it is rooted—in the individual's nature. In this way, it is also integrated into the overall unity of capacities and activities attributable to the good person and it is thus (by being integrated and by reducing necessary efforts) that it plays a crucial role for **eudaimonia**—though in a way quite different from the way the many had in mind when they said that good fortune produces doing well.

Yet, one might assume an even closer connection between **eutuchia** and **eudaimonia**. According to this assumption **eutuchia** would not just be a welcome support with regard to external goods: its contribution to **eudaimonia** would go far deeper, in that the impulses underlying it even affect, and contribute to, virtuous actions. While good fortune, so one might think, is not (not obviously) connected with natural excellence, it still has a close, and explicit, connection with virtuous actions. A reason for taking this view could be this: Aristotle himself suggests that desire (**epithumia**), a non-rational inclination for the pleasant, is the basis for impulses, and he seems to think that these impulses are those of the **eutucheis** who succeed, due to their nature, without **logos**. Yet, the desiring in question is said to be for that object and taking place at that time and in that way as it is supposed to (VIII.2, 1247b18–28; also 1248a5ff., a16ff.). And this is just the wording Aristotle uses persistently to express the idea that some behaviour...
or action is in accordance with excellence (for instance, EE II.3). The actions of the *eutuchês* thus seem even to include virtuous actions.\(^\text{32}\)

However, this cannot be right. As such, the actions of the *eutuchês* are not actions properly speaking: as actions of the *eutuchês* as well as actions arising from *epithumia*, they do not involve *logismos* or any kind of *logos*—which, however, would be a prerequisite for something to be an action (II.8, 1224a28–30; also b2). As actions—or rather, doings—following from non-rational desire, they do not involve choice (*prohairesis*, II.10, 1225b26–31; VIII.2, 1247b28–30 has to be a rather loose way of speaking), which, again, is a prerequisite for something to be a virtuous action. At best—and this is all Aristotle can have in mind here—these doings have the same good results as virtuous actions have: in this sense, they are as they should be.

Yet, what kind of good is it that those doings bring about? According to 1247b20, the result is something pleasant. Pleasure, in turn, is a psychic good (II.1, 1218b34 f.), though not an excellence of the soul (see 1220a4 f.). Thus the thought would be that the *eutucheis* most of the time get the object of their desire, and the (non-rational) pleasure following from it, right, though without having the disposition of, say, *sôphrosunê*. Where most people need education and habituation, the *eutucheis*, due to their natural constitution, simply evaluate the right objects of desire in the appropriate way—without realising what they are doing. Is this *eutuchia*, then, concerned with some psychic good (pleasure) or with external goods (objects of pleasure)? In

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\(^{32}\) This view might also include some expectations as to the effect that *EE* VIII.2 had something to contribute to aspects of contemporary discussions on moral luck: in becoming virtuous, the person who is naturally fortunate enough to desire the right objects in the right way seems to have ‘a head start, since she [has] better natural impulses’ (Annas, *Morality*, p. 76). She is just better off with regard to her constitution. This might raise problems then, for instance, concerning the evaluation of her constitution or concerning the questions to whom her success as well as the excellence of her actions are to be attributed and whether she herself would attribute them to herself (the *MM* seems to doubt the self-attribution and frankly denies the objective accountability: *tuchê* and *eutuchia* are among the things that are not up to us, s. II.8, 1207a8–20, b1–3).

However, the limits of construing the treatment of *eutuchia* in *EE* VIII.2 as making a contribution to the discussion of moral luck soon become apparent. Whatever way it is, in which *eutuchia* may support or contribute to *eudaimonia*, Aristotle does not discuss, nor does he hint at a discussion of, how the success that comes with it is to be attributed and evaluated. *eutuchia* would certainly not be an object of praise—the most important kind of evaluation in the *EE*: there is, in the *EE*, no reason to assume that praise is awarded to anything else than to ethical or dianoetical excellence and actions deriving from them (s. II.1, 1220a4–8, VIII.3, 1248b16–26). Aristotle’s interest in *eutuchia* is not (at least not explicitly) motivated by the question of how to judge or evaluate a life or a doing, insofar as it depends on *eutuchia*. For a critical view of the value *EE* VIII.2 might have as a contribution to a discussion of moral luck see also Kenny, *Perfect Life*, p. 76 and Annas, *Morality*, p. 377.
a way, both. Though I would still think that the focus is on the way the eutuchês deals with external goods (pleasant objects), not on the pleasure they provide. What is important, though, is the fact that the eutuchês as such does not possess any excellence of the soul. He does perhaps the same things as the virtuous person, but he is not virtuous.

As for the eudaimôn, then, the interpretation given above might still stand: it is not necessary for him to be a eutuchês with regard to desire. Being a eutuchês might make his handling of pleasant objects easier, but eudaimonia does not depend on eutuchia.

Again, one might object to these remarks that the purpose of the chapter is simply not to connect eutuchia and eudaimonia, but rather to contrast them, to show how much they differ and to argue that the view (as proposed in EE I.1) that eutuchia leads to doing well or to eudaimonia is simply wrong. However, if this were Aristotle’s purpose here it would be difficult to explain why in fact he does not explore the various differences between eutuchia and eudaimonia, but rather follows at length the quite different question concerning the naturalness of good fortune. One could reply that in establishing the true origin of (natural) good fortune, Aristotle also establishes the difference between good fortune and eudaimonia, which has a different origin. Still, it would be difficult to explain why in the end Aristotle introduces a starting-point which is the same for any psychic activity alike, namely the divine within us. Again, one could reply that Aristotle had had to introduce this starting-point before he could proceed to discuss the naturally fortunate person insofar as she is related to it—which then again distinguishes her from the eudaimôn.

Unfortunately, we will not be able to establish whether the chapter has any purpose beside discussing the natural origin of good fortune. Apart from the first sentence of the chapter, there is no explicit link in VIII.2 between good fortune and doing well, neither affirmative nor negative, and there is no explicit link between good fortune and eudaimonia anywhere in VIII.2. Nevertheless, I regard it as charitable to apply Aristotle’s own methodological principle provided in I 6, namely the principle that we have to take seriously the established views and ought to look for any truth they may contain. I cannot think of any other reason why he would have discussed eutuchia in the EE than because he wanted to lead us to a deeper understanding of the traditional view that connects it with eudaimonia as well as of its presuppositions and limitations, but also its merits.
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